An Analysis of Gameover Zeus Network Traffic

Malware is evolving to use encryption techniques to obfuscate network communication to evade detection. This paper analyzes anomalies within network traffic generated by Gameover Zeus. The anomalies result from the encryption methods used to obfuscate network communications. However, even though the anomalies can be seen when manually inspecting the network packets, the obfuscation techniques pose difficulties when attempting to use signature based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) for detection. While the anomalies ma...
Malware is evolving to use encryption techniques to obfuscate network communication to evade detection. This paper analyzes anomalies within network traffic generated by Gameover Zeus. The anomalies result from the encryption methods used to obfuscate network communications. However, even though the anomalies can be seen when manually inspecting the network packets, the obfuscation techniques pose difficulties when attempting to use signature based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) for detection. While the anomalies may not be useful for constructing IDS signatures, they may be useful in constructing custom detection algorithms.
1. Introduction

In September of 2011, a peer-to-peer variant of Zeus emerged on the internet (Symantec, 2014). This version of Zeus, also known as Gameover or P2P Zeus, is not susceptible to traditional takedown methods because the command and control infrastructure is no longer centralized. Detection of this variant is also made more difficult because communication between the peers is encrypted (Andriesse & Bos, 2014). Although the botnet has been significantly disrupted by a takedown effort (Symantec, 2014), analysis of the malware can provide useful insights into the effectiveness of signature based intrusion detection systems.

The protocol used for communication has been described in detail in research papers written by Andriesse & Bos (2014) and Cert Polska (2013). This paper uses the information from the research papers to decrypt and analyze the information in two separate packet captures. In the first packet capture, the Zeus infected hosts use a simple XOR based algorithm for encrypting its traffic. In the second packet capture, the RC4 algorithm is used for encryption. The two packet captures have interesting anomalies that differ due to the encryption algorithm that was used.

The IP addresses shown in the figures in this paper have been converted to private IP addresses. The packet captures are available on request from the author.

2. Zeus Communication Protocol

2.1. Overview

The protocol used by Gameover Zeus is described in detail in a research paper published by Andriesse and Bos (2014). The protocol includes mechanisms for exchanging binary and configuration updates, requesting peer lists, and requesting the IP address of special members of the botnet referred to as “proxy bots” (Andriesse & Bos, 2014). The following sections outline a portion of the research that was used when analyzing the packet captures.

Daryl Ashley, ashley@utexas.edu
2.2. **Network Communication**

Each infected host uses a unique UDP port for communication (Cert Polska, 2013). For hosts infected with a version of Zeus prior to June, 2013, the port was selected from the range 10,000 to 30,000. For hosts infected after June, 2013, the range was between 1024 and 10000 (Andriesse & Bos, 2014). Figure 1 shows the output of a packet capture that was generated using the command `tcpdump -nr zeus.pcap proto 17 and host 10.1.1.1`. The network traffic of a host infected with Gameover Zeus was captured to a file named zeus.pcap. The host that was infected with Gameover Zeus has an IP address of 192.168.1.1. Since the infected host sends UDP packets to a number of peers, the host filter was used to display traffic that was generated to a single peer, the peer at IP address 10.1.1.1. The filtered output makes it easier to focus on the network traffic generated between the two peers.

![Figure 1: tcpdump Output of Zeus UDP Packets](image)

The packet capture shows two hosts communicating with each other using the UDP protocol. But, there is nothing that appears to be malicious about this network traffic. The host with IP address 192.168.1.1 is using port 26609 for network communication. Since this port is within the range 10000 to 30000, the infected host is running a version of Zeus released prior to June, 2013. When the infected host sends a packet, the source port is set to 26609. When the host at IP address 10.1.1.1 receives the UDP packet, it will send replies to port 26609.

2.3. **Message Header**

Each UDP packet sent by a host infected with Zeus contains a Zeus message as its UDP payload. The Zeus message can be broken up into two parts, a 44 byte message header followed by a message payload. The message payload will vary in length.

