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Beyond the Tunnel: A Lab-Based Comparative Evaluation of Network-Layer VPN and Identity-Aware Reverse Proxy Architectures Against the CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model

Beyond the Tunnel: A Lab-Based Comparative Evaluation of Network-Layer VPN and Identity-Aware Reverse Proxy Architectures Against the CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model (PDF, 0.45MB)Published: 17 Sep, 2026
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Network-layer virtual private network (VPN) appliances still anchor enterprise remote access, and repeated mass exploitation of these appliances has made them a recurring initial access vector for ransomware operators. Identity-aware reverse proxies (IAPs), usually marketed under the Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) label, are positioned as the replacement.

Whether they actually align better with Zero Trust than a modern VPN, or only claim to, has not been tested objectively. To answer that question, a controlled lab was built, six products were deployed across both architectures, and each was put through a 21-test battery mapped to the five pillars of the CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model, with every outcome scored against predictions registered in advance and the raw evidence retained for audit.

The architectural advantage is strongest on the Networks pillar, where identity-aware proxy access withholds default network reachability and shrinks blast radius. For the Applications and Data pillars, the results depend primarily on the security features bundled with each product and its platform, and the two architectures converge on Identity because both draw their authentication strength from the same identity provider. The study contributes a repeatable methodology and a scored matrix that shows where the architectures genuinely diverge.

For security architects, it offers evidence-based grounds to make identity-aware proxy access the default for internal web applications, while recognizing that architecture alone does not settle every pillar.

FAQ

An AI agent interrogator is a tool that probes an AI agent's natural language interface from the outside, with no access to its source code, to reconstruct the list of tools, functions, and capabilities it can invoke. Agent Interrogator, introduced in this SANS research, does this through a two-stage process: identifying high-level capabilities first, then enumerating the specific tools behind each one.

Yes. In testing, Agent Interrogator detected 100% of the tools made available through a Zapier MCP server connected to a test agent, even though the agent's hard-coded prompts gave the LLM no explicit documentation about those tools.

Across 20 repeated interrogation runs per test target, Agent Interrogator detected both functions on a baseline test agent in 95% of runs and reported zero hallucinated tools against a control agent configured with no tools at all.

Detection frequency dropped for tools discovered later in a session, from 100% down to as low as 45% for the last-discovered Gmail functions. The research attributes this to the framework's maximum iteration limit being too low to exhaustively work through a large tool set, not to a fundamental flaw in the interrogation approach.

Excessive agency describes an AI agent being granted capabilities, such as authentication functions, that should sit outside the agent's control with proper guardrails. The test agent used in this research includes a get_current_user function as a deliberate example of this vulnerability class.

Not fully yet. The current framework does not recursively interrogate a discovered tool if that tool is itself another AI agent with its own set of tools, which the research flags as a priority area for future work as agent-to-agent protocols like MCP and A2A become more common.