SEC595: Applied Data Science and AI/Machine Learning for Cybersecurity Professionals


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Contact UsA fact sheet warning of "malicious cyber activity targeting US-based automatic tank gauge (ATG) systems" has been jointly published by The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the US Department of Agriculture (USDA). ATG systems are used in the Energy, Chemical, Food and Agriculture, and Transportation Systems Sectors "for automated and remote monitoring of storage tank parameters, including fuel and liquid levels, temperature, and possible leak detection." The fact sheet includes likely tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by the threat actors targeting these systems. The threat actors are reportedly gaining access to the ATG systems and altering settings. They are targeting the systems through a variety of attack vectors including authentication bypass and hardcoded credentials to access device management interfaces; OS command execution and SQL injection to execute arbitrary code and manipulate databases; and privilege escalation to expand their presence once they have gained access initial access to the systems. Suggested mitigations include not exposing the ATG serial port or other applicable web interfaces directly to the internet; restricting access with firewalls, access control lists (ACLs), or virtual private networks (VPNs) where remote access is required; changing all default passwords and implementing "strong, unique security codes and administrative credentials for all interfaces;" applying patches; monitoring and reporting any suspicious activity; and urging third-party service providers to adopt CISA, FBI, EPA, and DOE’s Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology [CPG 1.E].

An attacker does not have to shut down a refinery or fuel terminal to create problems; simply manipulating the data that operators rely on can lead to incorrect decisions and unnecessary disruptions. The encouraging part of this advisory is that the recommended mitigations are not exotic. Internet exposure, default credentials, and weak remote access controls continue to be recurring themes in OT incidents. This tells me that basic cyber hygiene remains one of the most effective security controls available.

The recent events in Garden Grove and Longview, regardless of root cause, provide adequate justification to make sure that your ICS, particularly critical infrastructure, are safe from external manipulation. Use the guidance from IC3 to build the discussion of protections which need to be validated, especially remote access. Control systems are really cool, and they are important; you should have a good understanding of exactly what they do and what they are used for, because when they are just working, they disappear into the background.

These vulnerabilities have been well documented for several years and have already been exploited several times “for fun and profit.” With fuel supply levels in everybody’s focus right now, even a relatively small manipulation of readings could have a large economic impact. Bad data is often more dangerous than unavailable or stolen data.
Remote monitoring makes perfect sense for many reasons, but let’s be realistic: the moment you connect OT devices to the internet, they become a target. Once the decision to connect is made, implementing mitigations is non-negotiable. Skipping these safeguards is quite simply a failure to meet a standard cyber duty of care.
A critical remote code execution vulnerability in the Mirasvit Full Page Cache Warmer for Magento 2 extension is being actively exploited. CVE-2026-45247, CVSS 9.8, is described as a PHP object injection vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to achieve remote code execution by supplying a crafted serialized PHP object in the CacheWarmer cookie. The vulnerability was found by researchers at Sansec. Mirasvit released an updated version of the Full Page Cache Warmer for Magento 2 extension on May 25, 2026, and users are urged to update to version 1.11.12 or later. The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added the vulnerability to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on Wednesday, June 3 with a mitigation deadline of June 6. Sansec writes that its "scans found roughly 6,000 stores running Mirasvit extensions. Real numbers are likely higher, since content delivery networks such as Cloudflare hide many installs from our fingerprinting."

Exploiting the flaw requires no authentication and has a low degree of complexity. Assume the fix was reverse engineered to discover the exploit process. The flaw impacts versions prior to 1.11.12, and the patches were released May 25th, so you should only be verifying they were applied.
The Hacker News
SC Media
SecurityWeek
Sansec
NIST
On Tuesday, June 2, the White House published an AI Executive Order (EO) titled “Promoting Advanced Artificial Intelligence Innovation and Security.” The order instructs federal agencies to upgrade the country's systems for Advanced AI and to secure frontier model deployment. This includes "develop[ing] and maintain[ing] a classified benchmarking process to assess the advanced cyber capabilities of AI models" and creating a voluntary framework with AI developers to provide the federal government with access to certain AI models 30 days before they are released publicly, to assess those models for cybersecurity issues.

