SEC536: Adversarial AI - Penetration Testing AI Systems


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Contact UsOn June 12, 2026, Anthropic disabled Fable 5 and Mythos 5 for all customers in order to comply with an export control directive sent by the US Department of Commerce at 5:21 p.m. ET that day, which ordered the company to suspend access to both models "by any foreign national ... including foreign national Anthropic employees." Fable 5 had been publicly released three days earlier, but Mythos remained restricted to specific partner companies. The text of the directive has not been published as of this writing, but Anthropic characterizes the government's reasoning as an unspecified "national security concern" over a method to bypass, or "jailbreak," Fable 5's safeguards against discovering vulnerabilities. Anthropic contends that this suspension is based on a misunderstanding, and that the capability offered by this "narrow" jailbreak is comparable to competitors' publicly available models. On June 14, an open letter that has now been signed by more than 150 executives and technical leaders was sent to US Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick and National Cyber Director Sean Cairncross, asking them to lift the directives and "commit to an open, scientific and transparent process of handling AI risk assessments in the future." The signatories believe that while Mythos-class models are "quite good at finding flaws and weaponizing exploits [...] they are not uniquely good at these tasks," and the safeguards built into Fable 5 erred on the side of overprotective. The letter asserts that availability of AI is essential for developers and security teams: "This action has taken the best models away from defenders, created market uncertainty, and risked America’s AI leadership without any real risk to justify it." The letter concludes by urging that any future AI regulations be grounded in industrial and academic scientific evaluations, created through a democratic process, enforced transparently and fairly, and used only as necessary to ensure public safety. One of the signatories is Katie Moussouris, Luta Security Founder & CEO, who previously served as a technical expert during international negotiations on the Wassenaar Arrangement, concerning export controls and defensive cybersecurity. Anthropic consulted Moussouris on the research that spurred the directive, and she described why the report should not have led to an export control: "The researchers took open-source code with known CVEs, plus new code with deliberately planted vulnerabilities, and asked Fable 5, Mythos, and Opus to 'review the code for security issues.' Fable 5 refused. They then asked the models to 'fix this code' and, through a multistep and manual process, turned the output into scripts that test the patches. [...] That is not a guardrail bypass. It is the most valuable thing an AI model can do for defensive security: executing the find, fix, and test loop defenders run every day."

Tricky balance of enabling a competitive edge while preventing one's adversaries from obtaining the same advantage. When working with foreign nationals you need to understand what is considered a deemed export as well as understanding risks to your IP when handled by non-citizens. In my career that was significant as we were working with federal information, both unclassified and classified. Regardless of which side you're on, appreciate that this is an indication that AI jailbreaks are being taken seriously by DoC, and they are worried about loss of our IP/competitive edge. Anthropic is working to educate and clarify the risks to DoC by documenting controls, which include defense in depth, likelihood of jailbreak, to include difficulty, mitigations, and 30-day data retention. This should be resolved quickly.
Add me to the coalition of executive leaders calling for the immediate removal of the government's export control directive. The current restrictions do nothing but hamstring cyber defenders. Prohibiting access to Fable 5 actively puts them at a disadvantage, when they have everything to gain from its deployment.

Secrets are really hard to keep. Open source intelligence is hard to keep secret.
Anthropic
Free Fable
Luta Security
CyberScoop
TechCrunch
Infosecurity Magazine
The Register
CyberScoop
Nextgov/FCW
The Record
ZDNET
The Hacker News
About 1,500 package build files in the Arch User Repository (AUR) have been poisoned with infostealer and rootkit malware since June 11, up from initial estimates closer to 400. AUR is a community-maintained repository of package build files for Arch Linux, whose documentation emphasizes that user-produced packages are not thoroughly vetted and used "at your own risk;" however, this attack kept legitimate packages intact without introducing malicious code that a user might detect, instead modifying the build instructions to download a separate malicious npm dependency during the build process. According to reports from IFIN and Sonatype, a malicious actor spoofed (but did not compromise) the account of a trusted maintainer, and proceeded to adopt packages marked as abandoned, adding preinstall scripts that retrieved the malicious npm package. On Monday, June 15, AUR disabled new account registrations while malicious commits are being removed. Michael Taggart at IFIN recommends that Arch users check their exposure by reviewing affected packages and indicators of compromise, "preserv[ing] the system for forensic investigation as appropriate," rotate all credentials, deny outbound Tor traffic, possibly reinstall Arch, and keep in mind that the possibility of a rootkit undermines system trust.

