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Windows Responders Guide

When a system encounters an incident, there is a need to handle the case properly to gather evidence and investigate the cause. Initial response is the stage where preliminary information is gathered to determine whether there is any breach of security and the possible causes if any. This paper provides the first responder guide to handle incident occur on a Windows platform system. In this paper, we will discuss what are the issues one needs to consider during the initial response stage. There are critical evidence th...

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GIAC Security Essentials

Practical Assignment Version 1.4b

Online

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Windows Responder's Guide

Abstract

When a system encounters an incident, there is a need to handle the case properly to gather evidence and investigate the cause. Initial response is the stage where preliminary information is gathered to determine whether there is any breach of security and the possible causes if any. This paper provides the first responder guide to handle incident occur on a Windows platform system.

In this paper, we will discuss what are the issues one needs to consider during the initial response stage. There are critical evidence that need to be protected and gathered during the initial response stage. We will hence discuss what are the tools that can be used to gather the necessary evidence and how to collect them appropriately. Finally, we will explore areas that one needs to look out for during the investigation on the evidence collected.

1. Introduction

When a system encounters an incident, the common reaction among most people will be to panic and jump straight into the system to find out the cause and hopefully try to get it back to normal working condition as soon as possible. Such knee-jerk reactions is especially so for systems supporting critical business operations. However, such actions may tamper with the evidence and even lead to a lost of information causing potential implications. This is especially critical if the recourse actions involve legal proceedings. Hence it is very important to establish a set of proper and systematic procedures to preserve all evidence during this critical initial response stage.

Not every incident will lead to a full investigation or legal proceeding. However, in the event when a security breach has taken place, proper handling of the system is necessary. However, one should always bear in mind that different incidents might require different procedures to resolve.

In most cases, not all systems can afford the downtime to carry a full investigation before knowing the most possible cause. Initial response is the stage of preliminary information gathering to determine the probable causes and the next appropriate response. Responders should be equipped with the right knowledge on how and what information to collect without disrupting the services. During the initial response, it is also critical to capture the volatile evidence on the live system before they are lost.

This paper will cover the initial response focusing on the windows platform, how and what evidence should be collected and analyzed quickly. We will begin the discussion on what is initial response, what are the potential issues need to be

considered, what to do and what not to do during the stage of initial response. To carry out the initial response successfully, the responder needs to prepare a set of tools to gather the evidence. We will list out some of the essential tools that a responder should be equipped and run through how and what evidence should be collected. This paper will not cover the forensic investigative analysis process. However, areas to look out for footprints of intrusion on the system will be discussed.

2. Initial Response

Initial response is the stage where preliminary information is gathered to determine whether there is any breach of security, and if so, to determine the possible breach and assess the potential impact. This will allow one to determine what is the next course of action, whether to let the system continue its operation or arrange for immediate isolation for a full investigation.

During the initial response stage, the following questions (Who, What, When, Where, How) should be asked:

- Who found the incident?
- How was the incident discovered?
- When did the incident occur?
- What was the level of damage?
- Where was the attack initiated?
- What techniques were being used to compromise the system?

There should be a well-documented policy and procedures on how different types of incidents should be handled. It is also important to understand the policies and response posture. The level of success to solve an incident does not depend only on the ability to uncover evidence from the system but also the ability to follow proper methodology during the incident response and evidence gathering stage.

When one suspects a system is compromised, the natural question is to ask whether to bring the system offline, power off the system or let it remain. For a compromised system, do you intend to collect evidence and trace the attacker or just patch the system and life goes on? There is no right answer to this. It really depends on the organization's business needs and response plan. For example, when one suspects the attacker is still on the system, you may not want to alert him/her by pulling the system offline immediately, but let the system remain and continue to monitor the his/her activities before taking appropriate actions. However, for a system that contains sensitive information, there may be a need to pull the system offline immediately before incurring further damage.

3. Evidence Gathering

Electronic media is easily manipulated, thus a responder needs to be careful when handling evidence. The basic principles to keep in mind when gathering the evidence is to perform as little operations on the system as possible and maintain a detailed documentation on every single steps on what have been done to the system.

Majority of the security incidents do not lead to civil or criminal proceedings. However, it is to the best interest of the organization to treat the incidents with the mindset that every action you take during incident response may later lead to legal proceeding or one day under the scrutiny of individuals who desire to discredit your techniques, testimony or basic finding skills.

Maintaining a chain of custody is important. Chain of custody establishes a record of who handle the evidence, how the evidence is handled and the integrity of the evidence is maintained.

When you begin to collect the evidence, record what you have done and the general findings in a notebook together with the date and time. Use a tape recorder if necessary. Note that the system that you are working on could be rootkited.

Keep in mind that there are things to avoid doing on the system:

- Writing to the original media
- Killing any processes
- Meddling the timestamp
- Using untrusted tools
- Meddling the system (reboot, patch, update, reconfigure the system).

4. Protecting the Volatile Information

When the system is required to undergo the computer forensic process, it is necessary to shutdown the system in order to make bit-level image of the drive. There are discussions on how system should be shutdown, and we are not going to cover this in details here. However, by shutting down the system, a great deal of information will be lost. These are the volatile information, which include the running processes, network connection and memory content. It is therefore essential to capture the volatile information on the live system before they are lost.

The order of volatility is as follows:

- Registers, cache contents
- Memory contents
- State of network connections
- State of running processes
- Contents of file system and hard drives
- Contents of removable and backup media

For the first four content, the information are lost or modified if the system is shutdown or rebooted.

Some of the volatile evidence that are important to gather are:

- System date and time
- Current running and active processes
- Current network connections
- Current open ports
- Applications that listening on the open sockets
- Current logon users

Such volatile evidence is important, as it will provide the critical first hand information, which may make or break a case. In some cases, some hackers may have tools that run in memory. Gathering such evidence is therefore necessary as part of the initial response procedure.

