SEC536: Adversarial AI - Penetration Testing AI Systems


Experience SANS training through course previews.
Learn MoreLet us help.
Contact usBecome a member for instant access to our free resources.
Sign UpWe're here to help.
Contact UsColorado Governor Jared Polis has disclosed that operational technology (OT) systems at two small water utilities suffered breaches in late August 2026, several weeks after similar incidents at other water utilities around the US made headlines. Both targeted utilities are private, and both serve fewer than 200 people. A spokesperson for the governor said the "incidents consisted of individuals changing equipment settings, disabling remote access and alarms, and altering pumping cycles." Both utilities addressed the security issues themselves; the incidents did not affect the utilities' ability to provide services, nor did they threaten public safety. Earlier this summer, water utilities in at least 12 other US states reported being targeted by cyberattacks; on July 30, 2026, the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued an alert that it was "observing a significant increase in cyber threat actors targeting programmable logic controllers (PLCs) in the Water and Wastewater Systems (WWS) Sector," and providing organizations in that sector with suggested mitigation to secure those systems. Several weeks later, CISA published broader Internet Exposure Reduction Guidance, and noted that it had observed breaches at more than 100 water and wastewater utilities in July 2026.

There is one detail here that makes this story worth commenting on even after all the recent water incidents: The attackers manipulated the safety process, not just the control systems. These were very small water systems, and the incidents had no reported impact on water quality or public safety. What is concerning is that the attackers changed pumping cycles and equipment settings while also disabling alarms. Alarms are an engineered safeguard that operators depend on to know when a process is behaving abnormally. Protecting the integrity of those safeguards is just as important as protecting the devices that control the process.

Thus far the recent attacks on water utilities have not disrupted service to customers. But, if they are messing with the control systems and testing the compromised capabilities, it very well can happen. Consider this a mulligan and take the time to make sure that you're secure. At the very least, make sure that OT systems are NOT exposed to the internet and that they are isolated from your IT systems. Then make sure you keep things updated, including access and boundary control devices. Don't be a Shodan search away from a bad day.
In risk management terms, this was a critical "near miss" that could have had devastating consequences. To mitigate similar risks, all critical infrastructure organizations must review every internet-facing device to determine if external access is necessary, implementing continuous monitoring wherever it is required, while also auditing their insider threat programs.

Any connection of OT to the public networks must use end-to-end application layer encryption.
SecurityWeek
Denver Post
CISA
CISA
Security agencies in Australia, Germany, Japan, and the US have published a joint advisory warning of malicious activity conducted by a threat actor group with ties to North Korea. According to the advisory, the threat actor group, dubbed WaterPlum or Contagious Interview, "conducts cyberattacks by infiltrating unsuspecting job seekers’ computer networks, harvesting sensitive information, and stealing cryptocurrency. WaterPlum is victimizing individual IT professionals in Japan, the United States, Europe, and other countries." By posing as employers offering job interviews for software developers and other professionals, the group has reportedly infected more than 30,000 devices in more than 100 countries and stolen funds and cryptocurrency wallet credentials. The group’s method is to contact targeted individuals via social media and online job platforms, coax them to be interviewed or receive a call about potential work, and use a variety of social engineering tactics to trick the targets into running malicious code on their devices. The advisory includes the threat actors' known tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and notes in closing that "The techniques described in this advisory are only examples; actors continuously evolve and refine their methods [and advises individuals to] stay informed by monitoring alerts from domestic and international security agencies and by reviewing reports published by security vendors."

In other words, fake job interviews are the new social engineering lure. With the change in the job market, some of which is related to AI adoption displacing employees, I'm hearing more folks who are frustrated, desperately looking for any sort of response to their application. Unfortunately, this isn't the callback you're looking for. Beware of an interview asking to execute code or download applications to your systems, to include copying/pasting of commands. The nine page report from IC3 below includes mitigations for employers and job seekers, and includes useful references for more information.

