SEC536: Adversarial AI - Penetration Testing AI Systems


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Contact UsThe House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party has published a report on its investigation into three Chinese telecommunications companies: China Mobile, China Unicom, and China Telecom. The US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) revoked or denied the companies' Section 214 authorizations between 2019 and 2022 due to cybersecurity concerns, years before the discovery of the Salt Typhoon cyber espionage campaign. The legislators found that "Chinese state-owned carriers remained deeply embedded in the U.S. internet ecosystem long after federal regulators had already found them vulnerable to CCP exploitation, influence, and control." The report makes several policy recommendations, including codifying the FCC’s authority to deny blanket authorizations and restrict domestic interconnection; establishing statutory authority over retained foreign adversary infrastructure; broadening Team Telecom and Information and Communications Technology Services (ICTS) jurisdiction over private commercial arrangements involving foreign controlled infrastructure; mandating entity specific FCC Covered List determinations and funding targeted rip-and-replace; "funding internet routing-security enforcement and ensuring federal agencies have the technical talent necessary to address foreign adversary threats, [and] requir[ing] interim logging, monitoring, and recording until covered infrastructure is removed or mitigated."

This story reinforces an old engineering principle: You cannot secure what you cannot see. Before organizations can reduce risk from foreign-controlled infrastructure, they first need an accurate understanding of where those systems and interconnections remain. Also, decommissioning hardware and services takes time; technical debt and legacy interconnections can outlive the policies that were intended to eliminate them.

This story is particularly relevant to the debate around the proposed EU Cybersecurity Act 2.0, where a vendor could potentially be designated "high-risk" based on the country in which it is headquartered rather than based on any demonstrated technical weakness. Geopolitical risk matters, but it should complement rather than replace evidence-based technical risk assessments. Many argue that given the recent growing geopolitical tensions between the USA and the EU, this approach could theoretically result in US technology companies being deemed as "high-risk." As I recently argued in Help Net Security, we should judge a vendor's security by its technology and practices, not simply by its postcode. https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/06/16/eu-cybersecurity-act-2-0-regulation/

This infrastructure was linked to the successful Salt Typhoon attacks, so we need to mitigate that threat vector. It is interesting to note that the CCP doesn't allow US telecom companies into China. The tricky part is replacing existing telecommunication infrastructure using disallowed components; in some cases this can be a non-starter. Start with an inventory — you may not have any of the disallowed components. Then see if there are possible mitigations, to include revisiting planned lifecycle replacement activities.
Government studies routinely recycle the same core advice: clarify authority, increase funding, and train personnel. Yet implementation remains the perennial bottleneck, and most reports gather dust. This release is no exception, merely repeating insights we’ve known since 2019.
Nextgov/FCW
The Record
ConstantContact
House
Analysis published by Forescout on August 5, 2026 describes the recent attacks on US water infrastructure and provides additional details and statistics about internet-exposed Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley programmable logic controllers (PLCs). Forescout warns that over 4,400 devices worldwide currently expose port 44818 to the internet, and that the specific MicroLogix 1400 and 1100 models being targeted use EtherNet/IP engineering protocol on that exposed port. EtherNet/IP accounts for 22% of all OT interactions on the company's honeypots, and the researchers explain that "exposing EtherNet/IP to the internet creates an unauthenticated path that, depending on device configuration, can allow attackers to obtain information about exposed assets or even write configurations on them." 70% of the exposed devices in the US are in the networks of large mobile carriers, and are likely connected via cellular modems. Of the exposed devices in cities targeted in the recent attacks, 86% were on the same mobile carrier network, connected via cellular routers, and two hosts exposed those routers' web management interfaces; one 15-device fleet of SCADA controllers "shared adjacent network addresses, similar serial numbers, largely uniform firmware, and one identical GPS coordinate pair." While certain CVEs in Rockwell/Allen-Bradley PLCs are known to be exploited, Forescout emphasizes that "the impacts described publicly could be achieved without exploiting these issues." The researchers also saw risky exposure patterns beyond PLCs, observing "expired certificates, unrenewed remote-access hostnames, wildcard coverage that hides live services, and abandoned servers [which] together indicate incomplete asset visibility on municipal utilities." Forescout recommends isolating OT assets while allowing for remote operations with Secure Remote Access (SRA), and echoes the recommendations in advisories from the FBI/EPA, the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and Rockwell. The blog post also offers a table of recommendations for threat hunting.