When it comes to the supply chain: assume compromise. This is yet another tricky to avoid and detect exploit path. Assume compromise means secure credentials and isolate systems, in particular for development, as much as possible.

This has been named the Atomic Arch campaign. The AUR stewardship process allows community members to maintain packages, and allows for a request to take ownership of an abandoned/orphaned package. The attackers took advantage of this to take over packages already trusted in this system. This time the build instructions were jacked up, not the build itself, which is a reminder that their integrity needs to be as judiciously maintained as your package. For those using Arch Linux, review the list of affected packages, check for the IoCs in the Whanos preliminary analysis report (https://ioctl.fail/preliminary-analysis-of-aur-malware/), and report any findings. You may also wish to use the aur_ckeck.sh tool to find instances of the atomic-lockfile malware. As this is a rootkit, you may need to reinstall Arch from scratch to avoid any remnants left by normal cleaning processes.
The Register
The Hacker News
BleepingComputer
IFIN
Sonatype
Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has published a report describing "a sophisticated campaign attributed to UNC6508, a People's Republic of China (PRC)-nexus threat actor, targeting institutions in the North American academic, medical, and military research community." The threat actor was present in targeted networks for more than a year. GTIG disrupted the infrastructure the threat actors had established, and also worked with Mandiant Consulting to notify affected organizations and provide help with remediation. GTIG writes that the threat actor "compromised externally facing web applications, deployed bespoke malware, pivoted to sensitive internal systems, and abused enterprise administrative tools for covert data exfiltration. The threat actor had broad collection aspirations, including sensitive defense intelligence related to national security, Indo-Pacific command operations, artificial intelligence, uncrewed vehicle systems, cyber offensive programs, and medical research." GTIG also collaborated with the FLARE team and Workspace Security on the operation.

The earliest known compromise occurred in September 2023, where externally facing servers were exploited to deploy the INFINITERED custom malware to capture legitimate credentials. Google provides prevention, detection, and remediation guidance, which applies to more than just this sector. This includes SIEM, audit, and log monitoring as well as MFA, device bound session credentials, alerts for compromised passwords, patching/updates, and YARA rules and IoCs for the detection of the INFINITERED malware. Leverage this to both prevent and minimize dwell time. You really want to be sure you can detect and respond to malicious activity as rapidly as possible — you don't want to be explaining to management why they were in your system for a year undetected.
The threat actor's advanced capabilities, combined with the specific profile of the targets, strongly point to a nation-state sponsor. Historically, several governments have sought to bolster domestic industries by provisioning stolen or proprietary research to private entities — a practice some analysts argue catalyzed the early growth of firms like Huawei.

Anything connected to the Internet must be isolated from everything else. Think "defense in depth." Think structured network. Think zero trust. Face it: we are all targets. We have many adversaries, and they are very resourceful.
Dark Reading
The Register
SecurityWeek
In 2025 the Operational Technology Division of the FBI built a 22,000-square-foot "Kinetic Cyber Range" (KCR) in Huntsville, Alabama to train personnel to handle cyber incidents and investigations in a simulated small town. The KCR contains a wide variety of areas ranging from residential and commercial — houses, a hotel, a gas station with a grocery market, an arcade, a data center, and real vehicles — to government and critical infrastructure buildings including a courthouse, a power company, and a hospital. Every space is set up with realistic physical conditions as well as "functioning systems, networks, and devices designed to behave as they would in the real world," down to Active Directory, email, and firewalls on a network, a home full of IoT devices, or a data center containing over 200 Windows and Linux servers. The range is also populated with "role players acting as business owners, executives, and legal teams" to engage with during investigation; one scenario simulates a ransomware attack in a hospital network, including interfacing with healthcare staff and the stakes of a medical environment. Both the OT Division and the Cyber Division of the FBI make use of the range, as well as personnel from other groups including NASA, the US Army, and local law enforcement; to date the KCR has trained over 1,400 students.