The Internet may be efficient for identifying candidates but not for hiring. Remote hiring, particularly for remote work, is high risk.
CyberScoop
The Record
The Register
Help Net Security
MSMT
IC3
Threat actors have impersonated more than 40 organizations to spread infostealer malware known as “Rapuncel.” The campaign was detected on August 13, 2026, when “the LastPass Threat Intelligence, Mitigation, and Escalation (TIME) Team identified a fraudulent GitHub organization impersonating LastPass Authenticator which redirected visitors to attacker-controlled infrastructure which ultimately served the installer." The attackers used search engine optimization (SEO) to elevate a GitHub page serving the fraudulent LastPass installer; the threat actors appear to have done the same thing for a fraudulent macOS LastPass application. LastPass writes that "the campaign delivered a Microsoft-attested kernel driver with zero VirusTotal detections that terminated 145 antivirus and EDR processes from kernel mode, enabling potential credential theft across browsers, cryptocurrency wallets, Discord, Steam, Telegram and Windows Credential Manager."

The attack involves a user attempting to download a package update, which instead triggers a series of redirects ultimately leading to the attackers' servers, which provide a 148 MB Zip file that evades most security scans. Inside is an installer with a signed copy of the MS Visual Studio debugger; this has been renamed and configured to sideload the malicious vsdbg.dll DLL, then deploy the Rapuncel infostealer and Alinubx.sys kernel driver, which kills the AV/EDR software while registering itself as the NVIDIA NvFSFIler service. To bypass app encryption in Chromium-based browsers, the Infostealer injects a helper DLL and invokes its own Elevation Service. Rapuncel persists across reboots, so any EDR/AV products are killed again if reactivated. There are only a couple of things we can do here: First, grab the IoC's from the LastPass blog, hunt for them, and block the listed domains; next, remind users to only download from known good sources; and lastly, for compromised systems, users are going to need to update their credentials — ALL of them — from a known clean machine. This means any credentials stored in browsers; credentials for Discord, Steam, Telegram accounts, and anything in the Windows Credential manager. If there was a crypto wallet on the system, change those credentials too. Maybe a good time to have users enable any MFA options, including passkeys, that they had been postponing.

Paraphrasing an old saying, "If you put most of your eggs in one basket, make sure you buy a really well-made and strong basket." This incident was not exploiting a flaw in the basket, but rather impersonating the basket maker. Good job by LastPass in monitoring its brand; this is also a good reminder to (a) ask all your security vendors how they would have detected this, and (b) look into your own company’s brand monitoring effectiveness.

This is a classic application swap scenario. Something I've been discussing for close to 5 years now is that macOS is one of those "trusted" systems that maybe should deserve more focus. One of my focuses in the next few months or year is to home in on more macOS testing, as I think it's still too unexplored but represents a fairly wide attack surface.
BleepingComputer
SecurityWeek
LastPass
SolarWinds has released an update that fixes a high-severity unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability stemming from a hardcoded static key in Access Rights Manager (ARM). The flaw, CVE-2026-28326, CVSS score 8.8, is addressed in ARM 2026.2.1, released on Thursday, September 17. CVE-2026-28326 is the only CVE fixed in the update, which also addresses nine customer issues, including changes to group membership updating automatically for Azure AD resources without requiring a re-scan; collectors remaining connected after ARM service restart and no longer requiring re-registration or reconnection steps; and service actions scheduled for a future date through the web client executing at the scheduled time instead of running immediately. The ARM 2026.2.1 release notes remind users that "ARM and SolarWinds Platform products must be installed on separate servers. ARM is not a SolarWinds Platform product, and if you are on a version earlier than ARM 2023.2.4, first upgrade to 2023.2.4 and then upgrade to the current version." The document also includes a list of end-of-Life dates for various ARM versions. SolarWinds credits Kai Huang from Armadin with the flaw's discovery.

If I could bill someone a nickel for every hardcoded password… Bottom line, update SolarWinds ARM to 2026.2.1. Version 2023.2.4 and below were all EOL in May, so if you're on one of these, you need to jump. Read the Installation and Upgrade guide to identify all the steps you need to take to get to 2026.2.1 regardless of your starting point. If you're using SolarWinds ARM, you need to make sure it's on a separate server from your other SolarWinds platform products that is neither public nor internet facing.

SolarWinds is proving to be a risky source. Spraying malware and coding errors. Many vulnerabilities result from complexity. Hardcoded credentials are simple.
Sarah Wight, VP of Legal for Litigation, Competition, and Enforcement at LinkedIn, has posted that a federal court in California "has entered a consent judgment in LinkedIn's favor," prohibiting ProAPIs, Netswift, and their founder and CTO Rehmat Alam from scraping, selling, and transferring data from LinkedIn member profiles. The companies created millions of phony LinkedIn accounts through which they conducted their activity. The October 2025 complained alleged breach of contract; fraud and deceit; breach of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act; breach of the California Comprehensive Data Access and Fraud Act; unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practices; violation of the Lanham Act; misappropriation; and trespass to chattels.