Confirmation that the attacks targeting PLCs are real and that these are exposed to the Internet. That we can fix. Don’t focus on any specific PLC model or brand — isolate all of them. Then make sure that your management interfaces to your routers, regardless of location, are not internet accessible. If possible, limit access not only by network but by device. Access to all devices in a trusted network is an outdated model we need to evolve from.

There is a popular saying along the lines that “the EU regulates while the rest of the world innovates.” While there may be a grain of truth in this, examples like this demonstrate why regulations such as the EU's NIS2 Directive are necessary and why we can no longer rely solely on organisations to self-regulate the security of infrastructure upon which society depends. Regulation is often not the enemy of innovation; it is the price we pay for resilience.
NVIDIA's Open Secure AI Alliance — a coalition of over 120 organizations organized to support open-source AI security, announced following the news of OpenAI's attack on Hugging Face — is requesting comments on the Shared AI Findings Exchange (SAFE). SAFE is proposed as an independent organization comprising AI developers, infrastructure providers, customers, and researchers, as well as representatives of government and other sectors, responsible for "confidentially collect[ing] and analyz[ing] AI incidents and near misses, promptly inform[ing] affected parties and turn[ing] recurring failures into shared, evidence-based controls that reduce systemic risk." The program will handle a form of coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD) for AI incidents, review technical issues to promote open learning, conduct incident responses proportional to risk, establish interoperability and assurance requirements for its members, and prioritize both candid reporting and public learning. The guidelines include reporting requirements, timelines for notification, mandated preservation of evidence, a framework for incident review, a model for disclosure, and an imperative to produce detailed defensive recommendations. The same day, US National Cyber Director Sean Cairncross spoke at the Black Hat conference in Las Vegas on August 4, advocating for US investment in open-source AI.

We have spent decades developing coordinated vulnerability disclosure for traditional software, so it makes sense to develop similar mechanisms for AI. The challenge will be determining what constitutes an AI security incident, who needs to be told, and when. For organisations operating in Europe, initiatives such as SAFE will also need to coexist with regulatory reporting obligations under legislation such as NIS2, GDPR, DORA and the EU AI Act.

At this point, AI is in your future, and is likely used all over your shop, authorized or otherwise. Reframe your stock image of what “taking work home to work on it” means when your user can just upload to their favorite AI for assistance. We all need all the help we can get to make good decisions regarding AI deployment, as well as information about incident response, let alone best practices. The SAFE proposal, which is open for comments, includes reporting confidentiality, notification, collaborative analysis, structured reviews, governance, and more. Get in on this action, it's going to be helpful.

(I’m going to skew very old in this one…) Some of you may remember Thomas McCabe’s Software Complexity Metric where a score of above 50 meant the software was very high risk and essentially untestable. The NVIDIA release would probably score at least 49! But it is a complex topic and NVIDIA has a unique leverage point they can utilize to drive progress, especially if the big AI platforms back them. Intel had this chance in the early Internet years but was battling Microsoft and other issues, and it took many years for the needed CPU-embedded security features to come to market.
NVIDIA
GitHub
TechCrunch
GovInfoSecurity
Nextgov/FCW
This week, the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added five CVEs to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, all of which have three-day mitigation due dates. CVE-2026-63077, CVSS score 9.8, is a critical deserialization of untrusted data vulnerability in on-premises versions of JetBrains TeamCity that could result in unauthenticated remote code execution via the agent polling protocol. JetBrains has released updates to address the vulnerability, so users are urged to update to JetBrains TeamCity 2026.1.3 or 2025.11.7. CVE-2026-9198, CVSS score 9.8, is a critical code injection vulnerability in IBM Langflow OSS that can be exploited to allow unauthenticated attackers to achieve full remote code execution on default Langflow deployments. The flaw affects Langflow OSS versions 1.0.0 through 1.10.0, and users are urged to update to version 1.10.1 or later. CVE-2026-34486, CVSS score 9,8, is a critical a missing encryption of sensitive data vulnerability in Apache Tomcat that allows the bypass of the EncryptInterceptor. The flaw affects Apache Tomcat versions 11.0.20, 10.1.53, and 9.0.116, and users are urged to update to Apache Tomcat versions 11.0.21, 10.1.54, 9.0.117 or later. Patches for CVE-2026-18556 and CVE-2026-18577 address a high-severity authentication bypass using an alternate path or channel vulnerability in N-able N-central. The latter CVE is the result of an incomplete patch for the former. The flaw could be exploited to gain full administrative access to an N-central console. Users are urged to update to N‑central version 2026.3.1.7.