5. Creating a Response Toolkit

Preserving evidence and ensuring those evidence that you gather is correct is very important. There is a need to ensure the programs and tools that one uses to collect the evidence are trusted. Burning them into a CD-ROM media will be ideal to carry them around when responding to incidents. The responder should always be equipped with the necessary programs beforehand. This will shorten the response time and enable a more successful response effort.

There are many tools available that can be used to gather evidence from the system. Below is a list of tools that you should minimally be equipped with. There could be more depending how much you wish to carry out prior to bit-level imaging of the media. The important is to harvest the volatile information first. Those residing on the media could still be retrieved during the forensic analysis on the media image.

You need to ensure the tools that you used will not alter any data or timestamp of files in the system. It is therefore important to create a response disk that has all

the dependencies covered. The utility, filemon, could be used to determine the files being accessed and affected by each of the tool used.

Below is the set of response tools you should prepare:

Tools	Description	Where to get
cmd.exe	Command prompt.	From a trusted system
ipconfig	A system tool that enumerates IP address of the system.	From a trusted system
netstat	A system tool that enumerates listening ports and network connections.	From a trusted system
nbtstat	A system tool that displays NetBIOS over TCP/IP (NetBT) protocol statistics, NetBIOS name tables for both the local computer and remote computers, and the NetBIOS name cache.	From a trusted system
date	A system tool that enumerates the system date.	From a trusted system
time	A system tool that enumerates the system time.	From a trusted system
env	A utility that enumerates system variables.	http://unxutils.sourceforge.net/
psuptime	A utility that tells you how long a Win NT/2K system has been up.	http://www.sysinternals.com/ntw2k/freeware/psuptime.shtml
net	A system tool that enumerates NetBIOS connections, user accounts, share folders, start services etc.	From a trusted system
psloggedon	A utility that shows all users connected locally and remotely.	http://www.sysinternals.com/ntw2k/freeware/psloggedon.shtml
pulist	A command-line tool that displays active processes running on local or remote computers. It also captures the user running the processes.	http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/techinfo/reskit/tools/existing/pulist-o.asp
pslist	A command-line tool shows CPU-oriented information for all the processes that are currently running on the local system. The information listed for each process includes the time the process has executed, the amount of time the process has executed in kernel and user modes, and the amount of physical memory that the OS has assigned the process. Command-line switches allow you to view memory-oriented process information, thread statistics, or all three types of data.	http://www.sysinternals.com/ntw2k/freeware/pslist.shtml
listdlls	A utility that list all the DLLs that are currently loaded, including where they are loaded and their version numbers.	http://www.sysinternals.com/ntw2k/freeware/listdlls.shtml
fport	A utility that identify open ports and their associated applications.	http://www.foundstone.com/resources/intrusion_detection.htm

psservice	A utility that displays the status, configuration, and dependencies of a service, and allows you to start, stop, pause, resume and restart them.	http://www.sysinternals.com/ntw2k/freeware/psservice.shtml
psinfo	A command-line tool that gathers key information about the local or remote Windows NT/2000 system, including the type of installation, kernel build, registered organization and owner, number of processors and their type, amount of physical memory, the install date of the system, and if it's a trial version, the expiration date.	http://www.sysinternals.com/ntw2k/freeware/psinfo.shtml
arp	A system tool that maps the logical IP address to physical MAC address.	From a trusted system
hfind	A utility that find files that have hidden attribute set.	http://www.foundstone.com/resources/proddesc/forensic-toolkit.htm
streams	A utility to view NTFS file stream information.	http://www.sysinternals.com/ntw2k/source/misc.shtml
ntlast	A utility that monitors successful and failed login to the system.	http://www.foundstone.com/resources/proddesc/ntlast.htm
reg	A command-line registry manipulation. Allow you to query the registry entries.	From trusted NT Resource Kit
auditpol	A command-line tool that determines the audit policy on a system.	From trusted NT Resource Kit
regdmp	A command-line tool that dumps the registry as a text file.	From trusted NT Resource Kit
md5sum	A utility that generated a hash value of a file.	http://unxutils.sourceforge.net/
netcat (cryptcat)	A utility that reads and writes data across network connections. Cryptcat is an equivalent version of netcat but create an encrypted channel of communication.	http://www.atstake.com/research/tools/network_utilities/
cat	A utility that is the equivalent of cat in the Unix world.	http://unxutils.sourceforge.net/
find	A utility that is the equivalent of find in the Unix world.	http://unxutils.sourceforge.net/
grep	A utility that is the equivalent of grep in the Unix world.	http://unxutils.sourceforge.net/
filemon	A utility that monitors and displays file system activity on a system in real-time. It allows one to explore the way Windows works, seeing how applications use the files and DLLs.	http://www.sysinternals.com/ntw2k/source/filemon.shtml
pclip	A utility that put the Windows clipboard text to stdout.	http://unxutils.sourceforge.net/
tcpdump windump	A tool for network sniffer/analyzer. Windump is the Windows platform for tcpdump.	http://www.tcpdump.org/ http://windump.polito.it/

6. Gathering the Evidence


A critical question to ask someone when you encounter a live system is whether the system has been rebooted. It will be great news if the answer is no, but a yes reply is usually not a surprise.

Albeit the system has been rebooted and caused some vital information to be lost, it is still a good practice to carry out the initial response steps to gather the evidence prior to shutting down the system, as you will never know there could still be some other footprints around.


Step One: Open a Trusted Command Shell

The first step is to ensure all the tools are run from a trusted command shell.

Initiate a command shell from the Start Menu. Run the trusted command prompt from the trusted tools from the CD you have prepared.



All subsequent commands should then be run over this trusted shell.