The accounts were used to create a continuously updated database of all LinkedIn users — including member, school, employer, comments, and posts — which they sold to others without consent or permission. LinkedIn did detect and delete the phony accounts created to harvest member account data within hours, but that was still sufficient time for information to be harvested. The fake accounts were created by the hundreds, if not thousands, daily, overwhelming the countermeasures — kind of a DoS attack. This behavior is not unique to LinkedIn, who are actively working to detect and block this behavior much more quickly. With this ruling, I would expect other social media providers to go after similar activity on their platforms. While it’s tempting to pull back on your social media presence, many employers are now using it as part of their selection process, and if you don't have a profile that re-enforces your application, you're going to be passed over; instead, you may want to dial back on secondary or shadow profiles.

Sometimes protecting one's brand is expensive and confrontational.
The Record
CourtListener
The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has upgraded its coordinated vulnerability reporting platform from the Vulnerability Information and Coordination Environment (VINCE) to VINCE-NT, where NT stands for New Technology. CISA says the updated platform offers clearer reporting fields, updated workflows and standardized processes, improved communication and triage capabilities, and increased support for multi-party coordination and developing advisories. VINCE-NT launched on Thursday, September 17, 2026, and current VINCE cases will transition to the new system over the next few weeks. The associated FAQ notes that VINCE-NT's terminology differs from VINCE's: VINCE-NT uses the term "Supplier" in place of vendor, developer, and maintainer; "Component" in place of product; and "Reporter" in place of researcher and finder. "A more significant difference is that VINCE-NT supports more specific and formal vulnerability status information than Vendor Information provided in VINCE-generated Vulnerability Notes. This aligns more closely with CSAF and the CVE Record Format."

The prior VINCE system was rolled out in 2020, and was used for coordinated disclosure of vulnerabilities, sponsored by CISA and hosted by CERT/CC (CMU). The new system is hosted, sponsored, and managed by CISA. With an improved UI and more standardized information and reporting, this should improve the advisory publication workflow. New capabilities also include secure file sharing, seamless collaboration capabilities, and better automation; this should provide a needed shot in the arm to aid both defenders and researchers.

CISA appears to be working to improve the ratio of signal to noise in their intelligence so that users spend limited resources where action is essential and efficient.
Japanese software company Helpfeel has acknowledged a data breach of its Gyazo image-sharing service and has apologized "for the significant concern and inconvenience caused by this incident." Helpfeel said the platform suffered "unauthorized access by a third party, which exposed both customer data and image metadata." The company "blocked all access routes used in the incident and have completed remediation of the vulnerability that was exploited." According to Helpfeel's ongoing investigation, the incident compromised roughly 23.62 million customer-related records, which include names, email addresses, password hashes, user IDs, device IDs, login session IDs, X integration tokens (if connected), profile information, and other data. Helpfeel's breach notice page also lists the type of image metadata exposed, and notes that they "have also confirmed that the third party obtained a list identifying private images, ... [and] cannot rule out the possibility that some private images may have been viewed by the third party." The company plans to notify affected customers via email. Users are urged to change their passwords and be alert to suspicious communications.

The service uploads screenshots and screen recordings, providing users a shareable link for posting in social media, email/etc. The vulnerability was exploited on September 11, and the activity was detected later that evening with all access routes closed early on September 12. Even so, the metadata of about 490 million images along with 23.62 user records had been exfiltrated. That is a lot of data in a short interval. Make sure you're considering just how quickly data can be exfiltrated from a compromised system, both when evaluating response timelines and setting up monitoring for unusual activity. Beyond changing passwords, this would be a good time for Helpfeel to roll out MFA for everyone.
Most companies respond to a data breach with polished PR jargon and empty promises to "do better." A real apology is a rare exception. To truly move forward, organizations need to dissect these failures openly, analyzing both successes and missteps. Helpfeel can do that by publishing an authentic after-action report to own the incident and lead with transparency.
Help Net Security
SecurityWeek
BleepingComputer
Helpfeel
Ireland’s Data Protection Commission (DPC) has fined Google €403 million (US$462 million) for violations of the European Union's data privacy rules. Specifically, Google failed to process users' Web & App Activity and Location History data in compliance with standards established by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). DPC has ordered Google to bring their data processing practices into compliance with GDPR within six months. The finding was the result of an inquiry that looked at Google's data processing practices between May 25, 2018 and February 4, 2020. DPC is Lead Supervisory Authority for Google in the EU because Google's European headquarters is in Dublin. Google has stated that "From 2019 onwards, [they]’ve significantly evolved [their] practices and launched robust tools that make managing location data simple."