The 30-day review is the least interesting part of this order. What matters is that early access now runs through an NSA determination instead of vendor discretion, which quietly ends day-one-for-everyone for covered frontier models. For defenders it’s a tailwind for work already in motion, not a new mandate (your program doesn’t change, the patch cadence around it does). Find out where you sit in the access tier now.

The compromise between innovation and regulation continues. The changes lessen some controls in efforts to support industry requests to support innovation/rapid progress in AI, helping US developers in this highly competitive field. For the rest of us, we need to make sure that our AI governance is appropriate, keeping in mind that we too need to remain agile, so our controls are not worked around and (unauthorized) use of AI is not ignored or missed.
CyberScoop
Axios
Federal News Network
WIRED
The Record
SC Media
White House
Cisco has published a security advisory warning of a critical server-side request forgery (SSRF) in Cisco Unified Communications Manager. CVE-2026-20230, CVSS score 8.6, is the result of improper input validation for specific HTTP requests. Despite the score, Cisco has deemed the vulnerability critical because "a successful exploit could allow the attacker to write files to the underlying operating system that could be used later to elevate to root." WebDialer service is disabled by default, and successful exploitation requires that it is enabled. Cisco notes that proof-of-concept exploit code for the vulnerability exists. Cisco has released updates to address the vulnerability. Users running Cisco Unified CM and Unified CM SME release 14 with the WebDialer service enabled should update to 14SU6; an update for Cisco Unified CM and Unified CM SME release 15 is expected to be available in September. Users unable to update immediately are advised to disable the WebDialer service.

After you make sure the updates or mitigations are in place, take a pause to make sure that you've got appropriate protections for your UCM environment, and have a discussion about the value of a VoIP firewall. If you're using the WebDialer, make sure to understand the use case as you may not actually need it, so it can remain disabled (the default).
It’s been a bad couple months for Cisco. By now IT admins should be on alert and keep up regular patching as Cisco releases software updates. Truthfully, staying on top of updates is something you should be doing anyway, no matter which vendor is currently in the news.
SecurityWeek
The Hacker News
BleepingComputer
Cisco
The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has added a four-year-old flaw in the Linux kernel to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. CVE-2022-0492, CVSS score 7.8, allows an attacker to escalate privileges and bypass the namespace isolation, potentially also escaping from a container, by exploiting an improper authentication flaw in the cgroups v1 release_agent feature. This flaw has been fixed in Linux kernel versions 4.9.301+, 4.14.266+, 4.19.229+, 5.4.177+, 5.10.97+, 5.15.20+, 5.16.6+, and 5.17-rc3+. The same day, CISA also added CVE-2025-48595 (CVSS score 8.4) to the KEV, which allows an attacker to escalate privileges locally and achieve code execution in Android 14, 15, 16, and 16 QPR2, without user interaction needed, due to an integer overflow. Google's June 2026 security patch releases address this flaw. Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies are required to remediate these exploited flaws by June 5.

The flaws are in the KEV with a due date of June 5 — yes, that's today — and they were added Tuesday, meaning this is another case where a short event horizon is warranted. While those are old kernel versions (e.g., RHEL 8), you may have production servers still running that kernel, so make sure the relevant kernel updates are applied; fixes were released in 2022, but may not have been applied. Mixed news on the Android front: code fixes for Android were released to AOSP, so versions released after 6/5/26 have the fix, and now they need to propagate to your OEM. Your primary mitigations come through the use of Android 16 and Google Play Protect.

