SEC595: Applied Data Science and AI/Machine Learning for Cybersecurity Professionals


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Contact UsResearch from the GreyNoise Global Observation Grid indicates that a single threat actor may account for at least 83% of the active exploitation of recently disclosed vulnerabilities in Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM). CVE-2026-1281 and CVE-2026-1340 (both CVSS 9.8) were already known to be exploited at the time of Ivanti's disclosure and patch on January 29, 2026. Both flaws allow an unauthenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution (RCE) through code injection. Within a week, breaches of mobile infrastructure had been reported by the European Commission and by government organizations in the Netherlands and Finland, with some attacks seemingly taking place within 24 hours of Ivanti's advisory and watchTowr's proof-of-concept exploit description. "Between February 1 and February 9, GreyNoise sensors recorded 417 exploitation sessions from 8 unique source IPs," 346 of which originated from a single IP, registered to "PROSPERO OOO," labeled bulletproof by Censys, and ostensibly located in Russia. This malicious IP does not appear on the widely circulated indicators of compromise (IoCs) lists, and conversely the circulated IoCs do not appear in the exploitation GreyNoise observed. GreyNoise notes that "defenders benefit from a confidence-scoring framework for IOCs that accounts for infrastructure type, observed behavior concentration, and temporal proximity to the vulnerability window." The report offers analysis of the activity and exploitation techniques, and gives detailed recommendations for security leadership, security operations, and EPMM administrator teams for mitigation, threat hunting, and defense.

The site GreyNoise observed is not part of the Ivanti-provided IoCs. Add the information from the GreyNoise blog to your indicators and recheck. Then review their recommendations, such as making sure you’ve got a regularly ingested set of IoCs and carefully considering what’s internet facing; they apply to more than just this EPMM flaw.
Excellent analysis on a possible nation-state campaign against a vulnerable Ivanti product. That said, what’s more important is to have downloaded and installed the patch when it became available. Twenty days is an eternity in hacking time.
GreyNoise
Dark Reading
BleepingComputer
The Hacker News
On Thursday, February 12, 2026, the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added four CVEs to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, including a critical security control bypass vulnerability in SolarWinds Web Help Desk (CVE-2025-40536) with a mitigation due date of February 15, 2026 for Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies. The other three February 12 KEV additions are a critical SQL injection in vulnerability in Microsoft Configuration Manager (CVE-2024-43468), initially disclosed and patched in October 2024, that could lead to remote code execution; a high-severity update integrity verification vulnerability in Notepad++ versions prior to 8.8.9 (CVE-2025-15556); and a memory corruption issue in multiple Apple products (CVE-2026-20700). All three have mitigation due dates of March 5, 2026, for FCEB agencies. In addition, CISA added six Patch Tuesday-related Microsoft CVEs to the KEV on February 10, 2026. CISA also added a critical RCE vulnerability in BeyondTrust Remote Support (RS) and Privileged Remote Access (PRA) to the KEV on February 13, which is addressed in a separate story in this issue of NewsBites.

No real surprises here. This indicates active exploitation, and SolarWinds Web Help Desk is a popular target. Use the KEV as an indicator when prioritizing updates, even if you’re not an FCEB, to include checking for overlooked issues. Hoping you hear the equivalent of “been there, done that,” when asking staff for a status addressing these flaws.
The CISA KEV program often serves as a means for patch prioritization outside the Federal government. That said, any effective vulnerability management process would never allow an 18-month-old critical vulnerability with a CVSS of 9.8 (see CVE-2024-43468) to remain unpatched. That’s not reasonable cybersecurity.

While KEV mandates apply only to the government, and while KEV entries should receive priority in any case, this three-day mandate suggests more than usual urgency.
The Register
The Record
BleepingComputer
SC Media
CISA
NIST
NIST
NIST
NIST
On Friday, February 13, 2026, the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has added a vulnerability in internet-facing instances of BeyondTrust Remote Support (RS) and Privileged Remote Access (PRA) to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. The critical OS command injection vulnerability (CVE-2026-1731) has a mitigation due date of February 16, 2026 for Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies. On February 12, watchTowr Head of Threat Intelligence Ryan Dewhurst posted on social media that the company had "observed first in-the-wild exploitation of BeyondTrust across our global sensors. Attackers are abusing get_portal_info to extract the x-ns-company value before establishing a WebSocket channel." Dewhurst said that unpatched systems should assume compromise. BeyondTrust "issued and automatically deployed to all instances with BeyondTrust’s update service enabled" on February 2, 2026. On February 4, BeyondTrust emailed vulnerability notifications to self-hosted customers who had not already patched, and on February 6, BeyondTrust published a vulnerability advisory and sent follow-up emails to unpatched, self-hosted customers.