Daryl Ashley, ashley@utexas.edu
depending on the type of message being sent (Andriesse & Bos, 2014). Figure 2 shows the packet layout of a Zeus message, including the IP and UDP header sections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ip header</th>
<th>ip payload</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>udp header</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zeus message header</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rnd ttl lop type session ID source ID</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2: Zeus Packet Layout**

Figure 3 summarizes the fields that are present in the Zeus message header, as well as their position within the header and the length of each field. One field that is particularly interesting is the lop field. Zeus appends a number of random bytes to each message that is sent. The peer that receives the message discards the randomly generated bytes after it decrypts the message. The lop field contains the number of random bytes that have been appended to the message. Since a random number of bytes are appended to each message, the length of each UDP packet sent between two infected hosts will usually differ. The variable length packets may help infected hosts evade detection by intrusion detection systems (Andriesse & Bos, 2014). Therefore, Zeus may use variable length packets as well as encryption to evade detection.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>field</th>
<th>length</th>
<th>description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>rnd</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>randomly generated byte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>time to live</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>length of padding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>type</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>message type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>session ID</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>randomly generated to tag session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>source ID</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>used as unique identifier of infected host</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3: Zeus Protocol Header**

Daryl Ashley, ashley@utexas.edu
The other header fields that are interesting are the type and source ID fields. The type field will be discussed in the following section. The source ID field is a unique identifier of the host sending the message. In versions of Zeus after June, 2013, RC4 is used to encrypt messages. The source ID field is used as the RC4 key when encrypting replies to the sending host (Andriesse & Bos, 2014).

2.4. Message Types

There are a number of different message types that are used by Gameover Zeus (Andriesse & Bos, 2014). Figure 4 provides a summary of some of the message types. The length of the payload of each message type is of interest because it can be used to calculate the expected length of the message. The message length should be equal to 44 bytes (header) + payload length + lop.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>type</th>
<th>payload length</th>
<th>description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x0</td>
<td>0 or 12</td>
<td>version request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>version reply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>peer list request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x3</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>peer list reply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x6</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>proxy reply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x32</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>proxy announce</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4: Zeus Message Types

3. Packet Analysis

3.1. tcpdump

The packet captures were created using tcpdump. The initial analysis of the encrypted packets was also performed with tcpdump. The –X flag can be used to display the packet in hexadecimal format, along with an ASCII conversion on the right hand side of the output. The output can be filtered using the host, port, and

Daryl Ashley, ashley@utexas.edu
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Daryl Ashley, ashley@utexas.edu

3.2. Automated Analysis of Packet Captures

Several python scripts are included in the appendix of this paper. The scripts were used to automate the decryption and decoding of the UDP packets used by Zeus for communication. The dpkt Python module can be used to read a packet capture that was produced by tcpdump (Oberheide, 2008). For example, the code snippet shown in figure 5 will open a packet capture file and iterate through each of the packets, printing the source port of any UDP packets in the packet capture.

```
import dpkt
filename = "infected.pcap"
def main():
    for ts, pkt in dpkt.pcap.Reader(open(filename, 'r')):
        eth = dpkt.ethernet.Ethernet(pkt)
        if eth.type!=dpkt.ethernet.ETH_TYPE_IP:
            continue
        ip = eth.data
        if ip.p == dpkt.ip.IP_PROTO_UDP:
            udp = ip.data
            print "UDP source port", udp.sport

if __name__=="__main__":
    main()
```

Figure 5: Using dpkt to Parse Packet Capture

3.3. XOR Decryption

Prior to June of 2013, Gameover Zeus used a “rolling XOR” algorithm to encrypt its messages (Andriesse & Bos, 2014). An example of the rolling XOR algorithm is as follows. Suppose the message payload is the sequence of bytes “0x11 0x2e 0x54 0x9d”. The first byte is left as is in the cipher text. The second byte is encrypted by XORing the

Daryl Ashley, ashley@utexas.edu
second byte of the original message with the first byte of the cipher text: 0x11 XOR 0x2e = 0x3f. This is the second byte of the cipher text. The third byte is encrypted by XORing the unencrypted third byte of the original message with the second byte of the cipher text: 0x3f XOR 0x54 = 0x6B. Finally, 0x6B, the third byte of the cipher text, is XORed with the last byte of the original message. The cipher text is “0x11 0x3f 0x6B 0xF6”.

Decryption is the opposite of encryption. First, the last byte of the cipher text is XORed with the preceding byte of the cipher text: 0xF6 XOR 0x6B = 0x9d. This recovers the last byte of the original message. This process is repeated for all the remaining bytes in the cipher text except the first byte, which was not encrypted.

