homepage
Open menu Go one level top
  • Train and Certify
    • Get Started in Cyber
    • Courses & Certifications
    • Training Roadmap
    • Search For Training
    • Online Training
    • OnDemand
    • Live Training
    • Summits
    • Cyber Ranges
    • College Degrees & Certificates
    • NICE Framework
    • DoDD 8140
    • Specials
  • Manage Your Team
    • Overview
    • Group Purchasing
    • Why Work with SANS
    • Build Your Team
    • Hire Cyber Talent
    • Team Development
    • Private Training
    • Security Awareness Training
    • Leadership Training
    • Industries
  • Resources
    • Overview
    • Reading Room
    • Webcasts
    • Newsletters
    • Blog
    • Tip of The Day
    • Posters
    • Top 25 Programming Errors
    • The Critical Security Controls
    • Security Policy Project
    • Critical Vulnerability Recaps
    • Affiliate Directory
  • Focus Areas
    • Blue Team Operations
    • Cloud Security
    • Digital Forensics & Incident Response
    • Industrial Control Systems
    • Leadership
    • Offensive Operations
  • Get Involved
    • Overview
    • Work Study
    • Teach for SANS
    • Partnerships
    • Sponsorship Opportunities
    • Join the Community
  • About
    • About SANS
    • Instructors
    • Mission
    • Initiatives
    • Diversity
    • Awards
    • Contact
    • Frequently Asked Questions
    • Customer Reviews
    • Press
  • Log In
  • Join
  • Contact Us
  • SANS Sites
    • GIAC Security Certifications
    • Internet Storm Center
    • SANS Technology Institute
    • Security Awareness Training
  • Search
  1. Home >
  2. Blog >
  3. Control Panel Forensics: Evidence of Time Manipulation and More
370x370_Chad-Tilbury.jpg
Chad Tilbury

Control Panel Forensics: Evidence of Time Manipulation and More

June 5, 2013

The GUI control panel is a long standing feature of Microsoft Windows, facilitating granular changes to a vast collection of system features. It can be disabled via Group Policy but is largely available to most user accounts (administrative permissions are required for some changes). From a forensic perspective, we can audit control panel usage to identify a wide range of user activity:

  • Firewall changes made for unauthorized software (firewall.cpl)
  • User account additions / modifications (nusrmgr.cpl)
  • Turning off System Restore / Volume Shadow Copies (sysdm.cpl)
  • System time changes (timedate.cpl)
  • Interaction with third-party security software applets

While identifying individual system modifications is difficult, at a minimum we can show that a user accessed a specific control panel applet at a specific time. Context provided by other artifacts may provide further information. As an example, imagine you were reviewing control panel usage on a system and came across Figure 1.

image.png
Figure 1: Sample Userassist Output

Context is critical, and, while access to the Windows Security Center might not normally be particularly interesting, the fact that it was accessed immediately following the execution of a known (router) password cracking tool might make all the difference.

A Brief Overview of the Control Panel

The Windows control panel is implemented as a series of applets, each represented by a ?.cpl' file. Applets are commonly stored in the %system root%\System32 folder. The system binary 'control.exe' is the control panel application and is used to open applets. However, like many Windows actions, there are a seemingly endless number of ways to access an applet:

  • GUI Control Panel
  • Start -> Run dialog
  • Task bar (e.g. "Adjust date/time")
  • Command prompt (control.exe timedate.cpl)
  • Typing "Control Panel" on the Windows 8 start screen
  • ?

Unfortunately, different access methods can lead to different artifacts. In some cases, an artifact may not be stored at all depending on the method of applet execution and version of Windows. Luckily, control panel artifacts are recorded in multiple places, and one or more are usually available to identify the activity.

