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Intel IXP Network Processor Based Intrusion Detection

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**Intel IXP Network Processor Based Intrusion
Detection**

Gold Certification

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Abstract

Intrusion Detection is a very important part of network security, and with the increasing bandwidth in large scale networks, Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems must scale to handle the large internal LAN links. Common server and desktop hardware does not have the throughput to handle 10Gb/s network connections, so specialized hardware is required. The Intel IXP series Network Processor is one such system with the throughput to manage these network connections. This paper will introduce the IXP series processors as well as outline the steps to create a functioning Snort based IDS on the IXP 425.

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Introduction

Network Processors range in ability from simple interface cards in home computers to the large scale interfaces in core network routers and switches. Network Processors are nothing more than specialized processors with instruction sets designed to operate on packetized data such as that commonly seen on a network. These instruction sets allow these processors to handle billions of packets a second with relatively low clock speeds less than 1GHz. These processors can function as a small embedded system like the Intel IXP4xx series does, or can be a component of a much larger system. In larger systems these processors offload the handling of the TCP/IP stack from the main processor of the system allowing higher order functions to consume the main CPU's time. This can be done by inserting a card into a standard system's PCI bus as is done by the IXP2850 or as integrated components similarly to the implementation of Cisco Network processing engines.

The Cisco Network Processor line is highly proprietary, and is not released for use by independent groups. The Intel line of Network Processors however is used in both proprietary systems as well as custom applications. The availability of the IXP series and very controlled release of Cisco Network Processors limits the focus of this paper to the Intel systems.

Network Processors have many uses in today's security and performance based networking world. With the increase

in applications and use of the internet the average home internet connection has gone from dialup modems in the late nineties to high speed eight to twelve Mb/s links going to the home. If this bandwidth is summed for a small neighborhood it can easily be seen how larger cities would need high speed capabilities. The original routers were simple UNIX hosts that knew where to send the packet along the path to the next host. From there specialty hosts were required to keep up with the increasing demand. These specialty hosts became the first of the routers that later evolved into Network Processor based devices. Now Network Processors are even more specialized with some designed for cryptography, others with reduced instruction sets for speed.

Routers often use these Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) Network Processors in conjunction with Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) to handle their load. The packet enters through the interface, is passed to the Network Processor for initial inspection, this inspection includes checksum calculations and access control list application. Next the packet is passed on to either the backplane of the router for forwarding to another interface or to the high speed ASICs for manipulation. ASICs are used today for network address translation, packet routing decisions, and route table calculation.

Firewalls started as routers with access control and have developed into specialized hardware. They are still very similar to the router, but have much more processing

power. This additional processing power along with increased memory allows the firewalls to do multi-layer analysis. This analysis takes place in the Network Processor. The packet can be picked apart, and sorted out by any component in the packet. Network Processors are able to follow a packet stream just like a human can with logic structures that allow for streams to be classified and for packets to be dropped, passed or even modified. These Network Processors are specialized to handle packets at the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) layer as well as the Internet Protocol (IP) layer, where their router based brethren are specialized for the lower network layers only.

Other specialized Network Processors are also used in high end network interfaces. Most of these are designed to serve out content on high bandwidth systems; however there is one Network Processor based interface system designed for the online gaming market. This interface card by Bigfoot Networks called Killer allows the customization of the network stack and separates out the network communication allowing the central processing unit to handle the game without hardware interrupts from the network interface card while the Killer NIC handles the interrupts and prioritizes packets. It has been shown to reduce ping latency by up to 35% in games like World of Warcraft. This also brings to light one unusual benefit of using a Network Processor. They do not have to play by normal network rules. Network Processors have the ability to manipulate any field in a packet, or to re-order packets exiting the system. Some individuals have been known to exploit this flexibility and change the way games measure

their connectivity. Often algorithms give a slight edge to gamers with a slower (higher latency) connection to even out the playing field. This is often measured by the echo time to a host. Increasing this latency, while keeping the data rates the same for all other communication can allow an in-game advantage.

Intel Based Network Processors

Intel Network Processors are made up of two main parts, a general execution core and one or more Network Processing Engines (NPE). The NPEs are connected directly to the layer 1 interfaces and handle all of the packet based instructions. Figure 1 includes a diagram of a Network Processing Engine from an IXP 1200. The general execution core is typically an Intel XScale processor of varying abilities.