There are a couple of interesting observations about this algorithm. First, in order to determine the value of a specific byte in the original message, it is not necessary to decrypt the entire message. For example, to determine the original value of the second byte, XOR it with the preceding byte: 0x3F XOR 0x11 = 0x2E. It is not necessary to decrypt the third and fourth bytes before jumping to this step.

The second observation is that any value XORed with 0 is equal to the value itself. For example 0x4 XOR 0x0 = 0x4. Suppose that the rolling XOR algorithm is used to encrypt the message “0x11 0x2e 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00”. It can be shown that the corresponding cipher text is “0x11 0x3F 0x3F 0x3F 0x3F 0x3F”. Note that the encrypted byte at position 2 is repeated each time it is XORed with 0x00. This observation will be used when analyzing Zeus messages encrypted using the rolling XOR algorithm.

The python snippet shown below was used to decrypt messages that were encrypted using the rolling XOR algorithm.

```python
def xordecrypt(payload):
    decrypted = []
    decrypted.append(ord(payload[0]))
    for i in range(1, len(payload)):
        decrypted.append(ord(payload[i]) ^ ord(payload[i-1]))
    return decrypted
```

Figure 6: Python Subroutine to Decrypt Rolling XOR

Daryl Ashley, ashley@utexas.edu
3.4. **RC4 Decryption**

After June of 2013, Zeus started using RC4 to encrypt its traffic (Andriesse & Bos, 2014). RC4 is a widely used software stream cipher. The cipher generates a pseudo random sequence of bytes that is XORed with the message to produce a cipher text. The same pseudo random sequence of bytes is needed to decrypt the cipher text. The cipher text is XORed with the pseudo random sequence of bytes to recover the original message (Paul, 2012).

A software based stream cipher has two components. The first is a key scheduling component that uses a secret key to initialize the internal state of the RC4 instance. Once initialized, a pseudo-random generation algorithm is used to generate the sequence of bytes that is used for encryption and decryption (Paul, 2012). If a different key is used to initialize the RC4 instance, a different stream of bytes will be generated, and decryption of the cipher text will not succeed.

Figure 7 shows RC4 encryption of the plain text “john smith” when the RC4 instance is initialized with the key “darylashley”. The figure shows the byte stream produced by the pseudo-random generation algorithm. The figure also shows the hexadecimal representation of “john smith”. Each byte of the plain text is XORed with the corresponding byte in the byte stream. Figure 8 shows the RC4 encryption of the plain text “abcdesmith” using the same key.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>byte stream</th>
<th>0x55</th>
<th>0x5c</th>
<th>0xa6</th>
<th>0xf9</th>
<th>0xc1</th>
<th>0x55</th>
<th>0xaa</th>
<th>0x7c</th>
<th>0x4d</th>
<th>0xee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>plain text</td>
<td>0x6a</td>
<td>0x6f</td>
<td>0x68</td>
<td>0x6e</td>
<td>0x20</td>
<td>0x73</td>
<td>0x6d</td>
<td>0x69</td>
<td>0x74</td>
<td>0x68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cipher text</td>
<td>0x3f</td>
<td>0x33</td>
<td>0xce</td>
<td>0x97</td>
<td>0x3c</td>
<td>0x26</td>
<td>0xc7</td>
<td>0x15</td>
<td>0x39</td>
<td>0x86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 7: RC4 Encryption of ”john smith”**

Daryl Ashley, ashley@utexas.edu
If the same key is used to encrypt multiple messages, the RC4 algorithm is susceptible to cryptographic attacks. Even though each message has been encrypted, the last 5 bytes of each cipher text are identical because the 5 bytes at offset 6 of each message is “smith”. Since each RC4 instance was in an identical state when encrypting the messages, the same pseudo random byte sequence was used to encrypt each of the messages at this offset. Although it may not be possible to recover the original messages from the above cipher text, an attacker would know that the two messages contained identical data in the last 5 bytes of each message. This observation will be used when analyzing Zeus packets encrypted using the RC4 algorithm.

The Python Cryptography Toolkit is a python package that contains various cryptographic functions. It is available at https://www.dlitz.net/software/pycrypto. The package provides an ARC4 module that can be used to perform RC4 encryption of a message. The new() function can be passed a key parameter that can be used to initialize the internal state of the RC4 instance. The encrypt and decrypt functions can be used to encrypt and decrypt messages after the RC4 instance has been created and initialized (Litzenberger, 2012). Figure 9 shows a code snippet that uses the package to encrypt the plain text “abcdesmith” after initializing the RC4 instance with the key “darylashley”.