Vulnerabilities are not limited to "The" Linux Kernel but are spread across the many Linux kernels. Trust is hard to find.
BleepingComputer
SecurityWeek
Acer has published a security advisory noting that fixes will be released by the end of June 2026 for two CVSS 10.0 vulnerabilities in the firmware on Acer Wave 7 routers. CVE-2026-49200 allows an attacker to gain unauthorized system access by acquiring login credentials for web and Telnet, which are stored in cleartext within a file that is accessible from the web interface without authentication. CVE-2026-49201 allows an attacker to inject a persistent backdoor by decrypting, modifying, and re-encrypting system backups, because the binary responsible for processing device backups contains a hardcoded AES encryption key. These flaws were reported by an independent security researcher, and affect Acer Wave 7 router firmware version T7c_GBL_1.01.000055 and earlier. The advisory provides instructions for logging into the router's admin console to update the firmware once the update is released; in the meantime, BleepingComputer recommends that users mitigate risk by disabling remote management and/or restricting remote access over the internet to trusted IP addresses only.

This is a case of hardcoded credentials (cryptographic key) plus broken access control, which will be fixed, but not yet. Good time to double check that remote access to management of your router is disabled, regardless of manufacturer. If you must allow remote access, limit that access if you can; if you cannot limit it, I suggest only enabling it when that access is being actively used.
Acer's software engineers clearly need a refresher course on secure coding practices — right after they patch these two egregious vulnerabilities. Hopefully they will move quickly to eliminate hardcoded credentials in their products, a basic security flaw that should have been avoided from the start.

Remote router administration should be disabled out of the box. Enterprise administration must be restricted to a small set of privileged users. Enterprises should already be using Privileged Access Management systems.
On Monday, June 1, 2026, a credential-stealing worm was distributed in npm packages published in the official @redhat-cloud-services channel. According to ReversingLabs, "the affected packages collectively represent approximately 9.8 million total downloads and cover the full breadth of Red Hat's Hybrid Cloud Console JavaScript ecosystem," and were all published within a 72-second window starting at 10:54:09 UTC, suggesting an automated attack. Red Hat removed the packages immediately upon detecting the attack, and the company stated that all affected packages were "strictly limited to internal development, and the malicious code was never published for customer consumption via the console[.]redhat[.]com system." Investigation indicates that a compromised GitHub account pushed unauthorized commits to repos in the RedHatInsights GitHub organization, using preinstall hooks to attach the malware to packages. While Red Hat has not identified "any impact to customer or partner environments or Red Hat production systems," and while the company states that "no actions from customers are required," cybersecurity researchers recommend that users treat any system that installed an affected package as compromised and take action to mitigate risk. Socket recommends users identify exposure, isolate affected systems and suspend CI/CD workflows, remove malicious package versions and rebuild from clean environments, rotate all secrets and credentials, audit GitHub and npm activity, strengthen CI/CD and dependency controls, and hunt for indicators of compromise (IoCs) and signs of persistence.

Beyond making sure you don’t have any altered npm packages, you need to validate the security of your code repositories. Stolen credentials resulting in altered packages is too common, and we need to work with our developers to turn the tide, treating all environments as production when it comes to access, authentication and (security) auditing. You may get pushback that MFA is inconvenient or impactful, but I suggest that cleaning up malicious packages is more so.

Expect more of this. No vendor is safe. Recent “supply chain worms” have collected a critical number of credentials, enabling them to continue spreading.

Contaminating the supply chain has proved to be an efficient way to distribute malware. Suppliers have proven to be surprisingly vulnerable. Suppliers must be held to a high standard. While customers must be wary (Caveat Emptor), all customers will never be sufficiently so to resist spread.
Red Hat
Ars Technica
ZDNET
The Record
BleepingComputer
The Hacker News
ReversingLabs
Socket
On Monday, June 1, 2026, the support page for password manager Dashlane published a security advisory disclosing "a brute force attack against certain Dashlane user accounts" that began the previous day. Accounts targeted by the attack were temporarily locked when the company's security controls were triggered by a high volume of two-factor authentication (2FA) code login attempts trying to register new devices on existing user accounts. The attacker targeted device registration API endpoints to send the requests, and downloaded vaults belonging to fewer than 20 users of Dashlane's personal plan, which are encrypted with Argon2 + AES-256-CBC + HMAC-SHA256, and according to Dashlane "cannot be accessed without the Master Password." Dashlane has contacted all users who were directly impacted by this attack, and has not observed any evidence that internal systems were affected. The company has blocked traffic from the threat actor, reactivated suspended accounts, undertaken mitigation and security hardening measures, and is adding new layers of verification. The advisory recommends users remove any unrecognized registered devices on their accounts and enable 2FA.