Evidence of Control Panel Applet Execution

Windows Prefetch

Windows prefetch tracks application execution. Due to the way applets are opened, they do not garner their own.pf file in C:\Windows\Prefetch. It might make sense that Control.exe would provide evidence of applet execution, but sadly its prefetch file only alerts us to the fact that the control panel was opened (and it only exists in certain circumstances). To determine the specific applet executed, we have to dig deeper. If an applet has been executed, one (or more) RunDLL32.exe prefetch files will contain a reference. Multiple RunDLL32 prefetch files referencing the same applet indicate the applet was launched using different methods. This can be caused by case sensitivity used by the prefetch hash computation algorithm (nicely outlined in the Hexacorn blog here). Depending on the applet and how it was spawned, a DLLHost.exe prefetch file may also include a reference. Searching for these references within the myriad RunDLL32 and DLLHost prefetch files can be laborious, but if they exist, you will be rewarded with the first time, last time, and number of times the applet was run on the system.

image.png
Figure 2: RunDLL32 Prefetch Contents

In Figure 2, information embedded in the RUNDLL32.EXE-2F51D544.pf file tells us that the Date and Time applet was last executed on April 6, 2013 at 4:14:58am UTC and has been run at least once on the system. TIP: While you are poking around in those RunDLL32 prefetch entries, keep an eye out for other system applications of interest such as Microsoft Management Console plugins (i.e. COMPMGMT.MSC). The excellent prefetch tool shown in Figure 2 is by Mark Woan.

Windows Registry: Userassist (XP/Vista Only)

While prefetch files are one of the more reliable artifacts showing applet execution, a significant drawback is they do not specifically tie actions to a user. Since the userassist key is located in a user's NTUSER.dat hive it allows us to tie activity directly to an account. The full path of the key is:

NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current\Version\Explorer\UserAssist

image.png
Figure 3: Userassist Contents Showing Control Panel Applet Execution

Figure 3 shows control panel usage recorded on a Windows XP system. Notice the "UEME_RUNCPL" preface in each userassist entry. This is a unique identifier used within pre-Windows 7 userassist to denote control panel applet execution. In this case, we see four different applets have been run by this user a combined total of 10 times. The time and date applet was last run by the user on 4/5/2013 at 21:41:41 PM. (The userassist tool seen in Figure 3 was written by the inimitable Didier Stevens).

Userassist underwent significant changes with the release of Windows 7. Control panel applet access is no longer reliably recorded within Win7/Win8 userassist. Luckily we can use a unique Windows 7 artifact, jumplists, to retrieve similar information.

Win7/Win8 Jumplists

image.png

Jumplists are one of the more exciting artifacts found in the post-Windows 7 world, and surprisingly even the Windows control panel records information within them. If you aren't including jumplists in your examinations, you need to start. Harlan Carvey has done a tremendous job educating the community on their efficacy and has some great blog posts to get you started.

To gather jumplist information related to the control panel, look for a jumplist named according to the well-known control panel application identifier, 7e4dca80246863e3 (Forensic Wiki). The full path of the jumplist will look like:

%user profile%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\ AutomaticDestinations\7e4dca80246863e3.automaticDestinations-ms

Note that jumplists are unique to each user profile.

Jumplister_orig.jpg

Figure 4: Contents of Control Panel Jumplist (Windows 8)

The Windows 8 jumplist contents shown in Figure 4 illustrate an important point. Each control panel applet is assigned a Windows class identifier (CLSID) in the form of a globally unique identifier (GUID). As evidenced in the output from the Windows 8 system here, jumplists use the applet CLSID to record execution. It turns out that {E2E7934B-DCE5-43C4-9576-7FE4F75E7480} is the assigned CLSID/GUID for timedate.cpl. MSDN provides a mapping of applets and GUID associations here. Including GUIDs of interest within your string searches is a recommended best practice. Using this information, we see timedate.cpl was last run on April 5, 2013 at 6:53:33 AM by the owner of this particular jumplist. Unlike prefetch and userassist, we do not get additional information such as first time executed or number of times executed (though leveraging Volume Shadow Copies could provide similar information). The Jumplister tool shown here is also by Mark Woan.