Figure 1. Micro Engine Diagram

(IXP425 XScale Development Kit for Embedded Linux - Arcom, 2007).

Intel Network Processors are broken into three main categories, the 4xx series, 12xx series and 2xxx series. The 4xx series has three NPEs and one general instruction core provided by an XScale processor running at up to 533MHz. The NPEs provided on this system are of fixed configuration that is accessed through specific libraries and an API provided by Intel to the vendors of the completed systems. Each of the NPEs in this device is capable of handling 100Mb/s full duplex Ethernet data rates and 70Mb/s encrypted data rates. The 4xx series is

targeted for Small Office/Home Office applications and is often used to make light weight security, gateway and application servers.




Figure 2. IXP 425 Network Processor
(Intel IXP425 Network Processor, 2007).

The 12xx series contains six programmable NPEs and one StrongARM processor. This configuration allows custom applications to be run from the NPE allowing packets to be handled without Operating System kernel contact. The increase in Network Processors allows this device to have a total throughput of 6.26Gb/s. Each NPE has a 2K instruction store to reduce processor overhead. The main processing is handled by a StrongARM 166, 200 or 232 MHz processor. The 12xx series is targeted to the higher level systems with line rate OC12 interfaces available for voice and data communications.




Figure 3. IXP 1200 Network Processor
 (Intel IXP1200 Network Processor Family, 2007).

The 2xxx series is much more powerful than either of the other Network Processor lines released by Intel. This processor was designed for high end routing, switching and security applications. With ten 1Gb/s interfaces available or one 10Gb/s on the 2855 model this series is capable of handling today's highest performance markets. There are sixteen programmable Micro Engines. The two cryptography engines on board are used to accelerate cryptography algorithms; the cipher path is able to perform 25 million encryptions a second based on a 40 byte packet size (Intel

IXP2855 Network Processor, 2007). A 15Gb/s interface is included to connect multiple 28xx series processors together for high demand environments. These features combined with a 1.5 GHz clock speed and the RISC processor cores make this by far the most powerful dedicated Network Processor available.




Figure 4. Intel IXP 2855 Network Processor
(Intel IXP2855 Network Processor, 2007).

Vulcan IXP 425

The Intel IXP 425 can be purchased as a stand alone embedded Linux system with almost any interface type that can be conceived. Options include Ethernet, DSL, DSL Access Manager, 802.11 or any other interface that can be

connected to a PCI or USB bus. The Arcom Vulcan development kit provides two 10/100Mb/s Ethernet interfaces, four USB 2.0 interfaces, four 921.6 Kbaud serial interfaces, a CompactFlash slot and a PC/104 interface. The CompactFlash slot can be used for extra memory or interface with a Prism v2 CompactFlash Wireless adapter. The logical diagram of the Vulcan development board is included in Figure 5.




Figure 5. Vulcan Logical Block Diagram (IXP425 XScale Development Kit for Embedded Linux - Arcom, 2007).

Arcom provides a Fedora Core 3 development environment that is used to create new kernels, boot files; essentially any program components that are needed for the creation of a Vulcan based Network Processor Application. Included in the development software is the Intel Application library. It provides C libraries that can access and configure the NPEs in the IXP425 processor. These applications are loaded into kernel modules for the Redboot v2.6 kernel that is on the Vulcan at shipping. By default the Vulcan system has Secure Shell, a small HTTP server, Secure Copy, console access and kernel modules to drive the IXP425 processor and its interfaces loaded.

For the development machine an Intel 3.0Ghz Pentium 4 machine with 2GB of RAM, 500GB of hard disk space, two Ethernet interfaces and two serial interfaces was used. Once new applications were compiled on the host machine, they were loaded to a 512 MB CompactFlash memory card that was inserted into the Vulcan enclosure. The onboard 16MB of flash was saved for the original kernel for disaster recovery. The files could also be transferred via SCP to the Vulcan system, however they would not survive a reboot unless the files were added to the binary boot file, compressed and the binary was updated on the device.

