SEC595: Applied Data Science and AI/Machine Learning for Cybersecurity Professionals


Experience SANS training through course previews.
Learn MoreLet us help.
Contact usBecome a member for instant access to our free resources.
Sign UpWe're here to help.
Contact UsThe US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has published a joint cybersecurity advisory alongside federal intelligence and infrastructure agencies, warning organizations of ongoing attacks targeting programmable logic controllers (PLCs) in multiple US critical infrastructure sectors including "Government Services and Facilities (to include local municipalities), Water and Wastewater Systems (WWS), and Energy." The attacker is believed to be an Iran-affiliated advanced persistent threat (APT) exploiting Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley PLCs and possibly other PLC brands such as Siemens S7 "through malicious interactions with the project file and manipulation of data on human machine interface (HMI) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) displays, resulting in operational disruption and financial loss." The advisory urges organizations to disconnect PLCs from the public internet and deploy secure gateways and firewalls; to query logs from within the attack time frame for indicators of compromise (IoCs), including suspicious traffic on ports 44818, 2222, 102, 22, and 502; and to place the physical mode switch on Rockwell Automation controllers to the run position. CISA strongly recommends organizations check the full provided mitigation and hardening instructions as well as IoCs and attacker tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The advisory calls on manufacturers to create default settings that prevent internet exposure, to not charge for basic security features, and to support phishing-resistant MFA, stating "it is ultimately the responsibility of the device manufacturer to build products that are secure by design and default." Users who may be affected should contact their PLC manufacturer and report the malicious activity to CISA, the FBI, and/or the NSA.
The developers of AI agent OpenClaw have released a patch for a critical vulnerability. CVE-2026-33579, CVSS score 9.4, allows a low-privileged attacker to escalate privileges to full admin access by approving device requests that ask for broader scopes, due to missing scope validation in the /pair approve command path of OpenClaw before 2026.3.28. AI app building platform Blink notes in their blog post on this flaw that "It is the sixth pairing-related vulnerability disclosed in six weeks — a pattern that reveals systemic CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization) design debt in OpenClaw's entire device pairing and scope management subsystem." What's more, Blink estimates "63% of the 135,000+ publicly exposed OpenClaw instances run without any authentication layer," meaning any visitor to the network can obtain the basic privileges needed to exploit this flaw. Blink's overview of OpenClaw CVEs characterizes the quantity and severity of vulnerabilities in the first quarter of 2026 alone as "staggering." Updating to the latest version patched for this flaw (OpenClaw 2026.3.28 or later) will also address a CVSS 9.9 token rotation race condition flaw allowing full admin access and remote code execution, disclosed on March 29, the most critical flaw in OpenClaw to date. Blink notes that an advantage of managed hosting over self-hosting is prompt application of patches.

There are no vulnerabilities in OpenClaw. OpenClaw, as a concept, is the vulnerability.

Addressing six flaws in six weeks is no mean feat, so kudos to the developers who continue to work the issues. For now, it remains a good idea to keep OpenClaw isolated. Beyond applying the update, make sure that you don't have any unexpected pairing with devices with operating.admin scope, and watch for any approved by a pairing-only user, as this a strong exploitation indicator. With the tempo of OpenClaw fixes, it may be worthwhile to investigate a hosted service option where fixes are applied much more rapidly.
A pretty damning indictment of OpenClaw's approach to cybersecurity. Seems like OpenAI could spend just a small portion of their billions to provide secure software training for developers. The other approach is to have the world continue to QA the product and fix as necessary, taking the bad press in stride.
Researchers at Talos Intelligence have discovered "a large-scale automated credential harvesting campaign carried out by a threat cluster [they] are tracking as UAT-10608." The campaign involves targeting Next.js applications vulnerable to the React2Shell vulnerability (CVE-2025-55182), a critical pre-authentication remote code execution vulnerability in React Server Components. Talos says the threat actors have compromised more than 760 systems and that more than 10,000 files have been taken.

These attackers are sending a serialized payload to a vulnerable public-facing app (no authentication), which is then deserialized and instantiated on the server, which exfiltrates credentials. (Yup, untrusted input strikes again). The fix is two-part: first, apply the update to your react server environment, then address your environment. Review any credentials available to your application environment and make sure that you're regularly scanning for their introduction. Make sure everything is running with least privilege. Verify you're limiting access to session-based metadata; for example, implement IMDSv2 enforcement in AWS EC2 instances and deploy runtime self-protections, such as a WAF, which includes Next.js specific attack patterns.

