SEC595: Applied Data Science and AI/Machine Learning for Cybersecurity Professionals


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Contact UsMost organizations today cannot detect if an end user removes their laptop's hard drive, connects it externally, steals data, then reinstalls the drive. While solutions exist today, such as tamper-evident tape, tamper protection BIOS settings, or forensic tools to identify drive activity artifacts, none provide real-time alerts when a drive has been removed and externally connected.
This paper analyzes low-cost detection methods, using existing hard drive counters from Self-Monitoring, Analysis, and Reporting Technology (S.M.A.R.T.) and the Windows Registry, for their fidelity in detecting hard drive removal. Since these counters capture the number of times a drive is powered on, they could be monitored for anomalies upon system boot, providing a cost-effective detection mechanism against insider threats.