Daryl Ashley, ashley@utexas.edu
4. XOR Packet Capture

Figure 10 shows a UDP packet for a host infected with a version of Zeus that uses the rolling XOR algorithm to encrypt its traffic. The UDP ports used to communicate are between 10000 and 30000, so this is a version of Zeus prior to June 2013.

The –X tcpdump flag was used to generate a hexadecimal output of the packet payload. Based on the IP header length field, the length of the IP header is 20 bytes. Since the protocol field is set to 0x11, this is a UDP packet. So, there will also be a UDP header which is 8 bytes in length. The UDP payload should start at offset 0x1C of the packet. The first four bytes at this offset are circled in figure 10. These represent the encrypted rnd, ttl, lop, and type field of the Zeus header. The length of the UDP payload is 378 bytes, and is also circled in the figure.

Daryl Ashley, ashley@utexas.edu

```python
from Crypto.Cipher import ARC4 as rc4

# Secret key used to initialize RC4 state
KEY = "darylashley"

# Messages to encrypt
msg = "abcodesmith"

# Create RC4 Instance
r = rc4.new(KEY)
# Encrypt message 1
cipher = r.encrypt(msg)

# Display the message
print " ".join(hex(ord(n)) for n in cipher)
```

Figure 9: RC4 Python Snippet
The lop field is located at offset 0x1e of the packet, and the type field is located at offset 0x1f of the packet. The fields can be decrypted by XORing them with the preceding byte in the UDP payload. The lop = 0xd8 XOR 0xc6 = 0x1e. This means that the number of random bytes appended to this message was 30 bytes. The type = 0xde XOR 0xd8 = 0x6. Based on the summary of message types shown in figure 3, this is a proxy reply packet and should have a payload of length 304 bytes. The expected length of the packet is 44 (header bytes) + 304 (payload bytes) + 30 (lop) = 378 bytes. This matches the payload length displayed by tcpdump.

This approach to identifying a potential Zeus UDP packet is fairly straightforward. However, creating a rule to detect this type of packet for a signature based IDS, such as Snort, may not be possible. Instead, this approach could possibly be implemented as a dynamic preprocessor in Snort because a dynamic preprocessor can be used to perform more complex analysis of the packets inspected by Snort (Ashley, 2008).
However, this approach is more time consuming than writing a signature because custom code must be written.

Figure 11 shows the first 92 bytes of the Zeus payload after it has been decrypted and decoded. The python scripts used to decrypt and decode the packet are included in the appendix. The information used to decode the packet is based on the proxy struct describe in (Andriesse & Bos, 2014).

![Figure 11: Decrypted Packet Contents](image)

The portion of the decoded packet that is of interest is the ipv6 address and ipv6 port. The ipv6 address contains a sequence of sixteen 0x00 values, and the ipv6 port contains a sequence of two 0x00 values. This sequence of bytes produces the anomaly shown in the figure 12. The eighteen bytes in the UDP payload starting at offset 0x66 are identical to the byte located at offset 0x65 of the packet. The reason for the anomaly is described in section 3.3 of this paper. Code to check for this anomaly could potentially be added as a sanity check when writing the dynamic preprocessor.
5. RC4 Packet Capture

For versions of Zeus after June 2013, the encryption algorithm was changed to RC4. The key used to initialize the RC4 state is the source ID of the recipient host (Andriesse & Bos, 2014). Since the source ID of the sending host is included in the message header, the receiving host will have the sending host’s RC4 key, and will be able to encrypt the reply packet.

Since the packet is encrypted using RC4, the key used to perform the encryption is required to decrypt the packet (Paul, 2012). This is an improvement over the rolling XOR algorithm because no key was required to decrypt packets encrypted using the rolling XOR algorithm. Because the source ID of the receiving host is required to decrypt a packet, it is no longer possible to decrypt the lop and type fields to determine if the UDP payload length matches the predicted length of a Zeus message.

Daryl Ashley, ashley@utexas.edu
Figure 13 shows a decrypted proxy announce packet. The RC4 key was obtained by reverse engineering a binary used to infect the virtual host that produced the network traffic in the RC4 packet capture. Note that the ipv6 address and port each contain a sequence of 0x00 values as was the case for the proxy reply shown in the XOR section.