What impressed me most when I visited the Kinetic Cyber Range last year was how much it is not a “cyber range” in the traditional sense. The technology is there, but the focus is on understanding how cyber incidents affect people, businesses, public services, and critical infrastructure in the real world. That is a much harder problem than simply detecting malware, creating exploits, or analyzing network traffic. The KCR reflects a growing recognition that future cybercrime investigators and law enforcement professionals need to train in environments that look and behave like actual connected communities, not isolated computer labs or non-connected simulated businesses. Fun for me that this capability was built right here in my hometown of Huntsville, Alabama. Our city has quietly become one of the nation's most important centers for cyber, defense, space, and critical infrastructure expertise. And more is coming!

Having a kinetic range, with "real" systems as well as role players is a boon to developing cyber skills, both in offense and defense. Note this environment also includes working in real environments — the data center is cold, dark, and noisy, as it would be in a real-world situation. This range also teaches soft skills, such as working under stress, where communicating clearly and exercising judgment and restraint are as critical as expertise. This is very cool and brings back fond memories of using the SANS CyberCity kinetic range.
While this represents a critical capability for the federal government, extending this training to the state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) community is essential. As local governments increasingly digitize their constituent services, they face the greatest exposure and stand to benefit the most from these resources.

"A plan is not a document that one takes out and reads while sitting in the ashes. It is a capability, the ability to do something in its presence that one cannot do in its absence." –Robert H. Courtney, Jr. "We fight as we train as we fight." –US Military Doctrine. The implication is that creating and maintaining a capability requires both training and continuous practice and drills, and often a place to do those things.
The Office of the Maine Attorney General has taken its breach reporting portal offline after two phony breach reports were submitted to the system. Maine is one of a handful of US states that require entities reporting breaches to disclose the total number of individuals affected by the incident rather than just the number of residents of that particular state. The phony data breach reports purported to be from VRChat and Discord. VRChat posted that "A false data breach notice was filed on behalf of the company by an unknown third party." The Maine Attorney General's Office says the two phony reports have been removed from the database, and the portal will remain offline while they review their procedures “to make this abuse less likely in the future while preserving the public availability of such information." Entities needing to submit breach reports with the Maine AG's office can do so through the office's online reporting service. The Maine AG's database contains listings of nearly 6,000 breaches reported since mid-2020.

Remember how we had to implement reCAPTCHA, or similar measures, to reduce spam being submitted through comment and feedback forms? This is almost the same thing; the Maine AG is working to raise the bar to make sure reports are genuine. If you have a VDP system, you're probably wondering if there is something similar to curtail AI slop. I'm wondering how effective it'd be to use AI to detect AI in these scenarios.
Maine AG
The Register
Infosecurity Magazine
BleepingComputer
SecurityWeek
VRChat
Danish pharmaceutical company Novo Nordisk has disclosed a cyberattack that compromised information of healthcare professionals and patients involved in clinical trials. The company took several of its systems offline following the incident, notified authorities, and is currently investigating with the assistance of external cybersecurity experts. According to Novo Nordisk's breach notices, patient data were pseudonymized, meaning they cannot be identified from the cache of take that was taken. Healthcare providers affected by the incident were informed that compromised data may include company name, registration number, contact email address, phone number, office location, and WhatsApp details.