Step Two: Prepare the Collection System

Remember that you should not write the evidence collected to the original media. A simple way is to write the data to a floppy disk. However, some of the evidence collected may exceed the disk space of the floppy disk. One simple way is to pipe the data over the network to your responder's system. To do this, we could use the popular known "TCP/IP Swiss Army Knife" tool, netcat, to perform the job.

The process of setting up the netcat is first by setting up the netcat listener on your responder's system.

```
D:\>nc -l -p 55555 >> evidence.txt
```

The above command open a listening port on your responder's system and redirect anything received to evidence.txt. The switch `-l` indicates listening mode. The listener will close the socket when it receives data. To allow the listener to continue to listen harder after the first data is captured, use the `-L` switch instead. Thus, you can choose whether to create a new file for each command or appending all evidence gathered into one single file by using the appropriate switch. The switch `-p` allows you to select the port for the listener. You could choose any other port.

When the listener is ready, you can start to pipe the evidence to the responder's system by executing the following (assuming E Drive is the CD ROM Drive):

```
E:\>nc <IP address of responder's system> <port> -e <command>
```

OR

```
E:\<command> | nc <IP address of responder's system> <port>
```

For example, if you want to pipe the directory listing to the responder's system (with IP address 10.1.2.3), you execute:

```
E:\> nc 10.1.2.3 55555 -e dir
```

OR

```
E:\dir | nc 10.1.2.3 55555
```

Note that the evidence pipes through netcat is in clear. If you prefer to encrypt the channel (for example, you suspect there is a sniffer on the network), you can use cryptcat. Cryptcat is the standard netcat enhanced with twofish encryption. It is used in the same way as netcat. Note that the secret is hardcoded to be "metallica" (use the `-k` option to change this key).




Figure 1: Using netcat to collect evidence

Step Three: Collect Volatile Evidence

Now you can start running your toolkit to collect the volatile evidence.

The necessary evidence to collect is:

- Basic system information
- Running processes
- Open sockets
- Network connections
- Network shares
- Network users

The system date and time should be recorded before and after collecting the evidence.

Command	Purpose
date /t time /t	To gather the date and time of the system. The system date and time must be checked with the current date and time to see any deviation. This is important when there is a need to correlate with logs from different sources, for example the firewall and IDS logs.
ipconfig /all	To gather the IP address configuration of the system.
env	Record the system environment. To understand the environment and identify any unusual environment being set. See Appendix, Figure A-1 for a screenshot on env listing.
psinfo	Record the system information, including the hotfixes applied.

	See Appendix, Figure A-2 for a screenshot on psinfo listing.
psuptime	Record the uptime of the system. See Appendix, Figure A-3 for a screenshot on psuptime listing.
psloggedon	Record users connected locally and remotely. To identify any unusual users on the system.
ntlast -r ntlast -f ntlast -r -f	To record the successful and failed logins to the system.
net use net session net file net share net view net user net accounts net localgroup net start	To gather the system information. This includes what are the share folders, user accounts, local group, start services etc. To identify unusual connections, users and services. See Appendix, Figure A-4 for a screenshot on net start listing.
nbtstat -n nbtstat -c nbtstat -s	To access the remote NetBIOS name cache, listening the recent NetBIOS connections for approximately the last ten minutes. To gather the local NETBIOS name and NetBIOS Table cache of remote systems. To identify unusual logon users.
pclip	Retrieve content of the Clipboard. To identify any unusual content on the clipboard.
pslist pulist psservice	Gather process information. pslist to gather running processes. pulist to gather active processes. To identify unusual processes. See Appendix A, Figure A-5 to A-7 on a screenshot on the various commands listing.
listdlls	Record all the DLLs that are currently loaded, including where they are loaded and their version numbers.

	<p>To identify unusual DLLs, open files and Trojans.</p> <p>See Appendix A, Figure A-8 on a screenshot on listdlls listing.</p>
fport	<p>Record opening ports.</p> <p>To identify opening ports and their applications.</p> <p>Useful checklist: http://www.neohapsis.com/neolabs/neo-ports/neo-ports.svcs http://www.simovits.com/nyheter9902.html http://isc.sans.org/port_details.html</p> <p>See Appendix A, Figure A-9 on a screenshot on fport listing.</p>
netstat -an	<p>Record listening services. Record open ports.</p> <p>To identify unusual ports and connections.</p>
netstat -rn	<p>Record routing table.</p> <p>To identify unusual network connections</p>
arp -a	<p>Maps logical IP address to Physical MAC address.</p>
<pre>dir /t:a /a /s /o:d c: dir /t:w /a /s /o:d c: dir /t:c /a /s /o:d c:</pre>	<p>Gather Last Access Time. Gather Last Modification Time Gather Last Create Time</p> <p>Only the files on the C Drive are recorded. For other drives, change the drive label according.</p> <p>To correlate timestamp of files with the unusual files, processes and connections.</p> <p>See Appendix A, Figure A-10 to A-12 on a screenshot on the various listings.</p>
hfind c:	<p>Record files in C Drive that have hidden attribute set.</p> <p>To identify suspicious files with hidden attribute set.</p> <p>See Appendix A, Figure A-13 on a screenshot on hfind listing.</p>
md5sum <file>	<p>Create the md5 checksum of all the files collected to ensure the information is not manipulated subsequently.</p>

Some of the evidence gathered may seem normal but when all the evidence are collected, they provide a good picture of the system. From there, one can trace the normal and unusual processes, connections and files occurring in the system.

Step Four: Collect Pertinent Logs

After gather the volatile information, the next thing is to gather the pertinent logs. While this information is not considered to be volatile and could be retrieved during the forensic investigation, getting these information will still be helpful to get the first hand knowledge of the cause. Note that bit-level image of the media could take a while and during this period, investigation can be started on these logs first.