![Figure 13: Decrypted Proxy Reply Packet](image)

Figure 14 shows the encrypted packet as displayed via tcpdump. Note that the 18 bytes at offset 0x66 are no longer identical. This is a result of the strengthened encryption that this version of Zeus is using. So, the two methods outlined in section 4 of this paper are no longer able to detect Zeus traffic.
In order to find an anomaly in the network traffic, several packets transmitted between the same hosts must be inspected. Recall that the source ID of the sending host will be included at a specific location of the Zeus message header. Also recall that the RC4 key used to encrypt the message is the source ID of the recipient of the message. If the same source ID is reused to initialize the RC4 state prior to encryption of each packet, the sender’s encrypted source ID will be identical. Figure 15 shows this anomaly in the packet capture.

Although it may not be possible to recover the unencrypted source IDs of the two infected hosts from this packet capture, this anomaly may be useful in identifying potential Zeus messages. For example, in the packet capture shown in Figure 15, the

Daryl Ashley, ashley@utexas.edu
lengths of the four packets are different, and the packet contents are encrypted. But, the 20 bytes within the packet sent by IP address 192.168.1.1 highlighted in red are identical. Similarly, the 20 bytes sent by IP address 10.1.1.1 highlighted in blue are identical. This does not definitively prove that the two hosts are infected with Zeus. However, this may be useful for identifying hosts that are good candidates for further investigation.

Figure 15: Encrypted Source Identifiers

A Snort preprocessor may be used to detect this type of traffic as well. However, detection has been made more difficult because the information needed to find a potential Zeus packet is no longer available in a single UDP packet. Instead, the preprocessor would need to maintain enough information for each UDP packet received so that future
6. Conclusion

It can be argued that the encryption methods used by Gameover Zeus are a weakness that can be exploited by security analysts. For example, the use of the rolling XOR algorithm appears to violate several ideas that are central to the idea of modern cryptography.

Modern cryptography considers the notion of “security through obscurity” to be a bad idea. History has shown that this approach has failed many times (Klein, 2014). This paper shows that reverse engineering efforts were useful in identifying some weaknesses that can be leveraged to help detect the malware. However, this is not an optimal solution. For example, suppose 1000 new malware variants are written, and each uses a custom encryption algorithm that has some sort of weakness. The task of reverse engineering all of the executables and writing 1000 dynamic preprocessors does not seem practical.

Another idea of modern cryptography is the development of encryption algorithms that are computationally expensive to attack (Goldreich, 2001). For example, suppose an attacker has access to encrypted ecommerce data. The attacker may have many months and a large number of computers to try to extract information from the encrypted data. Modern cryptographic algorithms attempt to thwart this type of attack.

The rolling XOR algorithm used by Zeus is trivial to decrypt once the algorithm is known. This custom algorithm would not be considered an acceptable form of encryption from the standpoint of modern cryptography. So, why does this algorithm pose problems for signature based intrusion detection systems? The answer may be that the task of encryption and evasion are significantly different. An intrusion detection system does not have many months to decrypt the network packets that it analyzes. If the goal of Zeus’s encryption is simply to evade detection, it may not need to use an encryption algorithm that will protect data against a brute force attack that will last several months and will be run on a number of computers. It simply needs to evade...
detection from a device that is potentially responsible for analyzing gigabits of data each second. Taken in this context, the weakness in Zeus’s encryption may not be as glaring after all.
References


Daryl Ashley, ashley@utexas.edu
import struct
from Crypto.Cipher import ARC4 as rc4

HEADER_LENGTH = 44
PEERLISTREQUEST_LENGTH = 28
PEERLISTREPLY_LENGTH = 450
PROXYREPLY_LENGTH = 304
PEER_STRUCT_LENGTH = 45
TYPE_PEERLISTREQUEST = 2
TYPE_PEERLISTREPLY = 3
TYPE_PROXYREPLY = 6
TYPE_PROXYANNOUNCE = 50

def rc4decrypt(key, payload):
    decrypted = []
    r = rc4.new(key)
    dec = r.decrypt(payload)
    for c in dec:
        decrypted.append(ord(c))
    return decrypted

def xordecrypt(payload):
    decrypted = []
    decrypted.append(ord(payload[0]))
    for i in range(1, len(payload)):
        decrypted.append(ord(payload[i]) ^ ord(payload[i-1]))
    return decrypted