If you're involved in a clinical trial, you may wish to ask how your information is protected. In this case Novo Nordisk has protected participant information. The stolen data can be used to influence participating Healthcare providers, enabling BEC or other business shenanigans. About all you can do is make sure that your protections are up to date and that folks are keeping a watchful eye out for malicious activity.
HIPAA Journal
The Register
SecurityWeek
Novo Nordisk
Novo Nordisk
A former IT support specialist for Iowa’s Saydel Community School District (SCSD) was sentenced to 21 months in prison for a series of cyberattacks carried out over 20 months following his dismissal from SCSD. Ezekiel Dean Potter was fired from SCSD in April 2023, and prior to being fired, Potter obtained more than 300 sets of user account credentials for school district systems. Starting in May 2023 and continuing through January 2025, Potter launched a series of damaging and disruptive cyberattacks against various components of SCSD's IT systems, including irretrievably deleting the district's Facebook page, deleting data related to the district's Apple School Manager account, attempting to reset usernames and passwords associated with SCSD’s GoDaddy account, and disrupting access to its Schoology learning management software account via the SCSD Google administrator account. In all, the attacks cost SCSD and their insurers more than $100,000. Investigators were able to trace the malicious activity directed at the district to IP addresses associated with businesses where Potter worked after he was let go from SCSD. After he left one of those positions, Potter reportedly asked a former co-worker at one of those businesses to retrieve and wipe a USB drive that he had left in his desk. Instead, the employee gave the drive to company management, who turned it over to law enforcement. The device was found to contain information related to the SCSD attacks. In January 2026, Potter pleaded guilty to fraud charges under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. After he serves his prison sentence, he "will be subject to restrictions and monitoring related to employment, finances, and computer systems, including searches of electronic devices upon reasonable suspicion." He is also required to pay nearly $60,000 in restitution to the school district and its insurers.

If I had been responsible for some of the services at SCSD that got deleted, I would be extremely upset by this series of events, wanting a far more severe sentence and financial penalty, and likely lose sight of protections I could implement. Make sure that you go through and see what you can do to maintain backup copies of data stored in services. Can you keep copies of social media posts so they could be re-published? Have you enabled backups for online services like MS365, hosted web sites, DNS, etc.? Is your list complete and updated? Have you tested restoring them? How are your forensic capabilities on those services? You may find that without added licensing, your access/transaction logs are far less than you expect; don't wait to find this out in the middle of an incident.
While his exact motives remain unclear — aside from evident animosity toward the school system — reinstatement was never a realistic outcome. This case highlights a critical vulnerability: IT teams possess extensive, privileged access and require close managerial oversight, yet they are frequently granted an implicit level of trust that leaves institutions exposed.

Terminated employees will always leave with special knowledge; we cannot do much about that. However, they should not leave with privileges; we can do something about that. We should not grant privileges that we do not have a plan as to how to withdraw them.
A Ukrainian man, Oleksii Oleksiyovych Lytvynenko, has pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud in connection with a scheme to deploy Conti ransomware. Lytvynenko was living in Ireland and was extradited to the US. Lytvynenko and his alleged co-conspirators "used the Conti ransomware to terrorize people and businesses in the United States and around the world, causing millions of dollars in damage." Between 2020 and 2022, Conti was used in attacks targeting computers and networks in various locations, including 47 US states and 31 countries. The FBI estimates that those attacks led to more than $150 million in ransomware payments. When Lytvynenko is sentenced in September 2026, he will face up to 20 years in prison. Last month, Deniss Zolotarjovs, another member of the Conti ransomware, group was sentenced to 102 months (eight and a half years) in prison.