The pertinent logs to gather are:

- Registry
- Events logs
- Relevant application logs

Command	Purpose
auditpol	To determine what policies exists on the system.
reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current Version\Run /s	Retrieve the content of all "Run", "RunOnce", "RunServices" and "RunServiceOnce" keys and all subkeys.
reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current Version\RunOnce /s	To identify unusual programs and Trojans.
reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current Version\RunServices /s	
reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current Version\RunServicesOnce /s	
reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current Version\Explorer\	Review Most Recently Used (MRU) files. To identify unusual files.
reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current Version\Uninstall	Trace improper uninstall of programs. To identify unusual programs and Trojans.
streams -s c:	Check any NTFS streams on the C Drive.

Note that an attacker can make use of the NTFS stream to hide files. For example, the following will allow the attacker to hide the file, `hack_file.exe`, in `web.log`.

```
C:\> cp hack_file.exe web.log:hack_file.exe
```




```
Command Prompt
C:\streams>e:\cp hack_file.exe web.log:hack_file.exe
C:\streams>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 2098-D720

Directory of C:\streams
05/17/2003  02:44p    <DIR>          .
05/17/2003  02:44p    <DIR>          ..
05/17/2003  02:24p                26 Copy of web.log
06/16/2001  04:24a            77,312 hack_file.exe
05/17/2003  02:45p                26 web.log
           3 File(s)              77,364 bytes
           2 Dir(s)          1,627,987,968 bytes free

C:\streams>
```


The file size of `web.log` will not change. To identify stream file, use the `streams` command.



```
MS-DOS E:\cmd.exe
E:\>streams -s c:\streams\
NTFS Streams Enumerator v1.1
Copyright (C) 1999 Mark Russinovich
Systems Internals - http://www.sysinternals.com
c:\streams\web.log:
  :hack_file.exe:$DATA 77312
E:\>_
```

To obtain the stream file, you just need to reverse the process:

```
C:\> cp web.log:hack_file.exe hack_file.exe
```

Stream file can be executed by START command:

```
C:\> start web.log:hack_file.exe
```

Event logs and other application logs are next to collect. They could be piped over to the responder's system using the `cat` utility. The default locations are as follows:

Logs	Default Location
Event logs	c:\winnt\system32\config\AppEvent.Evt c:\winnt\system32\config\SecEvent.Evt c:\winnt\system32\config\SysEvent.Evt
IIS Web logs (if any)	c:\winnt\system32\logfiles\W3SVC1\
Mail logs (if any)	c:\winnt\system32\logfiles\SMTPSVC1\

After the files are captured into the responder's system, you should make a `md5sum` on the files to ensure the integrity of the files are not tampered when carry out subsequent investigation.


Step Five: Perform additional network surveillance

Where possible, it is good to monitor closely any connection to the system subsequently, especially if you suspect the attacker might return. Running a sniffer program on another system to monitor the network activities on that suspected system would be good.

Tool	Purpose
tcpdump/windump/ethereal/snort	Network Monitoring. Information gathered from netstat. Did the attacker come back?

7. Scripting the Initial Response

The commands used to gather the evidence can be written in a batch file. This will make the job of the responder easier and at the same time avoid mistyping the command. A simple way to create a script is to create a text file and give a .bat extension to it. This will give us a very neat way to collect evidence from the system. For example, we could key in the following as a single text file with file name ir.bat:



```

time /t
date /t
ipconfig /all
netstat -an
netstat -rn
pslist
pulist
fport
time /t
date /t

```

8. Identification of Footprints

You have now collected:

- Basic system information
- Running processes
- Open sockets
- Network connections
- Network shares
- Network users
- Pertinent logs

The next step is to identify the footprints. During the review, one should look out for the following:

- Check for hidden or unusual files
- Check for unusual processes and open sockets
- Check for unusual application requests
- Examine any jobs running

- Analyze trust relationship
- Check for suspicious accounts
- Determine the patch level of the system

Whenever there is any suspicious observation, take note of the event and timestamp. Correlate the event with other logs based on related files, processes, relationship, keywords and timestamp. The timestamp will also be useful to correlate with external logs such as the logs from firewall and intrusion detection system. Any suspected events should not be left out.

If one is analyzing IIS records, note that it uses UTC time. This is supposed to help to synchronize when running servers in multiple time zones. Windows calculates UTC time by offsetting the value of the system clock with the system time zone. Take note of this when you correlate the entries of the IIS logs with timestamp of other logs.

The Registry provides a good audit trail:

- Find software installed in the past
- Determine security posture of the machine
- Determine DLL Trojan and startup programs
- Determine Most Recently Used (MRU) Files information

9. What's Next?

Based on initial response finding, one should be able to determine the possible cause of the security breach and decide the next course of action whether to:

- Perform a full bit-level imaging for full investigation;
- Call the law enforcer; or
- Get the system back to normal (reinstall, patch and harden the system).

For bit-level disk image, there are tools out there that could perform an excellent job. [Encase](#) and [SafeBack](#) are two of the commercial tools that you could consider for image acquisition and restoration, data extraction, and computer forensic analysis. Another tool that you can consider is dd, which is free. dd is a utility that comes with most Unix platform. Now it has ported to Windows platform as well and you can get it at <http://unxutils.sourceforge.net/>.

10. Wrapping Up

In the event of any incident, having a proper initial response plan and procedure is important to ensure the evidence gathered is intact and at the same time do not tamper the evidence as far as possible. Volatile information is critical to

protect and ensure they are collected first before they are lost. Sometimes such information may make or break a case.

By having a good preparation to response to any security incidents will save a lot of time and effort in handling cases. Planning ahead is necessary for initial response. Never rush to handle an incident without any preparation.