Ever get prompts from services that a new device is being added or your service is being accessed in an unexpected way? If you do, make sure that you're checking their legitimacy. In an attack scenario, it's easy to get frustrated and approve/authenticate to make them stop. Dashlane is augmenting the new-device registration workflow to prevent recurrence, so keep an eye out for updates on how that impacts you. In the meantime, make sure that all your registered devices are current and correct, removing anything unrecognized.
The nature of this attack points to a highly skilled threat actor. Knowing the customer list ahead of time, understanding how to circumvent the 2FA code challenge, and successfully exfiltrating the vaults took serious preparation. The bottom line is that Dashlane was targeted by an adversary with substantial resources.

I will take this opportunity to point out that Strong Authentication is defined as "at least two kinds of evidence, at least one of which is resistant to replay." Implicit in "at least" is the idea that all security mechanisms have limitations and that two factors may not be sufficient for some applications and environments.
Dashlane
BleepingComputer
TechCrunch
Ars Technica
The Register
The Hacker News
SecurityWeek
On Thursday, June 4, 2026, Microsoft retired the master password feature in the password manager of its Edge browser. Instead, Edge will replace the password requirement with Windows Hello, which uses PIN, fingerprint, or facial recognition to sign in. Ignas Valancius, VP of engineering at NordPass, said that while there might be some resistance to the change, he sees the move "toward passwordless authentication is a positive development." The shift is in line with Microsoft's commitment to "reducing ... reliance on passwords and other phishable authentication methods by accelerating passkey adoption." It has been just over a year since Microsoft announced that new Microsoft accounts would be passwordless by default.

This means one less password to manage if using the built-in password manager in Edge. Even so, some will call the helpdesk, so you want to brief them on the change. If you're using a third-party password manager with its own authentication, this won't impact you.

The implementation of passwordless authentication for multi-user devices will be tougher than it looks. It should include speaker recognition for some applications and environments (e.g., voice assistants in hospital rooms).
TechRadar
Tom's Guide
Microsoft
Microsoft
In April 2026, a security researcher styled “Nightmare Eclipse” began publishing proof-of-concept (PoC) exploits on GitHub for half a dozen previously unknown and undisclosed vulnerabilities in Microsoft products, described below. On May 27 Microsoft stated its opposition to what it described as "uncoordinated" and "not responsibly disclosed" findings, mentioning the company's Digital Crimes Unit bringing cases against "those that enable ... criminal activity." However, the researcher had disclosed the exploits in blog posts alleging mistreatment during previous attempts at coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD), including Microsoft's deletion of the researcher's reporting account and GitHub account. Following four days of "conversation around coordinated disclosure and the relationship between security researchers and vendors," Microsoft clarified, "We have no intention to pursue action against individuals conducting or publishing their security research. [...] Given the nature of this work, there will at times be misunderstandings. We remain committed to engaging in good faith and to providing a respectful and professional experience for all researchers, regardless of past interactions." This interaction has spurred discussion in the cybersecurity community around Microsoft's relationship with vulnerability reports and the role of vulnerability research at large. On June 2, a separate cybersecurity researcher expressing grievances with Microsoft's CVD process publicly disclosed a flaw in VS Code allowing theft of GitHub access tokens, claiming to have given GitHub an hour's notice. Microsoft merged a fix for this flaw on June 3.
Two of Nightmare Eclipse’s exploits target CVSS 7.8 vulnerabilities allowing privilege escalation in Microsoft Defender: "BlueHammer" (CVE-2026-33825), disclosed on April 2, and "RedSun" (CVE-2026-41091), disclosed April 15. "UnDefend," (CVE-2026-45498, CVSS 7.5), is a denial-of-service tool for Defender, disclosed April 12. Microsoft has released patches for these three. "YellowKey" (CVE-2026-45585, CVSS 6.8) targets a security feature bypass in BitLocker, disclosed on May 12 alongside "GreenPlasma," a privilege escalation flaw in the Windows CTFMON component, which has not yet been assigned a CVE. Microsoft has released mitigations for YellowKey. "MiniPlasma" was disclosed on May 15, and targets CVE-2020-17103, a CVSS 7.8 flaw allowing privilege elevation in Windows Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver, which is apparently exploitable in some current Windows builds despite it having been fixed in 2020.