If you’re self-hosting BeyondTrust Remote Support, you really need to validate that it is both updated and securely configured. Make sure alerts like the one sent by BeyondTrust go to the right folks; you may need to setup a distribution list to both your contracting office and IT/Cyber staff.
Help Net Security
BleepingComputer
The Hacker News
SecurityWeek
SC Media
BeyondTrust
X
NIST
Google released a security fix in the Stable Desktop channel for Chrome on February 13, 2026, addressing a flaw known to be exploited in the wild. CVE-2026-2441, CVSS score 8.8, allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox using a crafted HTML page, due to a use-after-free flaw in CSS in Chrome before version 145.0.7632.75. Google thanks Shaheen Fazim for reporting the vulnerability on February 11. BleepingComputer observed that the Chromium commit history indicates that the flaw stems from "an iterator invalidation bug in CSSFontFeatureValuesMap, Chrome's implementation of CSS font feature values," and that the commit message suggests work on this fix is ongoing.

Consider the scenario of returning from travel/vacation: you come back to your computer, but do you stop and restart all your browsers? (Not just Chrome!) How about the laptop you lugged all over? Yeah, it’s a nuisance. But the updates are really frequent. If you shut them all down, or shut down your computer for the duration, you’re going to need to check for updates. Don’t forget that browser you “never” use. If you’re lucky enough to be enterprise-managed, ask how browser updates are orchestrated. They may be expecting the browser to download them.
Patch management is easy; simply quit your browser and restart. Also, as a reminder and overall good security practice, reboot your system on a weekly basis.

Prefer purpose-built clients to browsers when it comes to sensitive applications. Prefer strong authentication. Consider browser management a priority.
Chrome Releases
BleepingComputer
The Register
The Hacker News
SecurityWeek
Researchers at ReversingLabs have observed a campaign to deliver remote-access Trojan (RAT) malware through a fraudulent job recruiting process targeting applicants for Python and JavaScript developer positions related to cryptocurrency. The campaign leverages a fake company with an established presence online to lend credibility to recruiters who approach targets directly on social media or lure them via job advertisements. Applicants are directed to GitHub repositories containing innocuous "test task" code instructing the developer to "run, debug, and improve the system as a DevOps engineer." The repositories themselves are not malicious, but once compiled and run they immediately pull malicious downloaders from dependencies legitimately hosted in npm and PyPI packages. One of the GitHub repositories, "bigmathutils", contained nothing malicious until it had been downloaded over ten thousand times, at which point an updated version was released including malicious payloads, before being quickly deprecated to conceal the malicious version. The final payload is a RAT, which notably uses token-protected communication with its command-and-control (C2) server, "something that was previously observed in campaigns attributed to North Korean state-sponsored actors." ReversingLabs offers indicators of compromise (IoCs), and posits that this is a state-sponsored campaign due to its "modularity, long-lived nature, patience in building trust across different campaign elements, and the complexity of the multilayered and encrypted malware."

Fake recruitment messaging has been rampant for years. If your awareness/education program hasn’t been focusing on this vector, use this one to get going on that, along with developer education on GitHub safety practices.

This campaign is attributed to the Lazarus gang, and is targeting developers with crypto/blockchain backgrounds, which means they may be creating these malicious builds on their personal devices. The offer is really attractive and hits developers square in their “can you solve this?” soft spot. That means you have to both assimilate the IoCs from ReversingLabs and also educate your developers about this campaign, to include looking closely at the profiles of companies attempting to recruit them. Make sure you’re really checking dependencies when building projects; watch for unexpected updates.
Recruiting has mostly gone online these days, and so has the means of exploiting the hiring process. This is an ingenious multi-stage exploitation campaign targeting employees directly and through their current employer.

With the ever changing uncertainty around the global economy, many people are looking to a change in employment for more suitable roles. This in turn exposes them to this type of attack, which could impact your organisation should those looking to change their employment do so on their work devices. It is worth building this threat into your risk models and ensuring the controls you have in place are appropriate. In addition, this story is a timely reminder to read/reread Ken Thompson's paper "Reflections on Trusting Trust" https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~rdriley/487/papers/Thompson_1984_ReflectionsonTrustingTrust.pdf
ReversingLabs
BleepingComputer
Researchers at ETH Zurich (Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich/Federal Institute of Technology Zurich) and Università della Svizzera Italiana (USI) have published a paper detailing security vulnerabilities in password managers. The researchers examined the security architecture of the Bitwarden, LastPass, and Dashlane cloud-based password managers. The researchers write that they were able to successfully demonstrate 12 attacks against Bitwarden, seven attacks against LastPass, and six attacks against Dashlane. Although all three services claim to offer "zero-knowledge encryption," meaning that the stored passwords are encrypted and the providers have no access to further stored data, the researchers were able to view and in some cases change passwords in the tested password managers, and have offered suggestions for improving their security, including "updating the systems for new customers in line with the latest cryptographic standards." The researchers also recommend "choosing a password manager that is transparent about potential security vulnerabilities, undergoes external audits and, at the very least, has end-to-end encryption enable by default."

Remember, password managers are an important element in having users pick better passwords, change them if compromised, and avoid reuse. If you’re using one of the identified password managers, read the report for the specific concerns. The report provides issues to consider when selecting or advising on password manager selection. In general, the report finds that password managers pull back from implementing the latest cryptographic mechanisms due to concerns of backwards compatibility and loss of stored secrets, as well as time to market. They suggest vendors offer improved versions with enhanced security leaving updates at the customers discretion. That would be better for customers but not ideal for the provider.