Having said all these, the next step after a good preparation is practice. The actions taken during the stage of initial response is critical. Do not wait for an incident to occur before you start to kick in your established plan, checklist and toolkit. Remember practice makes perfect.

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Investigation of Windows NT/2000", 4 December 2001, URL:
http://www.sans.org/rr/incident/comp_forensics3.php

Lori Willer, "Computer Forensics", 4 May 2001, URL:
http://www.sans.org/rr/incident/comp_forensics2.php

Kelvin Mandia and Chris Prosise, "Incident Response: Investigating Computer
Crime", Osborne/McGraw-Hill, July 2001, ISBN: 0-07-213182-9

<http://unxutils.sourceforge.net/>

<http://www.sysinternals.com/>


<http://www.foundstone.com/>

<http://www.atstake.com/>

<http://www.guidancesoftware.com/>

<http://www.forensics-intl.com/>

Appendix A




```
e:\cmd.exe

E:\>env
*:*:*
*E:*E*\
*EXITCODE-00000000
ALLUSERSPROFILE=C:\Documents and Settings\All Users
APPDATA=C:\Documents and Settings\koonyaw\Application Data
COMMONPROGRAMFILES=C:\Program Files\Common Files
COMPUTERNAME=AUTUMN
COMPSSFC=C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe
HOMEDRIVE=C:
HOMEPATH=\
LOGONSERVER=\\AUTUMN
NUMBER_OF_PROCESSORS=1
OS=Windows_NT
PATH=C:\cygdrive\c\WINDOWS\system32;C:\cygdrive\c\WINDOWS;C:\cygdrive\c\WINDOWS\System32\Wbem
PATHEXT=.COM;.EXE;.BAT;.CMD;.VBS;.VBE;.JS;.JSE;.WSF;.USH
PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE=x86
PROCESSOR_IDENTIFIER=x86 Family 15 Model 2 Stepping 7, GenuineIntel
PROCESSOR_LEVEL=15
PROCESSOR_REVISION=A207
PROGRAMFILES=C:\Program Files
PROMPT=$PSG
SESSIONNAME=Console
SYSTEMDRIVE=C:
SYSTEMROOT=C:\WINDOWS
TEMP=C:\cygdrive\c\DOCUMENT1\koonyaw\LOCALS~1\Temp
TMP=C:\cygdrive\c\DOCUMENT1\koonyaw\LOCALS~1\Temp
USERDOMAIN=AUTUMN
USERNAME=koonyaw
USERPROFILE=C:\Documents and Settings\koonyaw
WINDIR=C:\WINDOWS
TERM=cygwin

E:\>_
```

Figure A-1: env



```
e:\cmd.exe

E:\>psinfo

PsInfo v1.11 - local and remote system information viewer
Copyright (C) 2001 Mark Russinovich
SysInternals - www.sysinternals.com

System information for \\AUTUMN:
Kernel version: Microsoft Windows XP, [ntprocessor] Free
Product type: Professional
Product version: 5.1
Service pack: 1
Kernel build number: 2600
Registered organizations:
Registered owner: koonyaw
Install date: 4/1/2003, 6:24:00 AM
Activation status: Activated
System root: C:\WINDOWS
Processors: 1
Processor speed: 1.2 GHz
Processor type: x86 Family 15 Model 2 Stepping 7, GenuineIntel
Physical memory: 400 MB
Hotfixes:
0147222: No Description
0323255: Windows XP Hotfix (SP2) [See 0323255 for more information]
0327979: Windows XP Hotfix (SP2) 0327979
0328310: Windows XP Hotfix (SP2) 0328310
0329048: Windows XP Hotfix (SP2) [See 0329048 for more information]
0329115: Windows XP Hotfix (SP2) [See 0329115 for more information]
0329170: Windows XP Hotfix (SP2) 0329170
0329390: Windows XP Hotfix (SP2) [See 0329390 for more information]
0329441: Windows XP Hotfix (SP2) 0329441
0329834: Windows XP Hotfix (SP2) [See 0329834 for more information]
0331953: Windows XP Hotfix (SP2) 0331953
0810565: Windows XP Hotfix (SP2) 0810565
0810577: Windows XP Hotfix (SP2) 0810577
0810800: Windows XP Hotfix (SP2) 0810800
0811490: Windows XP Hotfix (SP2) 0811490
0811600: Windows XP Hotfix (SP2) 0811600
0814000: Windows XP Hotfix (SP2) 0814000
0814995: Windows XP Hotfix (SP2) 0814995
0817207: Windows XP Hotfix (SP2) 0817207

E:\>_
```

Figure A-2: psinfo

```

e:\cmd.exe
E:\>psuptime

PsUptime v1.1  system uptime utility for Windows NT/2K
by Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

This computer has been up for 1 day, 0 hours, 13 minutes, 17 seconds.

E:\>

```

Figure A-3: psuptime

```

e:\cmd.exe
E:\>net start
These Windows services are started:

Ati HotKey Poller
Automatic Updates
COM+ Event System
Computer Browser
Cryptographic Services
DHCP Client
Distributed Link Tracking Client
DNS Client
Error Reporting Service
Event Log
Help and Support
Infrared Monitor
IPSEC Services
Logical Disk Manager
Messenger

