SEC595: Applied Data Science and AI/Machine Learning for Cybersecurity Professionals


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Contact UsDigiCert has revoked digital certificates that were stolen from the company's internal support portal. Following a malware incident involving a customer support team member, DigiCert conducted an investigation that revealed "the threat actor was able to procure initialization codes for a limited number of code signing certificates, few of which were then used to sign malware." The compromised certificates were revoked within 24 hours of their discovery, and the revocation date was set to the day they were issued. The incident began on April 2, 2026, when "a threat actor contacted DigiCert's support team via a customer chat channel and delivered a ZIP file disguised as a customer screenshot. The file contained a .scr executable with a malicious payload." While established security measures blocked four instances of the malware from being delivered, the fifth attempt compromised a support analyst's machine. A subsequent investigation found that a second machine had been compromised two days later. In all, DigiCert revoked 60 certificates. In a related story, Microsoft has addressed an issue in Microsoft Defender that was incorrectly flagging legitimate DigiCert root certificates as malicious. Microsoft told BleepingComputer that the issue was related to the DigiCert breach.

An interesting side effect of the incident was Microsoft marking the DigiCert CA as malicious and removing it from some systems. The CA file remains valid and must not be removed. DigiCert only revoked 60 certificates signed by this CA while it was under attacker control, but the CA itself was not compromised.

Beware of screensavers bearing gifts. You may want to consider .scr files as an attachment to block, and at the very least consider it a risky executable which needs to come from a known good source. The malicious software would have been stopped by the endpoint EDR, had it been enabled with an appropriate protection level. Make sure that your endpoints are all running appropriate EDR, and that your EDR protection settings are tuned for your environment. The base settings, while non-disruptive, aren't really sufficient to cover all the threats. Make sure that you're following best practices for your EDR.

Sounds like DigiCert had a flaw in their customer service identity verification process that didn’t fail until the fifth attempt — good reminder to check your own security retry performance.
DigiCert followed the standard playbook in revoking the stolen certificates. That said, hopefully they will be more forthcoming on how the actor gained initial access. For example, what changed ’the fifth time’ the malicious package was delivered? We all could benefit from that knowledge.

Certificates do not sign: private keys do. Certificates are information about the key. Private keys should be generated and stored in such a way — e.g., in high security modules (HSMs) — that while they can be used, there is no one sufficiently privileged to see, copy, or otherwise compromise them.
Cybersecurity researchers are reporting a campaign of supply chain attacks targeting packages in the PyPi, npm, and PHP ecosystems, including packages for SAP, PyTorch Lightning, and Intercom that were infected with a worm dubbed "Mini Shai-Hulud" due to similarities with the Shai-Hulud npm worm from September 2025. SAP's mbt v1.2.48, @cap-js/db-service v2.10.1, @cap-js/postgres v2.2.2, and @cap-js/sqlite v2.2.2 packages, whose combined downloads exceed half a million weekly, were poisoned on April 29, 2026. The Mini Shai-Hulud compromise involves "injecting malicious preinstall scripts that execute during dependency installation. The campaign leverages a multi-stage payload to harvest developer and CI/CD secrets across GitHub, npm, and major cloud providers, and exfiltrates the data via attacker-controlled GitHub repositories. It also contains code designed to propagate via compromised tokens." On April 30, the worm spread from SAP into PyTorch Lightning PyPI packages, and in turn propagated from dependencies into intercom-client npm packages. Based on a shared RSA public key as well as attacker tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), researchers from Wiz attribute this campaign to TeamPCP. OX Security has observed stolen developer credentials in over 1,800 repositories since the compromise of SAP's packages. Wiz recommends that security teams search for affected package versions and malicious files, rotate all credentials including "GitHub tokens, npm tokens, cloud credentials, Kubernetes tokens, and CI/CD secrets," and audit GitHub activity for suspicious commits, new repositories, and the provided indicators of compromise (IoCs).