It is tempting to look at CISA's continued KEV catalog additions, like the five actively exploited flaws this week, and declare a "vulnerability apocalypse." However, the KEV catalog is not evidence that security is failing; rather, it shows that CISA's process is succeeding — for now. By identifying the few vulnerabilities that are actually being used in real-world attacks, the list cuts through the noise of all published CVEs. This allows security teams to focus their limited resources on the most critical patch-or-die situations, keeping the KEV list a valuable tool for prioritized defense.

You're probably going to find you have Tomcat installations which were bundled with other products, so you're going to need to track the vendor updates to make sure you're not on an unstable/unsupported configuration before just updating those copies of Tomcat, which is really darn tempting until you break the ERP system. While you're waiting, get after your TeamCity on-prem system; the flaw allows authentication bypass and arbitrary OS command execution. Langflow? What's that? This is a cross-platform end-to-end drag-and-drop GUI where users can construct AI agent workflows, and it is integrated into watsonx.ai. This is a case of bad default configuration, versus pros and cons around vibe coding. Update to 1.10.1, as there are no workarounds.
SecurityWeek
JetBrains
CISA KEV
The Register
IBM
CISA KEV
BleepingComputer
Apache
CISA KEV
The Register
N-able
CISA KEV
CISA KEV
On Wednesday, August 5, 2026, Cisco published 14 security advisories addressing 25 total CVEs: Three advisories are rated critical, five are rated high-severity, and six are rated medium-severity. The three critical advisories are the August 2026 Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Software Security Hardening Release (five CVEs), the August 2026 Cisco IOS XE Software Security Hardening Release (seven CVEs), and an advisory for one Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center Software Authentication Bypass Vulnerability. Cisco has released updates to address these vulnerabilities. The other advisories address a denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerability in Cisco IOS XE Software SNMP; a denial-of-service vulnerability in the Blocks Extensible Exchange Protocol (BEEP) feature of Cisco IOS XE Software; a denial-of-service vulnerability in Cisco IOS Software and IOS XE Software Extensible Messaging Client Protocol; a pair of argument injection vulnerabilities in Cisco Integrated Management Controller; a static credential vulnerability in Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center Software; two denial-of-service vulnerabilities in Cisco IOS XE Software Web-Based Management Interface; a firewall rules bypass vulnerability in Cisco Terminal Services Agent; an information disclosure vulnerability in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager; an information disclosure vulnerability in Cisco RoomOS Logging Subsystem; and a cross-site scripting vulnerability in Cisco Integrated Management Controller.

It's going to be so tempting to focus on the SD-WAN updates here. There are no workarounds for these flaws, so update your SD-WAN and Cisco IOS XE devices. If you're using IMC — if you have Cisco-UCS C-Series servers, then you are — update it and make sure that it's only exposed to authorized devices.