```

Figure A-4: net start

```

e:\cmd.exe
E:\>pslist

PsList v1.12 - Process Information Lister
Copyright (C) 1999-2000 Mark Russinovich
Systems Internals - http://www.sysinternals.com

Process information for AUTUMN:

Name           Pid  Pri  Thd  Hnd      Mem      User Time   Kernel Time  Elapsed Time
Idle           0    0    1    0        20      0:00:00.000  1:39:08.213  0:00:00.000
System         4    8    50   102       216     0:00:00.000  0:00:00.639  0:00:00.000
SMSS           508   11    3    21        352     0:00:00.020  0:00:00.030  24:20:36.254
CSRSS          564   13   11   336        804     0:00:01.822  0:00:07.470  24:20:34.741
WINLOGON       588   13   19   550       5016    0:00:00.791  0:00:06.399  24:20:32.949
SERVICES       640    9   16   295       3048    0:00:00.490  0:00:01.522  24:20:32.799
LSASS          652    9   19   290       1340    0:00:00.310  0:00:00.280  24:20:32.789
SUCHOST        804    8    8   220       2832    0:00:00.130  0:00:00.140  24:20:32.208
SUCHOST        828    8   62   995      14964    0:00:01.392  0:00:00.961  24:20:32.168
SUCHOST        960    8    4    44        1716    0:00:00.030  0:00:00.040  24:20:31.427
SUCHOST       1004    8   15   167       4132    0:00:00.080  0:00:00.150  24:20:30.806
SPOOLSV       1168    8   11   132       3812    0:00:00.100  0:00:00.130  24:20:30.325

```

Figure A-5: pslist

```

c:\ Command Prompt
Process PID User
Idle 0
System 4
SMSS.EXE 508 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
CSRSS.EXE 564 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
WINLOGON.EXE 588 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
SERVICES.EXE 640 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
LSASS.EXE 652 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
SUCHOST.EXE 804 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
SUCHOST.EXE 828 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
SUCHOST.EXE 960
SUCHOST.EXE 1004
SPOOLSV.EXE 1168 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
ATI2EUXX.EXE 1272 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

```

Figure A-6: pulist

```

e:\cmd.exe
E:\>pservice inore
PsService v1.01 - local and remote services viewer/controller
Copyright (C) 2001 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

SERVICE_NAME: Alerter
DISPLAY_NAME: Alerter
Notifies selected users and computers of administrative alerts. If the service is
stopped, programs that use administrative alerts will not receive them. If thi
s service is disabled, any services that explicitly depend on it will fail to st
art.
        TYPE                : 20 WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS
        STATE                 : 1 STOPPED
                               <NOT_STOPPABLE,NOT_PAUSABLE,IGNORES_SHUTDOWN>
        WIN32_EXIT_CODE       : 1077 (0x435)
        SERVICE_EXIT_CODE    : 0 (0x0)
        CHECKPOINT           : 0x0
        WAIT_HINT            : 0x0

SERVICE_NAME: ALG
DISPLAY_NAME: Application Layer Gateway Service
Provides support for 3rd party protocol plug-ins for Internet Connection Sharing
and the Internet Connection Firewall
        TYPE                : 10 WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
        STATE                 : 1 STOPPED
                               <NOT_STOPPABLE,NOT_PAUSABLE,IGNORES_SHUTDOWN>
        WIN32_EXIT_CODE       : 1077 (0x435)
        SERVICE_EXIT_CODE    : 0 (0x0)
        CHECKPOINT           : 0x0
        WAIT_HINT            : 0x0

SERVICE_NAME: AppMgmt
DISPLAY_NAME: Application Management
Provides software installation services such as Assign, Publish, and Remove.
        TYPE                : 20 WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS
        STATE                 : 1 STOPPED
                               <NOT_STOPPABLE,NOT_PAUSABLE,IGNORES_SHUTDOWN>
        WIN32_EXIT_CODE       : 1077 (0x435)

```

Figure A-7: psservice


```

C:\> Command Prompt

ListDLLs V2.23 - DLL lister for Win9x/NT
Copyright (C) 1997-2000 Mark Russinovich
http://www.sysinternals.com

-----
System pid: 4
Command line: <no command line>
-----
SMSS.EXE pid: 508
Command line: \SystemRoot\System32\smss.exe

Base      Size      Version      Path
0x48580000 0xe000      \SystemRoot\System32\smss.exe
0x77f50000 0xa7000    5.01.2600.1106 C:\WINDOWS\System32\ntdll.dll
-----
CSRSS.EXE pid: 564
Command line: C:\WINDOWS\system32\csrss.exe ObjectDirectory=\Windows SharedSection=1024,3072,512 Windows=0n SubSystemType=Windows ServerDll=basesrv,1 ServerDll=winsrv:UserServerDllInitialization,3 ServerDll=winsrv:ConServerDllInitialization,2 ProfileControl=Off MaxRequestThreads=16

Base      Size      Version      Path
0x4a680000 0x4000      \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\csrss.exe
0x77f50000 0xa7000    5.01.2600.1106 C:\WINDOWS\System32\ntdll.dll
0x75b40000 0xa000      5.01.2600.1106 C:\WINDOWS\system32\CSRSSRU.dll
0x75b50000 0xe000      5.01.2600.1106 C:\WINDOWS\system32\basesrv.dll
0x75b60000 0x46000    5.01.2600.1134 C:\WINDOWS\system32\winsrv.dll
0x77d40000 0x86000    5.01.2600.1134 C:\WINDOWS\system32\USER32.dll
0x77e60000 0xe6000    5.01.2600.1106 C:\WINDOWS\system32\KERNEL32.dll
-- More --

```

Figure A-8: listdlls

```

MS Select E:\cmd.exe

E:\>fport
FPort v1.33 - TCP/IP Process to Port Mapper
Copyright 2000 by Foundstone, Inc.
http://www.foundstone.com

Pid  Process      Port  Proto Path
412  svchost      -> 135   TCP   C:\WINNT\system32\svchost.exe
8    System       -> 139   TCP
8    System       -> 445   TCP
704  MSTask       -> 1025  TCP   C:\WINNT\system32\MSTask.exe
728  usmon        -> 1027  TCP   C:\WINNT\system32\ZoneLabs\usmon.exe
8    System       -> 1028  TCP
1416 navapw32     -> 1035  TCP   C:\PROGRAM~1\NORTON~1\navapw32.exe
820  svchost      -> 1440  TCP   C:\WINNT\system32\svchost.exe
820  svchost      -> 1455  TCP   C:\WINNT\system32\svchost.exe
820  svchost      -> 1457  TCP   C:\WINNT\system32\svchost.exe