Rather than think of a desert planet and cutting off spice production, consider this worm steals developer credentials. Those credentials were then used to create new GitHub repositories. Check to make sure that you didn't consume one of the poisoned SAP packages. Beyond getting the known good package, you need to rotate secrets (GitHub, cloud providers, Kubernetes, CI, local developer tools, etc.), not just npm tokens. Grab the IoCs from the Wiz blog and check your environment.
SANS ISC
Dark Reading
SecurityWeek
The Register
Wiz
Socket
Socket
Ox
Ubuntu's servers are back online following about two days of outages caused by a "sustained, cross-border" distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack starting on April 30. This incident prevented users from accessing the distribution's website and resources for remediation following the simultaneous unrelated disclosure and published proof-of-concept exploit code for a privilege escalation flaw in the Linux kernel. Users were also reportedly prevented from downloading and updating the OS. Ubuntu is just one of several major distributions of Linux affected by the kernel flaw. At the time of this writing, all services on Ubuntu's status page are listed "Operational.” Neither Ubuntu nor its parent company Canonical have issued further information about the attack since May 1 or verified any threat actor's attribution claims.

In case you missed it, Ubuntu 26.04 LTS was just released, so you likely have teams working on certifying the new version, which may have reverted to other package sources. Make sure they're using legit copies of packages. The same threat actor claiming this attack is also claiming responsibility for the recent DDoS attacks on BlueSky and on eBay's Japan and US divisions. Another argument for making sure your DDoS protections are enabled and comprehensive.

As a result of the DDoS, users may be tempted to download Ubuntu from unofficial sources. Please verify checksums and digital signatures. Ubuntu provides a file containing hashes, including a digital signature for the file. Do not trust unsigned hashes that are offered from unofficial sources.

The Internet is now part of the battlefield. We must anticipate multi-pronged attacks. This includes DoS attacks. It is difficult to set a goal for all enterprises for mitigation of such attacks. In this case two days seems high.
Ars Technica
TechCrunch
The Register
Ubuntu Discourse
Canonical
A flaw disclosed by cPanel was added to the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (CISA KEV) on April 30, 2026, with a mitigation deadline of May 3, and organizations have since reported ransomware attacks exploiting the flaw. CVE-2026-41940, CVSS score 9.8, allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to gain access to the control panel by using carriage return line feed (CRLF) injection to bypass authentication in cPanel and WHM 11.40 and later, also affecting WP Squared before version 136.1.7. BleepingComputer was contacted by several sources reporting the presence of a Go-based Linux encryptor for "Sorry" ransomware after compromise through this flaw, also noting that hundreds of sites impacted by these compromises have been indexed by Google. On May 2, researchers from Ctrl-Alt-Intel also observed a targeted campaign employing Watchtowr's published proof-of-concept exploit against "government and military entities in South-East Asia, alongside a smaller set of MSPs and hosting providers in the Philippines, Laos, Canada, South Africa, and the United States," as well as evidence of previous separate exploitations targeting an Indonesian defense training portal and Chinese railway data. On May 1 the Shadowserver Foundation estimated at least 44,000 IPs had been compromised, but that number has dropped into the low thousands in the days since; at the time of this writing, the highest concentration of compromises is in the US, followed by France, the Netherlands, the UK, and India. Daniel Pearson, CEO of KnownHost, stated shortly after cPanel's disclosure that his company has seen ongoing exploitation of CVE-2026-41940 since late February. cPanel's advisory gives instructions to users to upgrade to fixed cPanel and WHM versions 11.86.0.41, 11.110.0.97, 11.118.0.63, 11.126.0.54, 11.130.0.19, 11.132.0.29, 11.136.0.5, and 11.134.0.20, and to WP Squared version 136.1.7. The advisory was updated on May 4 with a new detection script that was refined to remove false positives.

cPanel is commonly used by companies offering virtual hosting. A vulnerability in cPanel puts all sites hosted on such a server at risk. cPanel offers an auto-update option, which should have covered many installs. With a rich vulnerability history, enabling auto-update is a sound option for those who must expose the admin interface to customers.

Make sure that you've updated your cPanel installs and implemented cPanel's security best practices, to include their recommended security settings checklists. Check with your hosting provider to learn what their update plans are. If you're using cPanel add-on modules, make sure they are up to date and not EOL. Where feasible, enable auto-update.
As discussed in SANS NewsBites Volume 28, Number 33 (Friday, May 1, 2026), the bad guys quickly weaponized and moved with speed and diligence. Any sysadmins supporting cPanel or WHM need to patch NOW and look for signs of earlier compromise.
cPanel
BleepingComputer
Dark Reading
The Hacker News
TechCrunch
SecurityWeek
The Register
Trellix, a cybersecurity incident detection and response company, has disclosed that intruders gained access to a portion of their source code repositories, and the company is currently investigating the incident with help from third-party forensic experts. Trellix has also notified law enforcement. Trellix was formed in January 2022 with the merger of FireEye and McAfee. Other cybersecurity companies have been similarly targeted over the past several months: Checkmarx reported a breach of its GitHub code repository in late April, and Cisco disclosed a breach of its internal development environment.