Putting it All Together — Evidence of Time Manipulation

Now let's look at a complete scenario. Imagine during routine event log analysis, you find the following event:

EventLog_TimeModification.jpg

You do a simple calculation and notice 864001 seconds is equal to just about 10 days. Looking at prefetch files last modified approximately 10 days after 3/28/2013, you find the following:

Prefetch_Timedate.jpg

At this point, we have some strong evidence that the system time has been modified. The only remaining question is what user account performed the change? Looking at userassist for the suspect account, you find the final piece of evidence:

Userassist_Timedate.jpg

TIP: If the system audit policy was set to log successful System Events, you would also see evidence of the time change in your Security Event Log, complete with the user account who made the change.

Well-known forensic artifacts can easily show a user account accessed a control panel applet like timedate.cpl. Proving what changes were made within that applet and why may require additional context. For example, in the case of a user setting the clock backwards to pre-date a contract, we might review control panel usage, event logs, document metadata and file system time stamp anomalies to tell the complete story.

Chad Tilbury, GCFA, has spent over twelve years conducting computer crime investigations ranging from hacking to espionage to multi-million dollar fraud cases. He teaches FOR408 Windows Forensics and FOR508 Advanced Computer Forensic Analysis and Incident Response for the SANS Institute. Find him on Twitter @chadtilbury or at http://forensicmethods.com.

Share:
TwitterLinkedInFacebook
Copy url Url was copied to clipboard
Subscribe to SANS Newsletters
Join the SANS Community to receive the latest curated cybersecurity news, vulnerabilities, and mitigations, training opportunities, plus our webcast schedule.
United States
Canada
United Kingdom
Spain
Belgium
Denmark
Norway
Netherlands
Australia
India
Japan
Singapore
Afghanistan
Aland Islands
Albania
Algeria
American Samoa
Andorra
Angola
Anguilla
Antarctica
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Aruba
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belize
Benin
Bermuda
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba
Bosnia And Herzegovina
Botswana
Bouvet Island
Brazil
British Indian Ocean Territory
Brunei Darussalam
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Cayman Islands
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
China
Christmas Island
Cocos (Keeling) Islands
Colombia
Comoros
Cook Islands
Costa Rica
Croatia (Local Name: Hrvatska)
Curacao
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
East Timor
East Timor
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Falkland Islands (Malvinas)
Faroe Islands
Fiji
Finland
France
French Guiana
French Polynesia
French Southern Territories
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Gibraltar
Greece
Greenland
Grenada
Guadeloupe
Guam
Guatemala
Guernsey
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Heard And McDonald Islands
Honduras
Hong Kong
Hungary
Iceland
Indonesia
Iraq
Ireland
Isle of Man
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Jersey
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Kiribati
Korea, Republic Of
Kosovo
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Lao People's Democratic Republic
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macau
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Marshall Islands
Martinique
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mayotte
Mexico
Micronesia, Federated States Of
Moldova, Republic Of
Monaco
Mongolia
Montenegro
Montserrat
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nauru
Nepal
Netherlands Antilles
New Caledonia
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Niue
Norfolk Island
Northern Mariana Islands
Oman
Pakistan
Palau
Palestine
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Pitcairn
Poland
Portugal
Puerto Rico
Qatar
Reunion
Romania
Russian Federation
Rwanda
Saint Bartholemy
Saint Kitts And Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Martin
Saint Vincent And The Grenadines
Samoa
San Marino
Sao Tome And Principe
Senegal
Serbia
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Sint Maarten
Slovakia (Slovak Republic)
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
South Africa
South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands
South Sudan
Sri Lanka
St. Helena
St. Pierre And Miquelon
Suriname
Svalbard And Jan Mayen Islands
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tokelau
Tonga
Trinidad And Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Turks And Caicos Islands
Tuvalu
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United States Minor Outlying Islands
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Vatican City
Venezuela
Vietnam
Virgin Islands (British)
Virgin Islands (U.S.)
Wallis And Futuna Islands
Western Sahara
Yemen
Yugoslavia
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Tags:
  • Digital Forensics and Incident Response