```

Figure A-9: fport

```

e:\cmd.exe
E:\>dir /t:a /a /s /o:d c: \more
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 50BE-DCA1

Directory of C:\

10/02/2001 12:00 AM          0 IO.SYS
10/02/2001 12:00 AM      233,632 ntldr
10/02/2001 12:00 AM      47,580 NTDETECT.COM
10/02/2001 12:00 AM    <DIR>      System Volume Information
10/02/2001 12:00 AM          0 MSDOS.SYS
10/02/2001 12:00 AM          0 AUTOEXEC.BAT
10/02/2001 12:00 AM          0 CONFIG.SYS
10/11/2002 12:00 AM    <DIR>      Drivers
10/11/2002 12:00 AM    <DIR>      Model
10/11/2002 12:00 AM    <DIR>      PCDR
10/11/2002 12:00 AM    <DIR>      Program Files
12/13/2002 12:00 AM    <DIR>      Documents and Settings
12/13/2002 12:00 AM    <DIR>      Recycled
04/03/2003 12:00 AM    <DIR>      WUtemp
04/24/2003 12:00 AM    <DIR>      WINDOWS
05/13/2003 12:00 AM          194 boot.ini
05/16/2003 12:00 AM    754,974,720 pagefile.sys
           8 File(s)      755,256,126 bytes

Directory of C:\WINDOWS

10/02/2001 12:00 AM    <DIR>      -
10/02/2001 12:00 AM    <DIR>      ..
10/02/2001 12:00 AM          791 orun32.ini
10/02/2001 12:00 AM    218,245 orun32.isu
10/02/2001 12:00 AM    <DIR>      repair
10/02/2001 12:00 AM    <DIR>      inf
10/02/2001 12:00 AM    <DIR>      Help
10/02/2001 12:00 AM    <DIR>      Fonts
10/02/2001 12:00 AM    <DIR>      Config

```

Figure A-10: Last Access Time

```

e:\cmd.exe
E:\>dir /t:m /a /s /o:d c: \more
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 50BE-DCA1

Directory of C:\

10/02/2001 11:01 AM    <DIR>      WINDOWS
10/02/2001 11:05 AM    <DIR>      Documents and Settings
10/02/2001 11:16 AM    <DIR>      Program Files
10/02/2001 11:18 AM          0 AUTOEXEC.BAT
10/02/2001 11:18 AM          0 IO.SYS
10/02/2001 11:18 AM          0 MSDOS.SYS
10/02/2001 11:18 AM          0 CONFIG.SYS
10/02/2001 11:25 AM    <DIR>      System Volume Information
08/29/2002 05:00 AM      233,632 ntldr
08/29/2002 05:00 AM      47,580 NTDETECT.COM
10/11/2002 10:23 AM    <DIR>      Model
10/11/2002 11:29 AM    <DIR>      Drivers
10/11/2002 11:57 AM    <DIR>      PCDR
12/13/2002 12:46 PM    <DIR>      Recycled
04/03/2003 06:24 AM          194 boot.ini
04/03/2003 06:42 AM    <DIR>      WUtemp
05/16/2003 12:11 PM    754,974,720 pagefile.sys
           8 File(s)      755,256,126 bytes

Directory of C:\WINDOWS

07/03/1997 08:35 AM      109,056 UNWISE32.EXE
07/03/1997 08:44 AM      82,864 UNWISE.EXE
05/01/1998 08:48 AM         4,052 unwise.ini
10/29/1998 01:15 PM    306,688 IsUninst.exe
10/02/2001 10:51 AM    <DIR>      I386
10/02/2001 11:01 AM    <DIR>      inf
10/02/2001 11:01 AM    <DIR>      Help
10/02/2001 11:01 AM    <DIR>      Fonts
10/02/2001 11:01 AM    <DIR>      Config

```

Figure A-11: Last Modification Time

```

e:\cmd.exe
E:\>dir /t:c /a /s /o:d c: :more
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 50BE-DCA1

Directory of C:\

10/02/2001  10:56 AM                47,580 NTDETECT.COM
10/02/2001  10:56 AM             233,632 ntldr
10/02/2001  10:57 AM                194 boot.ini
10/02/2001  11:01 AM                <DIR>      WINDOWS
10/02/2001  11:05 AM                <DIR>      Documents and Settings
10/02/2001  11:06 AM                <DIR>      Program Files
10/02/2001  11:18 AM                 0 CONFIG.SYS
10/02/2001  11:18 AM                 0 AUTOEXEC.BAT
10/02/2001  11:18 AM                 0 IO.SYS
10/02/2001  11:18 AM                 0 MSDOS.SYS
10/02/2001  11:25 AM                <DIR>      System Volume Information
10/11/2002  10:23 AM                <DIR>      Model
10/11/2002  11:29 AM                <DIR>      Drivers
10/11/2002  11:57 AM                <DIR>      PCDR
12/13/2002  12:46 PM                <DIR>      Recycled
04/03/2003  06:42 AM                <DIR>      WUtemp
04/09/2003  04:53 PM             754,974,720 pagefile.sys
           B File(s)             755,256,126 bytes

Directory of C:\WINDOWS

10/02/2001  10:51 AM                <DIR>      I386
10/02/2001  10:54 AM                 707 _default.pif
10/02/2001  10:55 AM             1,004,032 explorer.exe
10/02/2001  10:55 AM                 80 explorer.scf
10/02/2001  10:55 AM                1,405 msdfmap.ini
10/02/2001  10:56 AM             134,144 regedit.exe
10/02/2001  10:56 AM                 231 system.ini
10/02/2001  10:56 AM             46,592 twain_32.dll
10/02/2001  10:56 AM             94,784 twain.dll