Implementation

The code that was created contained a new kernel driver, and a modified libpcap. Libpcap is the code that allows Snort, TCPdump and several other tools to directly

read packets from the interface in raw format. Typically each packet is processed by the four layers of the IP stack (Physical, Data Link, Network and Transport) removing the extraneous information at each pass. This requires extra processing power, and the main CPU is required to handle each packet. This reduces the amount of packets that can be analyzed by the CPU and hinders the overall effectiveness of the IDS. Using a modified version of libpcap allowed the packets to be taken from the Network Processor Micro-Engine directly to the main memory without involving the CPU for packet fetching. The processor is then free to only handle the IDS application and is not concerned with servicing the interfaces. The packets are then stored in a queue in the memory until the IDS application has a chance to process these packets. Libpcap reads from the main memory to fetch packets for the IDS while the custom kernel module accepts incoming packets and passes them on to the main memory through the bus. This allowed a default IDS application to be used and only a new interface type was created in libpcap, making this a minimally invasive change to increase throughput.




Figure 6. IXP Snort VS *NIX based Snort

The kernel module was implemented mostly through the use of the IXP development API provided by Intel. For the IXP 425 this is the only method to access the Micro Engines as they cannot be accessed directly. The API provides functionality to configure the interface, buffers, and for packet handling. In order for the network interfaces to

send or receive packets the interface needs to be initialized. There are three main steps to initializing the interface; configuration, memory allocation, and packet handling subroutine creation. This code is provided in the Intel development binaries in the Arcom Development Kit. The configuration process requires that a MAC address is assigned to the interface, speed and the interface is initialized. The MAC addresses are assigned using the `IxEthAccMacAddr` macro. The addresses are assigned in hexadecimal. The line looks like this:

```
IxEthAccMacAddr npeMacAddr1={{0x2,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x0,}};
```

This assigns the MAC of 0200:0000:0001 to the interface of NPE1. The interfaces need to be initialized, and this is done with the following code:

```
if (ixEthAccPortInit(IX_ETH_PORT1) != IX_ETH_ACC_SUCCESS)
{
    /*Error Initializing Ethernet port 1*/
    return(IX_FAIL);
}
ixEthAccCodeletPhyInit();
if (IxEthAccPortUnicastMacAddressSet(IX_ETH_PORT_1,
&npeMacAddr1) != IX_ETH_ACC_SUCCESS)
{
    return(IX_FAIL);
}
```

The port is now initialized but not enabled for traffic. The configuration to provide transmit and receive capabilities is the next part of the configuration. Transmit and receive are each initialized separately, so for a Snort monitoring interface, only the receive is needed. The following line of code establishes the receive registers:

```
If(ixEthAccPortRxCallbackRegister(IX_ETH_PORT_1,
ethPortReceiveCallBack, IX_ETH_PORT_1) !=
IX_ETH_ACC_SUCCESS)
{
    return(IX_FAIL);
}
```

The port is now ready to receive frames, however the memory needs to be allocated so that there is somewhere to send the information. A simple statically allocated buffer was used to reduce complication. Since the packets are only used for alerts no response is taken, the packets do not have to be processed in any specific time.

After this point one of two kernel modules are loaded. The first will allow frames to be transmitted and received by the interface. This is the standard module used for IP traffic on one of the Network Processing Engines. It is supplied by default with the development library. The second module simply puts packets into the buffer that was described above allowing libpcap to read these packets to Snort.

Cost Analysis

The Vulcan development kit from Arcom had a purchase price of \$997.00 at the time of writing (IXP425 XScale Development Kit for Embedded Linux - Arcom, 2007). This provided a dual interface system capable of processing 100Mb/s of data, on a Linux system. Add to this several hours of development time to get the system processing packets, and building a special binary of the operating system that would keep changes through reboot to create a Snort Network Processor. This system does not have the disk space to store Snort logs and they will need to be sent to another host for storage and analysis. This requires a separate system to store and maintain the logs, as well as to create the operating system for the Network Processor.

To create a PC based stand alone Snort sensor is much cheaper. If you ignore the cost of the development time, the difference is essentially one Network Processor system.

Expanding to Large Networks

The point where a Network Processor based IDS becomes attractive is when traffic throughput is much larger than a single host can handle. A normal desktop PC or light duty server can act as the host for multiple IXP 28xx series devices. This allows for a log host to store alerts as well as the development environment. The real differences are when the data links on the monitored segments reach multiple Gb/s and even 10Gb/s. There are few systems on the market that can handle this kind of throughput and the

prices quickly become astronomically prohibitive. To monitor two 10Gb/s links the approximate costs would be about \$12,000 providing two 10Gb/s monitor ports and a 1Gb/s management port. This price change becomes much smaller when compared to the scale of the networks that would be monitored by this IDS system.