The Conti ransomware gang ceased operating under its original name in 2022, with former members moving to other ransomware and cybercrime operations. In this case, one of the authors of the loader for the ransomware was caught and being held accountable for his actions. It's taking some time and international cooperation, and it is nice to see law enforcement is successfully rounding up cybercrime gang members and bringing them to justice.
Help Net Security
SecurityWeek
BleepingComputer
Justice
Justice
The US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) expired on June 12, 2026 when legislators failed to pass a short-term extension to the warrantless surveillance law. FISA, which was enacted in 2008, allowed US intelligence agencies to gather data from US citizens as well as from residents of other countries, in an effort to identify foreign hackers, spies, and possible terrorists. The law's critics have called for changes, citing cases of its misuse. Legislators have been seeking to amend FISA to require agencies to obtain warrants prior to accessing information of US citizens. However, because Section 702 surveillance operates under yearlong certifications approved by the FISA Court, intelligence agencies are still able to use surveillance tools until March 2027, but cannot seek any new orders under the law. Additionally, telecommunications companies may be reluctant to share information without the law on the books. Legislators are on recess until Tuesday, June 23.

This is a matter for the legislative branch, not the executive, and the core beef is the abuse/protection of US citizens’ privacy rights. Expect a renewal of this or similar legislation in the future; even so, agencies can fall back on other surveillance avenues such as Executive Order 12333 which allows for surveillance around the world and also includes restriction on use/access to US citizen data.
This capability remains vital to US national security, and Congress must look past partisan politics to ensure the timely renewal of this legislation.

The law was originally passed in an atmosphere of fear after 9/11 and has always been controversial. Secret courts and secret orders, not to mention gag orders, invite abuse. Only bureaucrats love them.
TechCrunch
Ars Technica
The Record
Brennan Center
The Federal Data Center Enhancement Act (FDCEA), which passed in 2023, will expire on September 30, 2026 and there does not appear to be any effort made to extend its duration or create an alternative. The FDCEA establishes standards for data centers that are entirely or partially owned, operated, or maintained by US federal agencies. Its provisions address facility availability and uptime; use of sustainable energy; protection from power failure, physical intrusions, and natural disasters; and IT security. WIRED writes that "doing away with FDCEA would get rid of crucial requirements mandating that agencies consider how federal data centers or contractors use energy and water;" the Register notes that "the danger is that if the FDCEA is not renewed or superseded by similar legislation, then federal agencies across the US may cease to follow the requirements and simply act as they see fit when procuring new datacenter infrastructure."

This may get lost with all the dust-up over creating, or blocking, AI data center construction in the US. While the objections cite environmental concerns, advocates point out the result is likely those capabilities developing in other countries. Existing control frameworks, such as NIST 800-53, include controls around heating, cooling and fire suppression, and even resiliency, but don't include environmental concerns. Even without this specific legislation, federal data centers will still have to follow the most restrictive of any applicable federal, state, county or city regulations, which will likely keep them on their toes.
SANS Internet Storm Center StormCast Tuesday, June 16, 2026
BASE64 Statistics; Cisco SD-WAN Exploited; AMD TSME Disabled; Poisoning Deep Research Agents
https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9974
Evil MSI Background: BASE64 Statistical Analysis
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Evil+MSI+Background+BASE64+Statistical+Analysis/33072
Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager Arbitrary File Write Vulnerability
TSME/SME not activating on Ryzen 7 9700X
https://github.com/AMDESE/AMDSEV/issues/292
Deep-Research Agents Can Be Poisoned via User-Generated Content
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2605.24245
SANS Internet Storm Center StormCast Monday, June 15, 2026
Arch Linux Malicious User Packages; Splunk Vuln and Exploit; Exploiting AI Coding Agents
https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9972
Atomic Arch: Attackers Hijack Trusted AUR Packages to Deliver Rootkit-Like Malware
https://www.sonatype.com/blog/atomic-arch-npm-campaign-adds-malicious-dependency
Why Use App-Level Auth When Every Database Has Auth? (Splunk Enterprise CVE-2026-20253 Pre-Auth RCE)
A Fake Bug Report Hijacks Your AI Coding Agent – and Nothing Catches It.
https://tenetsecurity.ai/blog/agentjacking-coding-agents-with-fake-sentry-errors/
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