I’m going to quibble with what I think is some new terminology Cisco is using in some of their patch releases. Twice in this release and once in July, patch releases were called “Security Hardening Releases” because Cisco found them and Cisco is not aware of any exploits against them. This includes flaws with CVSS scores of 9.8. This is like cutting into your chicken at a fancy restaurant and finding it is pink and obviously not fully cooked, and having the waiter say, "We are not aware of anyone getting ill from this, but I’ll send your coq au vin back for 'hardening'." All other releases are announced as vulnerabilities — stick with consistent terminology in patch releases as opposed to public relations lingo.
Help Net Security
SecurityWeek
The Hacker News
Cisco
Cisco
Cisco
Cisco
Apple's Private Relay feature, which ostensibly hides an iCloud user's IP address while using a browser, fails to do so when visiting a website with certain configurations, according to researchers Tommy Mysk and Talal Haj Bakry. Private Relay does not tunnel network traffic at system level as a VPN does, but instead routes browser traffic through proxy servers at the application level. Because this feature uses the WebKit engine required in all iOS browsers, the flaw also affects Onion Browser and the researchers' own Psylo on iOS. Three features within WebKit enable this IP exposure: DNS prefetching, WebAuthn origin requests, and WebTransport connections. If a website tries to resolve a hostname for DNS prefetching, that functionality bypasses the proxy and instead uses the device's DNS path. If a website "supports, or pretends to support, passkeys," WebKit again bypasses the proxy host app and uses the operating system's credential system to issue the HTTPS request for WebAuthn, showing the user's real IP to the destination server. Connections with WebTransport use a QUIC connection "outside the web traffic that Private Relay proxies," exposing the real IP address to the server. Onion Browser at the "Silver" security level is not affected by this last leak because it disables WebTransport for WebKit under Lockdown Mode. This news follows recent coverage of a flaw in Apple's Hide My Email feature that exposed users' underlying email addresses despite Apple's awareness of the problem for over a year (described in NewsBites 28.54). Mysk cited this delay in a social media post stating that he and Bakry opted to avoid involving Apple, instead prioritizing patching Psylo and contacting the Tor Project and Onion Browser developers first, then publicly disclosing the issue.

Apple Private Relay is not the same as the Private Wi-Fi IP address: one uses proxy setting for web access routed through WebKit, similar to using an application-specific VPN, and the other is designed for semi-anonymous connections on the local network. Private Relay was introduced in iOS 15, and is under the iCloud settings on your device. Before panicking, check to see if you're using this feature. Odds are you've got lots of Private Wi-Fi address use and limited Private Relay use. While Apple works this, consider using a VPN rather than private relay.

Apple Private Relay will only affect browser traffic. It defines a system wide proxy which browsers will use as part of the WebKit library employed by browsers. Any other system component connecting to the network will not be protected by Private Relay. The same is true for similar technologies like Tor Browser. To protect all traffic, a "real VPN" should be used. Even there, exceptions may exist. Apple’s network stack has in the past exempted some internal processes from using the default gateway defined by VPNs.

Privacy and security features are only useful if people understand their limitations. Private Relay is not a VPN, although many non-technical people could understandably assume it is. Vendors need to be very clear about what their privacy technologies do, and just as importantly what they do not do, so that people can make informed decisions about the risks they face.
Adform, a global demand-side platform (DSP) digital advertiser, has disclosed a security incident that resulted in the company serving ads containing malware. Upon becoming aware of suspicious activity on July 27, 2026, Adform began an investigation and activated incident response procedures, working to contain the incident, remove the malicious code, and implement additional security measures. Adform states that the malware operated only while an affected web page was open, and "was designed to interfere with certain cryptocurrency transactions involving Bitcoin, Ethereum, or Tron. It could attempt to replace a cryptocurrency wallet address displayed, entered, copied, or pasted while an affected webpage was open." The company has not observed the malware present in ads since 17:51 UTC on July 27. According to Adform's investigation, users who visited a website that was served over HTTP and used Adform technology may have also exposed their source/public IP address, visited webpage path, and visited website hostname to the threat actor. Users who visited webpages served over HTTPS were protected from this request. Adform recommends users clear their browser caches and check the details of recent transactions with the affected virtual currencies. The company has notified publishers and advertisers who use Adform technology on sites served over HTTP, and on August 5 notified the Danish Data Protection Authority (Datatilsynet). Zack Whittaker, citing Kevin Beaumont's blog on the attack published a day before Adform's disclosure, notes that using an ad blocker "can prevent pervasive tracking, surveillance, and yes, even malware, from landing on your computer." Meanwhile, a report from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) found that " Some software development kits (SDKs) provided by advertising companies to help developers monetize their apps are automatically feeding users’ location data into systems that location data brokers use to track people."

If your website uses advertising, make sure your developers understand exactly what data the SDKs and advertising components they embed collect, where that data goes, and what security risks they introduce. Under GDPR and other regulatory frameworks, "we didn't know the SDK was doing that" is unlikely to be a convincing explanation. Organisations should also consider blocking advertising at the network perimeter to reduce the risk of malicious ads reaching end-user devices.