Verify your access controls on your source code repositories. Make sure MFA is required for updates, and give careful thought to who can read it. While we've talked a lot about malicious packages replacing legitimate ones, don't forget that you may not want just anyone to be able to download your legitimate code either. While you're looking at things, make sure that you are not ignoring secrets stored in those repositories. Don't make things any easier than they have to be for our adversaries.
Not a lot of details here, but snatching source code can lead to future vulnerabilities that lead to exploits. Perhaps they can lobby for early access to Claude Mythos or GPT-5.4-Cyber. That way they can get ahead of any new vulnerabilities discovered.

We must expect and resist attacks against the software products of major suppliers as a means of distributing malware. Suppliers should be held liable for any distribution of malicious, as opposed to merely shoddy, software.
Heise
Gov Infosecurity
BleepingComputer
The Hacker News
Trellix
Progress Software has released updates to address a critical authentication bypass vulnerability (CVE-2026-4670) in MOVEit Automation. The updates also fix a high-severity privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2026-5174) in the same product. Progress warns that "exploitation may lead to unauthorized access, administrative control, and data exposure." Progress credits researchers at Airbus with finding the vulnerabilities. Users are urged to update to one of the following versions: MOVEit Automation 2025.1.5 or newer, MOVEit Automation 2025.0.9 or newer, and MOVEit Automation 2024.1.8 or newer. Progress notes that "Upgrading to a patched release, using the full installer, is the only way to remediate this issue. There will be an outage to the system while the upgrade is running." Another Progress product, the MOVEit Transfer managed file transfer (MFT) solution, was targeted by threat actors in 2023, and reports of compromise via that vulnerability continue to trickle in: the State of New York's Department of Financial Services recently fined Delta Dental Insurance Company and Delta Dental of New York, Inc. $2.25 million over the companies' response to the MOVEit Transfer vulnerability; threat actors stole roughly 60,000 files from Delta Dental.

There have been at least six vulnerabilities in MOVEit since the first critical flaw reported in May 2023. If you have MOVEit, make sure that it's updated. If you're partnering with someone who requires MOVEit, consider suspending file transfers until you can confirm they have updated. Seriously research alternative file transfer systems, as you don't want the publicity should you be breached.
Help Net Security
BleepingComputer
The Hacker News
Progress
NIST
NIST
Educational technology company Instructure, which developed and maintains the Canvas learning management system (LMS), confirmed on May 1, 2026, that it experienced a security incident "perpetrated by a criminal threat actor." Instructure CISO Steve Proud stated in the original notice and in a May 2 update that upon learning of the attack, the company launched an investigation with external forensics experts, revoked credentials and access tokens associated with affected systems, deployed patches, rotated keys "even though there is no evidence they were misused," and increased monitoring across all platforms. The threat actor's unauthorized access affected data belonging to "users at affected institutions," including names, email addresses, student ID numbers, and messages among users, but there is no evidence yet of unauthorized access to dates of birth, government identifiers, or financial information. Because of the application key rotation, users must re-authorize access to certain tools: "Reissued application keys contain a timestamp in the name and will be visible to users during re-authorization. These are valid Instructure created keys and users should continue the authorization process." Instructure has published a separate notice about application key timestamps showing an example authorization screen for reference. At the time of this writing, Canvas Data 2 and Beta are available for all customers, but Canvas Test is under maintenance.