Continued use of reusable credentials is not simply risky but reckless.
Talos Intelligence
Dark Reading
BleepingComputer
SecurityWeek
NIST
The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) has published its Internet Crime Report for 2025. Phishing or spoofing accounted for the largest number of complaints (191,561), followed by extortion (89,129), investment (72,984), and personal data breach (67,456). The greatest losses were attributed to investment scams at $8.65 billion, business email compromise at $3.05 billion, and tech/customer support at $2.13 billion. Total losses reported to IC3 in 2025 exceeded $20 billion, a 26 percent increase over losses reported in 2024. When broken down by age, the largest number of complaints was submitted by individuals over the age of 60; the same group accounted for the greatest losses ($7.75 billion), more than twice the amount reported by individuals between the ages of 50 and 59. IC3 receives an average of nearly 3,000 complaints every day.

Phishing remains number one because it works. Before we play the user training card, make sure you've fully played the technical measures card. You need to make sure that you have not only your anti-spam protections dialed in, but also your EDR and boundary protections, which are both continuously updated and actively blocking known bad sites/actions. Now, review your training and make sure you're not shaming users; make sure it's targeted, actionable, and useful as well as providing users with continuous feedback to reinforce/form good habits.
A couple things stand out in the report: 1) phishing likely enabled the other three complaints listed; and 2) seniors are most vulnerable to these types of scams. Why? Simple. They tend to answer the phone, are more likely to believe the scammer, and aren’t as comfortable with digital devices.

One cannot help but wonder whether those over sixty are more victimized or simply better at reporting. In any case the population of those over sixty is larger than that between 50-59 and growing faster.
Certificate authority D-Trust, a subsidiary of German company Bundesdruckerei, announced on Saturday, April 4 that it is recalling all TLS certificates issued between March 12, 2025 and April 2, 2026. The certificates in question must be exchanged by 5pm local time on Monday, April 6, at which time they will be declared invalid. The recall is not due to a security issue, i.e., cyberattack; instead, the certificates suffer from a linting issue. Specifically, according to a Bugzilla Preliminary incident Report: "After conducting an in-depth internal analysis, supplemented by external expert review, D-Trust has concluded that its current RA-side configuration checks do not meet the definition of a 'linting tool' as intended by the industry."

In case you missed it (I had to refresh my understanding), linting is an automated process used to uncover compliance issues in certificate profiles such as pre-certificates (RFC 6962), TBSCertificates (RFC 5280), full certificates, CRLs, or OCSP responses. As of March 2025, pre-issuance linting is mandatory for all publicly trusted TLS certificates. As such, D-Trust determined they didn't fully meet this requirement and have no choice but to revoke and re-issue any certificates where linting was inadequate. Pretty much, if you're using D-Trust certificates, make sure that you're replacing them asap.

Lately, pushback against the CA Browser forum has been increasing somewhat, driven by what some perceive as draconian enforcement of rules that do not affect security. Microsoft last year negotiated a reprieve from having to revoke millions of certificates due to a formatting issue/typo in its requirements. For a user of any certificate authority, automation is a must. In particular, newer versions of the ACME protocol include provisions to automatically renew certificates that are being revoked before their scheduled expiration.
To require a total recall of certificates created during a specific time frame is not something you decide lightly as a registration authority. I suspect that when the static analysis testing resumed, they found something more troubling.
CERT-EU has released an update following the European Commission's (EC's) March 26, 2026 disclosure of a data breach, adding details about the attack's timing, nature, scope, impact, and attribution. Data amounting to about 340 GB uncompressed were exfiltrated from a compromised AWS account following an initial compromise March 19, and then were leaked online on March 28, including names, email addresses, and email content belonging to "42 internal clients of the European Commission, and at least 29 other Union entities." CERT-EU first received alerts from the EC on March 25 indicating misuse of Amazon APIs and a high volume of network traffic, and subsequent investigation revealed with high confidence that a threat actor had stolen an AWS API key as a result of the March 19 Trivy supply chain compromise. "The European Commission was unwittingly using a compromised version of Trivy during the relevant timeframe, having received it through normal software update channels." CERT-EU notes that the threat actor also "obtained management rights for the compromised AWS secret, which could have allowed them to move laterally to other AWS accounts belonging to the European Commission," though lateral movement has not yet been observed. Upon discovery, the EC secured the stolen AWS key and disabled the threat actor's newly created access keys; notified the EC's Data Protection Controller and Union entities' Data Protection Officers as well as the European Data Protection Supervisor; and on March 31 began communicating directly with those affected. CERT-EU urges organizations to follow Aqua Security's instructions to address the Trivy supply chain compromise and to also audit and rotate AWS credentials. The notice offers recommendations for immediately and continuously hardening and monitoring CI/CD pipelines.