While it's best to follow responsible disclosure processes, it's still safe to assume that vulnerabilities will be disclosed or otherwise leveraged rather than reported, and that's not new. What we can do is make sure that we acknowledge contributions provided, with clearly stated expectations on the required quality and nature of those submissions, and make sure our teams remain on top of maintaining an appropriate security posture. You should have your own definition of secure enough, which you evaluate regularly as the threat landscape evolves.
Microsoft could have easily avoided this mess. Though the timeline between initial disclosure and their response is muddy, the bottom line is clear. Companies have gone all-in on bug bounty programs, and they need to start doing a better job of dealing with security researchers who help keep their products safe.

Community reaction has forced Microsoft to walk back its initial position.
SecurityWeek
The Register
Microsoft
X
Windows Forum
The Record
SecurityWeek
SANS Internet Storm Center StormCast Friday, June 5, 2026
Coreutils for Windows; Cisco Unified Comm Manager Fix and Exploit; Acer Firmware Update; OAuth Orphans
https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9960
Microsoft's Coreutils for Windows
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Microsofts+Coreutils+for+Windows/33048
Cisco Unified Communications Manager Server-Side Request Forgery Vulnerability CVE-2026-20230
Firmware Update for Acer Connect W6x Router
https://community.acer.com/en/kb/articles/19672
OAuth marketplace apps keep access after publishers vanish
https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/06/04/oauth-marketplace-apps-audit/
SANS Internet Storm Center StormCast Thursday, June 4, 2026
swagger.json Scans; Android Fake Call Detection; Anthropic Dashboard
https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9958
Continuing Scans for swagger.json
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Continuing+Scans+for+swaggerjson/33044
Fake call detection on Android
https://blog.google/security/android-fake-call-detection/
Anthropic's coordinated vulnerability disclosure dashboard
https://red.anthropic.com/2026/cvd/
SANS Internet Storm Center StormCast Wednesday, June 3, 2026
SVG Phishing; Android Patches; Poly Voice Vuln; Ivanti Neurons Priv Escelation
https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9956
New Wave Of Phishing Emails with SVG Files
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/New+Wave+Of+Phishing+Emails+with+SVG+Files/33040
Android 2026-06-01 security patch level vulnerability details
https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/2026/2026-06-01
Poly Voice – Possible Remote Control of Certain Poly Devices CVE-2026-0826
https://support.hp.com/us-en/document/ish_15052661-15052687-16/hpsbpy04083
Security Advisory Ivanti Neurons for ITSM (CVE-2026-9614)
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Join Wiz live on June 16th to see how AI is reshaping cloud attack surface In this session, Wiz Research breaks down key findings from the State of AI in the Cloud Report 2026, unpacking what these trends actually mean for security leaders: how AI is changing the cloud operating model, where new exposure paths are emerging, and how security teams can adapt their strategies for increasingly automated environments.
SANS Demo Day 2026 (New Virtual Event) | Wednesday, June 24, 10AM - 5PM EDT | See cutting-edge cybersecurity tools in action, compare solutions side by side, and gain expert insights to make smarter, faster security decisions for your organization.
ICS Summit Solutions Track | Tuesday, June 9 | Chaired by Dean Parsons, see live demos, real-world attack case studies, and proven OT/ICS defenses.
Survey Insights Event | 2026 SANS SOC Survey Insights: A Decade of Evolution in Cyber Defense | Wednesday, June 17 | Christopher Crowley | Learn key global SOC trends and challenges from alert fatigue to budget priorities.