Related Content

Blog
DFIR_FOR509_Countdown_Social4.jpg
Digital Forensics and Incident Response, Cloud Security
April 9, 2021
NEW FOR509: Enterprise Cloud Forensics & Incident Response - Beta coming June 2021
The new Enterprise Cloud Forensics course brings examiners up to speed with the rapidly changing world of enterprise cloud
SANS DFIR
read more
Blog
3_Min_Max_(58).png
Digital Forensics and Incident Response
March 30, 2021
3MinMax Series Topic Review - Apple Acquisition
Apple devices that we must be aware of in order to perform forensic acquisitions
370x370_Kevin-Ripa.jpg
Kevin Ripa
read more
Blog
3_Min_Max_(56).png
Digital Forensics and Incident Response
March 30, 2021
3MinMax Series Topic Review - Using KAPE in Forensics
KAPE is an efficient and highly configurable triage program that will target essentially any device or storage location, find forensically
370x370_Kevin-Ripa.jpg
Kevin Ripa
read more
  • Register to Learn
  • Courses
  • Certifications
  • Degree Programs
  • Cyber Ranges
  • Job Tools
  • Security Policy Project
  • Posters
  • The Critical Security Controls
  • Focus Areas
  • Blue Team Operations
  • Cloud Security
  • Cybersecurity Leadership
  • Digital Forensics
  • Industrial Control Systems
  • Offensive Operations
Subscribe to SANS Newsletters
Join the SANS Community to receive the latest curated cybersecurity news, vulnerabilities, and mitigations, training opportunities, plus our webcast schedule.
United States
Canada
United Kingdom
Spain
Belgium
Denmark
Norway
Netherlands
Australia
India
Japan
Singapore
Afghanistan
Aland Islands
Albania
Algeria
American Samoa
Andorra
Angola
Anguilla
Antarctica
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Aruba
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belize
Benin
Bermuda
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba
Bosnia And Herzegovina
Botswana
Bouvet Island
Brazil
British Indian Ocean Territory
Brunei Darussalam
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Cayman Islands
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
China
Christmas Island
Cocos (Keeling) Islands
Colombia
Comoros
Cook Islands
Costa Rica
Croatia (Local Name: Hrvatska)
Curacao
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
East Timor
East Timor
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Falkland Islands (Malvinas)
Faroe Islands
Fiji
Finland
France
French Guiana
French Polynesia
French Southern Territories
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Gibraltar
Greece
Greenland
Grenada
Guadeloupe
Guam
Guatemala
Guernsey
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Heard And McDonald Islands
Honduras
Hong Kong
Hungary
Iceland
Indonesia
Iraq
Ireland
Isle of Man
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Jersey
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Kiribati
Korea, Republic Of
Kosovo
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Lao People's Democratic Republic
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macau
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Marshall Islands
Martinique
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mayotte
Mexico
Micronesia, Federated States Of
Moldova, Republic Of
Monaco
Mongolia
Montenegro
Montserrat
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nauru
Nepal
Netherlands Antilles
New Caledonia
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Niue
Norfolk Island
Northern Mariana Islands
Oman
Pakistan
Palau
Palestine
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Pitcairn
Poland
Portugal
Puerto Rico
Qatar
Reunion
Romania
Russian Federation
Rwanda
Saint Bartholemy
Saint Kitts And Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Martin
Saint Vincent And The Grenadines
Samoa
San Marino
Sao Tome And Principe
Senegal
Serbia
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Sint Maarten
Slovakia (Slovak Republic)
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
South Africa
South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands
South Sudan
Sri Lanka
St. Helena
St. Pierre And Miquelon
Suriname
Svalbard And Jan Mayen Islands
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tokelau
Tonga
Trinidad And Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Turks And Caicos Islands
Tuvalu
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United States Minor Outlying Islands
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Vatican City
Venezuela
Vietnam
Virgin Islands (British)
Virgin Islands (U.S.)
Wallis And Futuna Islands
Western Sahara
Yemen
Yugoslavia
Zambia
Zimbabwe
  • © 2021 SANS™ Institute
  • Privacy Policy
  • Contact
  • Twitter
  • Facebook
  • Youtube
  • LinkedIn