While the obvious preventative step is to make sure that you've got genuine packages and hardened your CI/CD pipeline, the CERT-EU blog has good suggestions to drive that conversation; make sure you're also set for detection of data exfiltration. If they're not already all over this, throw out the challenge to your defenders to see what they come up with — I bet you they have ideas they want to try, if they're not already at least partly implemented. For you, think belt and suspenders.
Excellent update provided. Supply chain attacks are becoming mainstream as a means to attack specific targets. Cybersecurity is complex; it’s not just the infrastructure one maintains but increasingly the security of third-party software providers. Active monitoring is one of very few security controls available once an evildoer has a compromised credential.
CERT-EU
Aqua
SecurityWeek
The Record
BleepingComputer
TechCrunch
Colorado's Consumer Right to Repair Digital Electronic Equipment Act took effect earlier this year and has already met with proposed legislation limiting its scope. Following an April 2 hearing, members of the Colorado Senate Business, Labor, and Technology committee voted unanimously to move the Exempt Critical Infrastructure from Right to Repair bill out of committee and into the state senate and house for voting. The new bill would "exempt information technology equipment that is intended for use in critical infrastructure from Colorado’s consumer right to repair laws." Tech companies lobbying for the exemptions cite cybersecurity concerns among their arguments to limit who can perform repairs. In an emailed response to request for comment, an IBM spokesperson told WIRED that "Given the critical and often sensitive nature of enterprise-level products, any legislation should be clearly scoped to consumer devices." Speaking at the hearing, right to repair advocates say the new bill at best vaguely defines both "information technology" and "critical infrastructure," leaving it to the manufacturers to decide what products would be exempt from the current right to repair law.

Not a bad idea to verify that any repair services you currently have are appropriately licensed/certified/trained to repair the items you've hired them for, particularly critical systems where the risks may outweigh the cost savings of non-OEM parts and technicians. The last thing you want is to hear you're unsupported during a failure or other critical process.
Seems like a bit more definition on what is or isn’t in scope is warranted given enactment of the statute. It also isn’t clear whether ICS/SCADA components commonly found in critical infrastructure are included in the original statute. The good news: video game consoles are exempt. Who says lobbying doesn’t work?

Drafting legislation to be effective while avoiding unintended consequences is both difficult and more art than science. In any case, given the falling cost of consumer electronics, replacement is often, not to say usually, cheaper than repair. (Just by way of example, when I was a boy, American families were going into debt to purchase television sets. Sets were not very reliable and radio and television repair was a thriving industry. Recently my 36" TV became difficult to turn on; once on it worked fine. I replaced it for $75 plus sales tax and delivery. Would have tolerated the problem were "repair" the only option. Noticeably better picture.) It is difficult to write a law that covers both capital (e.g., farm) equipment and consumer electronics.
Over the weekend, Fortinet released emergency fixes to address a critical improper access control vulnerability (CVE-2026-35616) in FortiClient Endpoint Management Server (EMS) that is being actively exploited. The flaw could be exploited to allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands with maliciously crafted requests. Hotfixes are available for FortiClient EMS 7.4.5 and 7.4.6. The issue will also be fixed in FortiClient EMS 7.4.7, which is listed as "upcoming." The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added CVE-2026-35616 to the Known Exploited vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on Monday, April 6, with a mitigation deadline for Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies of Thursday, April 9. The Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA) has also published an alert warning that the vulnerability is under active exploitation and urging users and admins to apply the hotfix.

If you're wondering, CVE-2026-35616, improper access control flaw, has a CVSS score of 9.8. That said, it's being actively exploited: apply the hotfix, which will take care of restarting services and takes only a few seconds. The release notes include the script to verify the patch is applied. The fix will be built into 7.4.7 when it's released, so the upgrade won't require reapplying this fix.
Help Net Security
The Record
Gov Infosecurity
The Hacker News
BleepingComputer
BleepingComputer
SecurityWeek
FortiGuard
CSA
The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has added a high severity Download of Code Without Integrity Check Vulnerability (CVE-2026-3502) in the TrueConf video conferencing tool to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) database with a mitigation deadline of April 16 for Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies. Researchers at Check Point say, "the flaw stems from the abuse of TrueConf’s updater validation mechanism, allowing an attacker who controls the on-premises TrueConf server to distribute and execute arbitrary files across all connected endpoints." In their report, they say that hackers with ties to China have been exploiting the vulnerability since the beginning of this calendar year. They observed "a series of targeted attacks against government entities in Southeast Asia carried out via a legitimate TrueConf software installed in the targets’ environment." Check Point disclosed the vulnerability to TrueConf, and the company released a fix for the issue last month.