This is a reminder that you can be held accountable for any past shortcomings in following GDPR. All you can do is make sure that you're fully following current guidance and documenting your decisions in that regard. If you've made improvements, document those. Make sure that you and your legal counsel are aligned; you've got attorney-client privileges, so use them to your advantage.

This fine is about 0.1% of Google’s 2025 profits — not that big of a slap on the wrist. Ireland has given Google six months to demonstrate that launching "…tools that make managing location data simple" meets the requirements for real user control of disclosure.
While the fine may seem substantial at first glance, it amounts to a tiny fraction of Google's annual revenue. With the GDPR and the incoming Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) imposing strict regulatory requirements across all digital components, we can expect ongoing investigations and penalties for US tech vendors. This creates a broader policy question: Do these practices or regulatory frameworks constitute violations of competition laws in Europe and beyond?

While perhaps not material, ~$0.5B should be sufficient to get even Google management's attention.
Help Net Security
SecurityWeek
The Hacker News
Data Protection Ireland
Ludwig Maximilian University (LMU) in Munich, Germany, is recovering from a cybersecurity incident that compromised sensitive student data. Over the weekend, LMU said that the intruders accessed an IT system that contains enrollment information, and the university says it is assuming the information was retrieved. The compromised information may include names, dates of birth, contact details, LMU email addresses, bank account data, and details about students’ courses of study and previous educational qualifications. The incident was detected on Wednesday, September 16, but LMU has not yet determined when the intruders first gained access to the affected system. The compromised server has been disconnected from the internet, and LMU is working with third-party cybersecurity experts and law enforcement. Students have reported difficulties accessing LMU systems; the university plans to extend the deadline for enrollment for the winter semester. An investigation is ongoing.

Universities are a target for ransomware and data exfiltration attacks. LMU has disconnected more than just the compromised IT systems because of possible trust relationships, resulting in greater impacts to the students. While impacting more users is not a popular move, making sure you have contained the incident is critical, which also means you need to have system interdependency information to properly build your incident response plan. Yeah, that can be hard to get, and the alternative, during an attack, can be worse.
SANS Internet Storm Center StormCast Tuesday, September 22, 2026
PNG Stego Analysis; NPM BTree Malware; Pi-Hole Advisory
https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/10104
TerminalFix PNG Steganography
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/TerminalFix+PNG+Steganography/33318
NPM Btree Malware Campaign Without Install Script
Pi-Hole Update and Advisory
https://github.com/pi-hole/FTL/security/advisories/GHSA-2794-hrj8-5jg9
SANS Internet Storm Center StormCast Monday, September 21, 2026
HTTP Query; Docker Escape; Brevo ClickFix Attack; LastPass Fake GitHub Repo
https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/10102
HTTP QUERY Method: The Grey Zone Between GET and POST
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/HTTP+QUERY+Method+The+Grey+Zone+Between+GET+And+POST/33352
Simple MacOS Docker Escape
https://www.accomplish.ai/blog/escaping-dockers-hypervisor/
Brevo ClickFix Compromise
https://status.brevo.com/incidents/01M2QBC4EZ24ZACW6SWQYVW8N3/write-up
LastPass (and other) lookalike GitHub Repo and Kernel Module Infostealer
https://blog.lastpass.com/posts/lastpass-delphos-report-rapuncel-infostealer
My Upcoming Classes
Catch up on recent editions of NewsBites or browse our full archive of expert-curated cybersecurity news.
A survey of 750 security leaders and practitioners reveals a gap between confidence and validation. Security teams are busy scanning, patching, and closing tickets—but are they proving attacks will fail? The State of Assumed Security shows how testing controls, confirming exploitability, and closing attack paths can turn assumed security into demonstrated resilience.
Move from point-in-time vulnerability scanning to continuous exposure management. Join Arctic Wolf® September 24 webinar.
Webinar | Closing the Gaps in Modern Data Protection | Watch now to address evolving risks in SaaS applications and AI pipelines.
Webinar | SANS 2026 Exposure Management Survey Insights: Cyber Exposure at a Crossroads | Wednesday, October 7