The issues identified in these password managers highlight how incorrect implementation and configurations can undermine strong cryptography. While these findings are concerning, we should remember that password managers remain far safer than password reuse. Administrators must continuously review and update their security settings and protocols in line with any findings identified through independent audits and responsible disclosure.

While successful attacks against password managers have been rare, they are obvious targets. One continues to believe that one is better with a password manager than without one. Be alert to further intel.
ETH Zurich
IACR
Infosecurity Magazine
Gov Infosecurity
The Register
Researchers at Hudson Rock have observed infostealer malware targeting OpenClaw AI Agent configuration files. The data associated with OpenClaw (previously known as Clawdbot and Moltbot) is a tempting target for data thieves because the files are likely to contain secrets, including authentication tokens and API keys. OpenClaw is an AI assistant that is usually configured to be able to access local files, email, and communications apps. Hudson Rock writes that they observed the malware stealing openclaw.json files, device.json files containing cryptographic keys, and soul.md memory files.

Infostealers moving from browser to AI Agent configuration files is significant. This one takes the entire OpenClaw configuration, which includes gateway tokens, allowing remote access to your OpenClaw if the service is exposed as well as allowing full impersonation of the pilfered user. The challenge will be to secure the configuration, which the AI Agent needs to access, from other processes which do not need access. We need to add securing AI Agent configurations to our AI governance plan, which means conversations with our AI providers, hopefully with proof to support any claims of risk mitigation.

If using, think carefully about privileges and risk of data leakage.
Researchers from several Brazilian universities along with a researcher from the University of Notre Dame and two researchers from Siemens Corporation examined the GitHub security advisory (GHSA) review pipeline. Of the more than 288,604 GHSAs published between 2019 and 2025, just 23,563, or roughly 8.2 percent of those, were reviewed by GitHub. In a paper published earlier this month, the researchers "characterize which advisories are more likely to be reviewed, quantify review delays, and identify two distinct review-latency regimes: a fast path dominated by GitHub Repository Advisories (GRAs) and a slow path dominated by NVD-first advisories.” The paper “further develop[s] a queueing model that accounts for this dichotomy based on the structure of the advisory processing pipeline."

After discussions with developers about the advantages of having an NVD entry to lean on for remediation analysis and prioritization, it’s interesting to learn that the same NVD slows the GitHub analysis dramatically. The fastest analysis from GitHub happens when there is a fix but no NVD. We need the analysis to help others make good decisions, so finding a happy medium is important for future success.
According to the HIPAA Journal's 2025 Healthcare Data Breach Report, the number of healthcare-related data breaches reported to the UDS Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights (HHS OCR) fell 4.3 percent from the number of breaches reported in 2024. HIPAA Journal notes that breaches that occurred in 2025 are still being added to the HHS OCR database, so that number could change. Data sets addressed in the report include number of individuals affected by large healthcare breaches (down over the last year, even when the nearly 193 million people affected by the Change Healthcare breach in 2024 are not included); largest breaches of 2025 (Aflac, with 13.9 million individuals affected, followed by Yale New Haven Health System and Episource, both with more than 5 million affected individuals); causes of healthcare data breaches (the majority were due to hacking or an IT incident); and the location of breached protected health information (PHI), with the majority of breaches occurring on network servers. The report also looks at geographical distribution of breaches and HIPAA violation penalties.

There is a difference between “weather” and “climate,” meaning one snowfall in April does not mean an ice age is coming any more than one 60 degree day in January would prove global warming. If you look across multiple years of this report, there does seem to be some positive breach climate change in lowering numbers of records exposed per breach and overall, generally indicating improved time to detect/respond overall, and possibly better overall security and incident avoidance by large service providers. Definitely good goals for 2026!

It is good news that the reported number dropped, but the drop needs to be bigger. What’s needed is support to implement improvements in security and also to maintain them across the healthcare sector.

One does not need a report to know that healthcare is a target and at high risk. At a minimum, implement strong authentication (passkeys for convenience) and isolate patient care applications from high-risk applications like email and browsing.
HIPAA Journal
SANS Internet Storm Center StormCast Tuesday, February 17, 2026
64Bit Malware; Password Manager Weaknesses; OpenClaw Config Theft
https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9812
2026 64-Bits Malware Trend
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/2026+64Bits+Malware+Trend/32718
A Comparative Security Analysis of Three Cloud-based Password Managers
Infostealer Infection Targeting OpenClaw Configurations
SANS Internet Storm Center StormCast Monday, February 16, 2026
Graph Generator; nslookup and clickfix; Chrome 0-Day; TURN Threats
https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9810
AI-Powered Knowledge Graph Generator & APTs
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/AIPowered+Knowledge+Graph+Generator+APTs/32712
nslookup and ClickFix
https://x.com/MsftSecIntel/status/2022456612120629742
Google Chrome 0-Day Patch
https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/02/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_13.html
TURN Security Threats
https://www.enablesecurity.com/blog/turn-server-security-threats/
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