TrueConf checks the on-premises server for updates at startup and applies them without validation. The attack leverages this trust relationship, needing only to compromise the server to have code deployed through your userbase. If you're a TrueConf shop, make sure that you're running version 8.5.3 or better, applying the update via a trusted channel and hunting for the IoCs in the Checkpoint blog.
The same researchers from the University of Toronto who in 2025 demonstrated the efficacy of the Rowhammer effect on NVIDIA A6000 GPUs with GDDR6 memory have now developed an attack using Rowhammer to conduct both GPU-side and CPU-side escalation and achieve a root shell, even with an input–output memory management unit (IOMMU) enabled. The Rowhammer effect is a type of disturbance error observed for over a decade, where repeatedly reading ("hammering") memory locations in densely celled dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) can leak an electrical charge that may cause bits to flip in an adjacent memory row. The new attack, dubbed "GPUBreach" corrupts GPU page tables to enable an unprivileged Compute Unified Device Architecture (CUDA) kernel to "gain arbitrary GPU memory read/write, and then chain that capability into CPU-side escalation by exploiting newly discovered memory-safety bugs in the NVIDIA driver." Two other research papers published independently at nearly the same time (GDDRHammer and GeForge) also detail Rowhammer attacks that lead to privilege escalation, but both are mitigated by enabling IOMMU, which is off by default. Error correction code (ECC) can also be enabled to defend against the Rowhammer effect, but may reduce performance and memory capacity. The researchers will present their full findings at the IEEE Symposium on April 13, 2026.

Even with this attack, enabling IOMMU and ECC (where available) remain recommended mitigations to other Rowhammer types of GPU attacks, but neither is perfect. ECC cannot correct attack patterns with more than two bit flips, and the GPUBreach attack bypasses IOMMU by leveraging driver vulnerabilities, so that will require an updated driver. Your action is to make sure both are enabled where available and deploy updated NVIDIA drivers when available. Tread lightly around HPC applications, as setting these may introduce unacceptable performance impacts in compute nodes.
SANS Internet Storm Center StormCast Tuesday, April 7, 2026
Redirects in Phishing; Internet Bug Bounty Suspended; BlueHammer; Keycloak MFA Bypass
https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9882
How often are redirects used in phishing in 2026?
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/How+often+are+redirects+used+in+phishing+in+2026/32870
HackerOne Suspends Internet Bug Bounty
https://hackerone.com/ibb?type=team
https://www.linkedin.com/posts/danielstenberg_hackerone-share-7446667043380076545-RX9b/
BlueHammer Windows 0-day Privilege Escalation
https://github.com/Nightmare-Eclipse/BlueHammer
https://deadeclipse666.blogspot.com/2026/04/public-disclosure.html
https://deepwiki.com/Nightmare-Eclipse/BlueHammer
Keycloak MFA Bypass CVE-2026-3429
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2026-3429
SANS Internet Storm Center StormCast Monday, April 6, 2026
TeamPCP Update and Axios Post Mortem; Strapi NPM Packages Compromised; Fortinet 0-Day
https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9880
Team PCP Update and Axios Post Mortem
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/32864
https://github.com/axios/axios/issues/10636
Strapi NPM Packages Compromised
https://safedep.io/malicious-npm-strapi-plugin-events-c2-agent/
Fortinet CVE-2026-35616 actively exploited
Catch up on recent editions of NewsBites or browse our full archive of expert-curated cybersecurity news.
Your cyber risk playbook for the AI threat era. AI use is as high as ever, but that’s come with a dramatic increase in AI-enabled cyber attacks, including phishing, manipulation, and social engineering. Cyber risk now requires an all-encompassing strategy that acts as an enterprise-wide capability. This playbook will help you create an AI-driven cyber resilience framework.
Spring Cyber Solutions Fest | May 5-7, 2026 | Learn from SANS experts and build skills in emerging technologies, cloud security, detection and response, exposure management, insider threats, malware, and ransomware.
Webinar | Beyond Backup: Identity Resilience for the Modern Enterprise | Wednesday, April 22, 2026 at 1:00 PM ET.
Webinar | Air-Gapped Security in a Connected World | Thursday, April 23, 2026 at 3:30 PM ET.