The ShinyHunters extortion gang is taking credit for this attack, claiming to have data for 275 million individuals across 9,000 schools, so suffice it to say there will be more to come on what was and was not breached. If you're a Canvas customer, check the Instructure site for system status. Also review the Application Key Timestamp Notice, as it applies to integrated tools. Customers with reissued application keys will have to re-authorize that access one time; even so, they may flag the process as malicious when it is, in fact, legitimate.
Two individuals have been sentenced to four years each in prison for deploying ransomware known as ALPHV BlackCat over a period of several months in 2023. Ryan Clifford Goldberg and Kevin Tyler Martin were both formerly employed in the cybersecurity industry: Goldberg worked in incident response at Sygnia and Martin was a ransomware negotiator at DigitalMint. The two along with a co-conspirator, Angelo John Martino III, who was also employed at DigitalMint, arranged with the ALPHV BlackCat administrators to use the ransomware and its extortion platform in exchange for 20 percent of any ransom payments they received. In December 2025, Goldberg and Ryan both pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to obstruct, delay, or affect commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce by extortion. Martino pleaded guilty to the came charge last month, and because of the nature of his involvement with the ransomware activity, is facing up to 20 years in prison when he is sentenced in July. DigitalMint has established new guardrails to ensure that negotiations are accurately audited and logged. These include "structured logging of all negotiation communications; clear audit trails for decision-making; defined oversight mechanisms throughout the engagement lifecycle, and ongoing refinement of processes as expectations evolve."

DigitalMint has instigated improvements in their processes adding more oversight and transparency to the engagement. Other ransomware negotiation companies should review these to see where they can also raise the bar. What DigitalMint doesn't indicate is improvements in their screening of staffing. Not only must all actions taken be accountable, transparent, and consistent with company values, but, based on my background in government, staff has to be screened regularly to ensure they are also aligned and haven't gone astray.

Good reminder to include questions about employee vetting in all security services RFPs/eval criteria.

Accountability is an essential control, not merely a "guardrail." A complete audit trail makes it possible to fix accountability for every transaction or change to an identified individual.
The Record
Help Net Security
SecurityWeek
US DoJ
DigitalMint
The Five Eyes countries have jointly published Careful adoption of agentic AI services, which "provides practical guidance to help organisations that design, develop, deploy and operate agentic AI systems, to make informed risk assessments and mitigations. The guidance concludes with actionable recommendations to help organisations prepare for and defend against emerging and future agentic AI threats." Authored by cybersecurity agencies in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the US, the document outlines agentic AI security risks with accompanying example scenarios, and offers best practices for securing agentic AI systems, including designing and developing secure AI agents, and deploying and operating agents securely.

Some human individual or enterprise is responsible for everything that a computer is tasked to do and for all properties and uses of the results. This includes any agency or privileges granted to the computer process. Start here.

The guidance does a good job of defining the differences between Agentic and Generative AI as well as the specific risks Agentic AI brings. It may take you a bit to unpack this, but it's time well spent. The best practices include links to external references you can leverage. As usual, I look at guidance like this to make sure I'm not missing anything, as well as to find topics of discussion for developers and users to find optimal ways to adopt (and understand) this technology safely and securely.
A key point in the guidance is that “organizations should address AI security… within established cyber security frameworks…” Definitely agree. The Center for Internet Security recently published three AI controls companion guides (LLMs, Agents, and MCP) that leverage its Critical Security Controls to protect AI systems. Using the CIS Controls allows one to secure LLMs, agentic systems, and MCP interfaces without adopting a new framework.
- https://www.cisecurity.org/insights/white-papers/controls-v8-1-ai-llm-companion-guide
- https://www.cisecurity.org/insights/white-papers/controls-v8-1-ai-agents-companion-guide
CyberScoop
Gov Infosecurity
The Register
Australian Signals Directorate
SANS Internet Storm Center StormCast Tuesday, May 5, 2026
Honeypot Update; MOVEit Patches; Apache http2 Vuln
https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9918
DShield Honeypot Update
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/DShield+Honeypot+Update/32948
MOVEit Automation Critical Security Alert Bulletin – April 2026 – (CVE-2026-4670, CVE-2026-5174)
Apache httpd http2 vulnerability
https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2026/q2/387
SANS Internet Storm Center StormCast Monday, May 4, 2026
Malicious Homebrew Ads; Wireshark Update; DigiCert False Positive; cPanel Exploited
https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9916
Malicious Ad for Homebrew Leads to MacSync Stealer
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Malicious+Ad+for+Homebrew+Leads+to+MacSync+Stealer/32942
Wireshark Update
https://www.wireshark.org/docs/relnotes/wireshark-4.6.5.html
DigiCert Microsoft Defender False Positive
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2033170
cPanel Exploited
Catch up on recent editions of NewsBites or browse our full archive of expert-curated cybersecurity news.
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