```

Figure A-12: Last Create Time

```

e:\cmd.exe
E:\>hfind c: :more
Searching...
C:\
ntldr                02/10/2001  00:00:00
NTDETECT.COM        02/10/2001  00:00:00
boot.ini            13/05/2003  00:00:00
C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\Application Data\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Quick Launch
desktop.ini        02/04/2003  00:00:00
C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\Application Data\Microsoft\Internet Explorer
Desktop.htt       02/04/2003  00:00:00
C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\Application Data\Drag'n Drop CD\database
desktop.ini        02/04/2003  00:00:00
C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\Favorites
C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\Favorites\Links
desktop.ini        02/04/2003  00:00:00
C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\My Documents\My Music
desktop.ini        02/04/2003  00:00:00
C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\My Documents\My Pictures
desktop.ini        02/04/2003  00:00:00
C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\My Documents
desktop.ini        02/04/2003  00:00:00
C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\Recent
desktop.ini        02/04/2003  00:00:00
C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\SendTo\ Drive D for Drag'n Drop CD
desktop.ini        02/04/2003  00:00:00
C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\Start Menu\Programs\Startup
desktop.ini        02/04/2003  00:00:00
C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\Start Menu\Programs\Accessories\Accessibi
lity
desktop.ini        02/04/2003  00:00:00
C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\Start Menu\Programs\Accessories\Entertain
ment
desktop.ini        02/04/2003  00:00:00
C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\Start Menu\Programs\Accessories
-- More --

```

Figure A-13: hfind



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Rocky Mountain Fall 2017	Denver, COUS	Sep 25, 2017 - Sep 30, 2017	Live Event
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Data Breach Summit & Training	Chicago, ILUS	Sep 25, 2017 - Oct 02, 2017	Live Event
SANS Copenhagen 2017	Copenhagen, DK	Sep 25, 2017 - Sep 30, 2017	Live Event
SANS London September 2017	London, GB	Sep 25, 2017 - Sep 30, 2017	Live Event
SANS Oslo Autumn 2017	Oslo, NO	Oct 02, 2017 - Oct 07, 2017	Live Event
SANS DFIR Prague Summit & Training 2017	Prague, CZ	Oct 02, 2017 - Oct 08, 2017	Live Event
SANS Phoenix-Mesa 2017	Mesa, AZUS	Oct 09, 2017 - Oct 14, 2017	Live Event
SANS October Singapore 2017	Singapore, SG	Oct 09, 2017 - Oct 28, 2017	Live Event
Secure DevOps Summit & Training	Denver, COUS	Oct 10, 2017 - Oct 17, 2017	Live Event
SANS Tysons Corner Fall 2017	McLean, VAUS	Oct 14, 2017 - Oct 21, 2017	Live Event
SANS Brussels Autumn 2017	Brussels, BE	Oct 16, 2017 - Oct 21, 2017	Live Event
SANS Tokyo Autumn 2017	Tokyo, JP	Oct 16, 2017 - Oct 28, 2017	Live Event
SANS Berlin 2017	Berlin, DE	Oct 23, 2017 - Oct 28, 2017	Live Event
SANS Seattle 2017	Seattle, WAUS	Oct 30, 2017 - Nov 04, 2017	Live Event
SANS San Diego 2017	San Diego, CAUS	Oct 30, 2017 - Nov 04, 2017	Live Event
SANS Gulf Region 2017	Dubai, AE	Nov 04, 2017 - Nov 16, 2017	Live Event
SANS Miami 2017	Miami, FLUS	Nov 06, 2017 - Nov 11, 2017	Live Event
SANS Milan November 2017	Milan, IT	Nov 06, 2017 - Nov 11, 2017	Live Event
SANS Amsterdam 2017	Amsterdam, NL	Nov 06, 2017 - Nov 11, 2017	Live Event
SANS Paris November 2017	Paris, FR	Nov 13, 2017 - Nov 18, 2017	Live Event
Pen Test Hackfest Summit & Training 2017	Bethesda, MDUS	Nov 13, 2017 - Nov 20, 2017	Live Event
SANS Sydney 2017	Sydney, AU	Nov 13, 2017 - Nov 25, 2017	Live Event
SANS London November 2017	London, GB	Nov 27, 2017 - Dec 02, 2017	Live Event
SANS San Francisco Winter 2017	San Francisco, CAUS	Nov 27, 2017 - Dec 02, 2017	Live Event
SIEM & Tactical Analytics Summit & Training	Scottsdale, AZUS	Nov 28, 2017 - Dec 05, 2017	Live Event
SANS Khobar 2017	Khobar, SA	Dec 02, 2017 - Dec 07, 2017	Live Event
SANS Munich December 2017	Munich, DE	Dec 04, 2017 - Dec 09, 2017	Live Event
European Security Awareness Summit & Training 2017	London, GB	Dec 04, 2017 - Dec 07, 2017	Live Event
SANS Austin Winter 2017	Austin, TXUS	Dec 04, 2017 - Dec 09, 2017	Live Event
SANS Frankfurt 2017	Frankfurt, DE	Dec 11, 2017 - Dec 16, 2017	Live Event
SANS Bangalore 2017	Bangalore, IN	Dec 11, 2017 - Dec 16, 2017	Live Event
SANS SEC504 at Cyber Security Week 2017	OnlineNL	Sep 25, 2017 - Sep 30, 2017	Live Event
SANS OnDemand	Books & MP3s OnlyUS	Anytime	Self Paced