An important subtlety: The attack only worked over HTTP, not HTTPS. Give serious thought to enabling HTTPS-Only Mode in Firefox, or "Always Use Secure Connections" in Chrome/chromium browser. While DSP advertisers need to ensure they are not serving malicious content, we should still leverage ad blockers and privacy-enhanced browsers for accessing sensitive information. Don't make the job of collecting information about you and your habits any easier.
While this attack was limited to HTTP pages on Adform, it highlights a broader risk: Thousands of websites still operate without basic encryption. Protect yourself by quickly checking your browser’s address bar, and ensure the site uses https:// or displays a padlock icon before interacting.

We may have links in the supply chain that we are not even aware of. Sprayers of malware should be held liable for consequential damages.
Adform
This Week in Security
EFF
TechCrunch
On Tuesday, August 4, Polish convenience store chain Żabka disclosed that a cyberattack compromised corporate data in an incident that occurred via a third-party contractor. Earlier this week, Żabka detected unauthorized activity on systems that are used to communicate with the franchise network. Żabka says the intruder compromised an account belonging to a third-party service provider. The company has notified Poland's Personal Data Protection Office as well as law enforcement and cybersecurity agencies. On Wednesday, August 5, Dutch luxury department store De Bijenkorf said that a cyberattack at one of its logistics partners has delayed customers' orders, returns, and refunds, and may have compromised customer data. While customers are able to place online orders, delivery may take longer than usual. An ongoing investigation is seeking to determine whether the attacker accessed customer information. These two incidents are the latest in a string of breaches targeting retailers. In July 2026, Lidl supermarkets disclosed that customer data were compromised following the breach of an IT service provider. Also in July, a cyberattack against Japan's Nichirei Logistics Group affected the food supply chain in that country, and Harrods and Louis Vuitton both disclosed cybersecurity incidents in 2025.

Make sure that you're holding third-party accounts to the same controls as you do for your users. Drill down on claims of “not able to do that” to make sure they are indeed (still) accurate, and then investigate compensating controls if needed. Fully understand any claims of invulnerability, because "too big to fail" really doesn't hold up any more.
Because cybercriminals consistently target retail by exploiting its weakest links, third-party vendors have become a primary vector for attacks. These recent incidents underscore the need to integrate third-party risk management into your broader cybersecurity strategy.

Strong authentication should be a contractual requirement for partners.
A data breach affecting Ohio-based revenue cycle management services provider Unlimited Technology Systems (UTS) has been confirmed to affect more than 3.8 million individuals, making it the largest healthcare-related breach reported to the US Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights (HHS OCR) this calendar year. UTS first became aware of suspicious activity on its systems in October 2025, and in July 2026 it confirmed that data had been stolen. The incident's entry in the HHS OCR database now indicates that the breach, which is classified as a hacking/IT incident of a network server, affects 3,803,750 individuals. The compromised information includes names, physical and email addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth, health insurance data, patient balance data, Social Security numbers, medical information including diagnoses, and scanned identification documents. Lifespan Physicians Group of Massachusetts, doing business as Brown Health Medical Group-MA has disclosed that the protected health information of nearly 312,000 individuals may have been compromised in a December 2025 incident. The breach has been reported to the offices of the Attorneys General for Massachusetts and Vermont. Those reports indicate that unauthorized activity was detected on a legacy file server on December 15-16, 2025. A review of that server's contents revealed that it contained names, dates of birth, contact information, Social Security numbers, driver’s license and other government-issued identification numbers, payment card numbers, financial account information, and personnel and human resources records, possibly including compensation or payroll data, licensure or credentialing information, and medical or disability-related records. The incident's HHS OCR record places the number of affected individuals at 311,760.

The Unlimited Technology Systems breach highlights a challenge many organisations face during an incident. Although the breach was discovered in October 2025, it was not until July 2026 that UTS could confirm whether data had been stolen. This is why preparation before an incident is critical. Do you have the right tools and skills to quickly determine the extent of a breach? And just as importantly, do you have appropriate communications prepared for different stakeholders so they can be kept sufficiently briefed as the situation develops?