To create the 28xx based system a completely different type of program would need to be created. The macros that were defined in the 425 do exist, but there is no Linux operation system on the 28xx. The IDS system would need to be created; the rules partitioned into blocks for the Micro Engines and pushed out to the device. One implementation uses one Micro Engine to control the interface, and the rule set is broken up into fifteen blocks. This can be seen in Figure 7. The packets would then be passed from Micro Engine to Micro Engine sequentially. Since packets only trigger an alert once, the first rule set should contain the most common or simplest rules. This would push the more difficult rules to the later Micro Engines, where they would see less traffic and allow the string matching to have more time. This would reduce overall load on the IXP, and increase throughput. This is much different than the system proposed for the IXP425 which was a single processor that just queues packets until they were analyzed. Breaking the rules into the subsets allows parallel processing similar to that of the superscalar processors that have been proposed for high throughput applications. Additionally, the 15Gb/s backplane connection for the IXP28xx would allow the creation of a very similarly based IPS but instead of the last Micro Engine

discarding the copy of the packet received; it would transmit it out of the other interface. This very simple bridging code is the example provided in many of the texts, and is provided by Intel in the sample code for all of their IXP based systems. The Snort type rules could then be duplicated for incoming and outgoing traffic and tuned based on direction. This would create a high throughput very reliable 10Gb/s throughput IPS system.




Figure 7. Proposed IXP2855 IDS

Another concern with any system today is security. New vulnerabilities are found each day. Currently in IDS the packet is managed by the IP Stack, libpcap and the Snort process. This leaves three main areas of vulnerability. If any one of these were exploited there

are two possibilities, the sensor could be rendered blind, or the box could be owned by an unauthorized person. Blinding the sensor would allow other attacks to continue unnoticed possibly allowing the attacker to exploit other systems on the network. If the sensor was compromised, it could be blinded as well or even used as an attacking point. The best way to reduce this threat is to take the software out of the chain. If the TCP Stack and the Kernel that are handling the packets are replaced with hardware as would be done in the 28xx based sensor. Which would be completely hardware and not as likely to be vulnerable to these attacks. If a vulnerability were discovered the worst that could happen is a temporary blinding of the sensor. The sensor would not have the ability to connect outbound to propagate the attack. Since the code is downloaded to the Micro Engines on boot, and the compiled code is not stored on the local device, a reboot would return the sensor to normal operation and original condition. Restoring a normal sensor of this type may require a complete format and rebuild from scratch which may take days.

Results

Although this shows much real world promise in larger scale networks, 100Mb/s is not enough to tax most Snort sensors, so this is not a very good system to test the feasibility of an IXP based Snort type sensor. It is much more economical to create a normal host based sensor. Another huge drawback of the IXP based systems is that they are not able to log locally. The IXP425 uses flash memory for storage. By default the Vulcan used in this project has

a very limited with either 16 or 32 MB of memory which can be expanded with CompactFlash memory cards. Flash memory has a limited life span with approximately 10,000 writes guaranteed. To provide a sample calculation, a life time 100 times the estimated, or 10 million writes over a 5 year period it breaks down to 228 writes an hour or about 3 writes a minute possible. There is however no theoretical limit on the read life time of a Flash memory, so if the alerts were offloaded, the only writes to the Flash memory would be rule set updates. Since Flash memory is written in blocks, as long as multiple rule changes are made at one time, the memory live span would not be an issue. Flash memory has a relatively slow access speed running below 10MB/s of read speed and much lower write speeds. This means that logging entire packets or even just alerts is not possible for a large scale network or a large rule set. The alerts would need to be stored on another device, but the flash memory would be an excellent storage device for the rule set and configuration.

Since the IXP based Snort is a custom application this is by far its biggest drawback. There is no support infrastructure in place for this device, it would be similar to using a home grown IDS. If it breaks the coder would be the support team fixing the problem. The learning curve is steep; this is not programmed in normal C or C++. Every rule change would need to be a custom write, a new kernel build, a new binary image compilation and a TFTP transfer on reboot. This severely slows the implementation of new rules, changing rule updates from editing a text,

file and restarting a process to a major build that takes hours if not days to implement and debug.

While the IXP based systems show significant promise in large scale performance, the mediocre performance per dollar compared to the price of a simple PC pushes the Network Processor based Snort IDS out of the range of the average user for Small Office/Home Office applications. The large scale systems show significant promise in throughput and scalability, but without a large vendor to provide technical support and development they are not a feasible system.

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