def print_header(rnd, ttl, lop, type, header):
    sessionid = header[4:24]
    sourceid = header[24:44]
    print "rnd:    ", rnd
    print "ttl:   ", ttl
    print "lop:   ", lop
    print "type:  ", type
    print "session id: " + " ".join(hex(n) for n in sessionid)
    print "source id: " + " ".join(hex(n) for n in sourceid)

def verify_packet_length(lop, type, length):
    if type == TYPE_PEERLISTREQUEST:
        expected_length = HEADER_LENGTH + PEERLISTREQUEST_LENGTH + lop
        if expected_length == length:
            print "*** Peer List Request Packet - lop is correct ***"
return 1

if type == TYPE_PEERLISTREPLY:
    expected_length = HEADER_LENGTH + PEERLISTREPLY_LENGTH + lop
    if expected_length == length:
        print "*** Peer List Reply Packet - lop is correct ***"
        return 1

if type == TYPE_PROXYREPLY:
    expected_length = HEADER_LENGTH + PROXYREPLY_LENGTH + lop
    if expected_length == length:
        print "*** Proxy Reply Packet - lop is correct ***"
        return 1

if type == TYPE_PROXYANNOUNCE:
    expected_length = HEADER_LENGTH + PROXYREPLY_LENGTH + lop
    if expected_length == length:
        print "*** Proxy Announce Packet - lop is correct ***"
        return 1
return 0

def decode_peerlistrequest(payload):
    print "Decoded Peer List Request:
    identifier = payload[HEADER_LENGTH:HEADER_LENGTH+ 20]
    random = payload[HEADER_LENGTH+20:HEADER_LENGTH+28]
    print "identifier: " + " ".join(hex(n) for n in identifier)
    print "random: " + " ".join(hex(n) for n in random)

def decode_peerstruct(peerstruct):
    iptype = peerstruct[0]
    peerid = peerstruct[1:21]
    ipv4addr = peerstruct[21:25]
    ipv4port = peerstruct[25:27]
    ipv6addr = peerstruct[27:43]
    ipv6port = peerstruct[43:45]
    print "ip type: " , iptype
    print "peer id: " + " ".join(hex(n) for n in peerid)
    print "ipv4 address: " + " ".join(str(n) for n in ipv4addr)
    print "ipv4 port: " , struct.unpack("<h", struct.pack("BB", ipv4port[0], ipv4port[1]))[0]
    print "ipv6 address: " + " ".join(hex(n) for n in ipv6addr)
    print "ipv6 port: " + " ".join(hex(n) for n in ipv6port)

def decode_peerlistreply(payload):

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print "Decoded Peer List: "
for i in range(0, 10):
    begin = i * PEER_STRUCT_LENGTH + HEADER_LENGTH
    end = begin + PEER_STRUCT_LENGTH
    decode_peerstruct(payload[begin:end])

def decode_proxyreply(payload):
    iptype = payload[HEADER_LENGTH:HEADER_LENGTH+4]
    proxyid = payload[HEADER_LENGTH+4:HEADER_LENGTH+24]
    ipv4addr = payload[HEADER_LENGTH+24:HEADER_LENGTH+28]
    ipv4port = payload[HEADER_LENGTH+28:HEADER_LENGTH+30]
    ipv6addr = payload[HEADER_LENGTH+30:HEADER_LENGTH+46]
    ipv6port = payload[HEADER_LENGTH+46:HEADER_LENGTH+48]