UTS published information, including guidance for affected individuals, has setup a dedicated call number, and will provide two years of ID/credit monitoring, but you need to contact them. It's a bit concerning that it's taken eight months for the notification; we, as service providers, need to do better, and we all need to be prepared to notify affected individuals when their data is compromised — not wait for them to find out.
A Canadian citizen has pleaded guilty to charges of computer fraud, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and a related conspiracy for his role in the compromise of Snowflake data storage platform customer environments in 2024. Connor Riley Moucka and his alleged co-conspirators used stolen credentials to compromise accounts; they stole terabytes of information, including individuals’ non-content call and text history records, banking and other financial information, payroll records, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) registration numbers, driver’s license numbers, passport numbers, Social Security numbers, and other personally identifiable information. They extorted more than $2.5 million from victims and offered stolen data for sale on cybercrime forums. As part of Moucka's plea agreement, he admitted to developing software that searched compromised cloud environments for sensitive data. Moucka was arrested in Kitchener, Ontario on October 30, 2024, and extradited to the US in March 2025. In all, affected organizations reported more than $9.5 million in losses. The breaches took place between February and October 2024, and Moucka is scheduled to be sentenced in late October 2026. Maksim Silnikau, a citizen of Belarus, has been sentenced to 16 years in prison for his role as creator and leader of the Ransom Cartel ransomware-as-a-service platform. Court documents indicate that starting in 2021, the group conducted attacks against at least 18 organizations over a two-year period, following the typical ransomware script of stealing data, encrypting systems, and demanding payment in exchange for a decryption key or a promise not to leak the stolen data. Silnikau was arrested in Spain in 2024 and extradited to the US through Poland. His co-conspirators have been charged in absentia.

Moucka's victims were exploited using stolen credentials, sometimes more than once. Full. Stop. Reusable credentials need to be replaced with phishing resistant MFA. Get with your team and make sure you're covering all types of identities, particularly AI, not just humans. Yes, this can be a big job, but it's way easier than it used to be, and odds are you'll have support from the top given this scenario. Do not be the company who is repeatedly compromised via the same mechanism.

Well done to all law enforcement agencies involved in these cases. While international borders may complicate investigations, these cases demonstrate that they do not necessarily protect cybercriminals from eventually being identified, extradited and prosecuted. Hopefully sentences such as these will make others reconsider whether cybercrime really does pay.
The Register
CyberScoop
The Record
BleepingComputer
Justice
The Record
The Hacker News
Justice
SANS Internet Storm Center StormCast Friday, August 7, 2026
Fast SSH Attacks; Dell BIOS Password Weakness; Crypto Wallet Vuln; Benchmarking LLMs for Threat Intel (@sans_edu)
https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/10042 22
Seconds to Compromise: How Automated SSH Actors Move From Login to Persistence Before You Can Blink [Guest Diary]
Dell BIOS Passwords: Weak XOR Encryption Allows Recovery from SPI Flash (CVE-2026-40639)
Ill Bloom: Crypto Wallet Vulnerability
Benchmarking Free-Tier Large Language Models as Cognitive Aids for Operationalizing Unstructured Cyber Threat Intelligence
SANS Internet Storm Center StormCast Thursday, August 6, 2026
keyv/cachable Worm IR; Apple Private Relay Leak; COLDCARD Phish
https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/10040
Don't Revoke That Token Yet: Inside the keyv/cacheable npm Worm
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Dont+Revoke+That+Token+Yet+Inside+the+keyvcacheable+npm+Worm/33218
IP and DNS Leaks in WebKit Affecting Proxy Browsers and Apple iCloud Private Relay
https://mysk.blog/2026/08/04/webkit-proxy-icloud-private-relay-ip-leak/?ref=404media.co
COLDCARD Issues
https://x.com/threatinsight/status/2084328552481112429
SANS Internet Storm Center StormCast Wednesday, August 5, 2026
Diagnostic Tool Hunt; Device Code Phishing; XCSSET; NuGet API Keys
https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/10038
Botnet Hunting for Vulnerabilities in Diagnostic Tools
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Botnet+Hunting+for+Vulnerabilities+in+Diagnostic+Tools/33214
Inside Greatness: Telegram-Distributed M365 AiTM PhaaS
https://zerobec.com/blog/greatness-phaas-aitm-and-device-code-phishing
A Deep Dive Into the Latest XCSSET Version
https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/xcsset-v40-malware-analysis/
Strengthening NuGet Supply Chain Security: Reducing API Key Lifetime
My Upcoming Classes
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