    print "ip type:      " + " ".join(hex(n) for n in iptype)
    print "peer id:      " + " ".join(hex(n) for n in proxyid)
    print "ipv4 address: " + ".".join(str(n) for n in ipv4addr)
    print "ipv4 port:    ", struct.unpack("<h", struct.pack("BB", ipv4port[0],
                                           ipv4port[1]))[0]
    print "ipv6 address: " + " ".join(hex(n) for n in ipv6addr)
    print "ipv6 port:    " + " ".join(hex(n) for n in ipv6port)
Appendix 2: XOR Packet Python Script

```python
import ZeusHost as zeus
import dpkt

filename = "xor.pcap"
def main():
    for ts, pkt in dpkt.pcap.Reader(open(filename, 'r')):
        eth = dpkt.ethernet.Ethernet(pkt)
        if eth.type!=dpkt.ethernet.ETH_TYPE_IP:
            continue
        ip = eth.data
        if ip.p == dpkt.ip.IP_PROTO_UDP:
            udp = ip.data
            print "UDP source port", udp.sport
            if udp.sport == 16503:
                payload = udp.data
                # Decrypt the packet payload
                decrypted = zeus.xordecrypt(payload)
                # Map the first 4 bytes
                rnd = decrypted[0]
                ttl = decrypted[1]
                lop = decrypted[2]
                type = decrypted[3]
                length = len(decrypted)
                # Use lop and type fields to verify that this is possibly a Zeus packet
                if zeus.verify_packet_length(lop, type, length):
                    print "Length of UDP packet: ", length
                    # Print the Zeus packet header
                    zeus.print_header(rnd, ttl, lop, type, decrypted)
                    # Decode Peer List Requess
                    if type == zeus.TYPE_PEERLISTREQUEST:
                        zeus.decode_peerlistrequest(decrypted)
                    # Decode replies to peer list requests
                    if type == zeus.TYPE_PEERLISTREPLY:
                        zeus.decode_peerlistreply(decrypted)
                    # Decode replies to proxy requests
                    if type == zeus.TYPE_PROXYREPLY:
                        zeus.decode_proxyreply(decrypted)

if __name__=="__main__":
    main()
```

Daryl Ashley, ashley@utexas.edu
import ZeusHost as zeus
import dpkt

CLIENTKEY="darylashley"
filename = "rc4.pcap"

def main():
    for ts, pkt in dpkt.pcap.Reader(open(filename, 'r')):
        eth = dpkt.ethernet.Ethernet(pkt)
        if eth.type!=dpkt.ethernet.ETH_TYPE_IP:
            continue
        ip = eth.data
        if ip.p == dpkt.ip.IP_PROTO_UDP:
            udp = ip.data
            if udp.dport > 0:
                payload = udp.data
                # Decrypt the packet payload
                decrypted = zeus.rc4decrypt(CLIENTKEY, payload)
                # Map the first 4 bytes
                rnd = decrypted[0]
                ttl = decrypted[1]
                lop = decrypted[2]
                type = decrypted[3]
                length = len(decrypted)
                # Use lop and type fields to verify that this is possibly a Zeus packet
                if zeus.verify_packet_length(lop, type, length):
                    print "Length of UDP packet: ", length
                    # Print the Zeus packet header
                    zeus.print_header(rnd, ttl, lop, type, decrypted)
                    # Decode Peer List Request
                    if type == zeus.TYPE_PEERLISTREQUEST:
                        zeus.decode_peerlistrequest(decrypted)
                    # Decode replies to peer list requests
                    if type == zeus.TYPE_PEERLISTREPLY:
                        zeus.decode_peerlistreply(decrypted)
                    # Decode replies to proxy requests
                    if type == zeus.TYPE_PROXYANNOUNCE:
                        zeus.decode_proxyreply(decrypted)

if __name__=="__main__":
    main()
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Type</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SANS Las Vegas 2018</td>
<td>Las Vegas, NVUS</td>
<td>Jan 28, 2018 - Feb 02, 2018</td>
<td>Live Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyber Threat Intelligence Summit &amp; Training 2018</td>
<td>Bethesda, MDUS</td>
<td>Jan 29, 2018 - Feb 05, 2018</td>
<td>Live Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>SANS Miami 2018</td>
<td>Miami, FLUS</td>
<td>Jan 29, 2018 - Feb 03, 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>SANS London February 2018</td>
<td>London, GB</td>
<td>Feb 05, 2018 - Feb 10, 2018</td>
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<td>SANS Scottsdale 2018</td>
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<td>SANS SEC455: SIEM Design Beta One 2018</td>
<td>Arlington, VAUS</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Anaheim, CAUS</td>
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<td>Bangalore, IN</td>
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<tr>
<td>SANS Brussels February 2018</td>
<td>Brussels, BE</td>
<td>Feb 19, 2018 - Feb 24, 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>SANS Secure Japan 2018</td>
<td>Tokyo, JP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cloud Security Summit &amp; Training 2018</td>
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<tr>
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<td>SANS Secure Singapore 2018</td>
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<td>Mar 12, 2018 - Mar 24, 2018</td>
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<td>Books &amp; MP3s Only, US</td>
<td>Anytime</td>
<td>Self Paced</td>
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