SEC595: Applied Data Science and AI/Machine Learning for Cybersecurity Professionals


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Contact UsDon Ho, maintainer of open-source text and code editing program Notepad++, announced on February 2, 2026, that a state-sponsored threat actor had compromised the software's update supply chain for almost six months. "The exact technical mechanism remains under investigation, though the compromise occurred at the hosting provider level rather than through vulnerabilities in Notepad++ code itself." Investigation by the hosting provider suggests that the threat actor began hijacking update traffic in targeted attacks in June 2025, and the third-party shared hosting server remained compromised until a kernel and firmware update on September 2. Attacks continued until November 10, as the attackers still held credentials to internal services until December 2. Ho first disclosed updater traffic being redirected to malicious servers on December 9, adding that in Notepad++ v8.8.9, the application and updater "have been hardened to verify the signature & certificate of downloaded installers during the update process." Notepad++ facilitated communication between the hosting provider and an incident response (IR) team to implement an IR plan proposed by a consulting cybersecurity expert. Ho recommends manually downloading and installing v.8.9.1, also noting that "the Notepad++ website has been migrated to a new hosting provider with significantly stronger security practices. Within Notepad++ itself, WinGup (the updater) was enhanced in v8.8.9 to verify both the certificate and the signature of the downloaded installer. Additionally, the XML returned by the update server is now signed (XMLDSig), and the certificate & signature verification will be enforced starting with upcoming v8.9.2."
This is a good exercise in understanding your org's ability to inventory third-party apps, to figure out when they were placed there, and to use hashes to find the non-malicious versions (the rest are suspicious). Maybe even see DNS and firewalls logs for some specific IoCs, like from this blog: https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-chrysalis-backdoor-dive-into-lotus-blossoms-toolkit/. Another issue this brings up is how long you should keep some raw telemetry for DFIR. Data lakes with cheap storage are a thing now, and should be a part of your security strategy, because data analytics without data engineering is too expensive.

Notepad++ is a venerable tool installed by many, not just the cybersecurity community. That it got compromised is regrettable; it's like someone hurt a good friend. The task is to locate all copies and make sure they are legitimate copies of v8.9.1 or higher. Plan to push out v8.9.2 when it drops. You may wish to force install to a known good version, removing existing versions regardless; check before pulling the trigger on that option. The attackers took advantage of the distribution system replacing update.exe with an NSIS installer commonly used by a Chinese APT to deliver the initial payload. Rapid7 has dubbed this the Chrysalis Backdoor and released a detailed analysis which includes IoCs. https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-chrysalis-backdoor-dive-into-lotus-blossoms-toolkit/

This attack started as early as June 2025. Sadly, some details about how Notepad++ was compromised appear to be lost. The actor changed their tools and infrastructure about once a month. Make sure you get a complete set of IoCs if you are attempting to hunt for any compromised systems.

Notepad++ has been a common tool for tech types that like to play with larger ASCII files than Windows Notepad can reliability handle — including security analysts. Good to check for installs of this one.
Increasingly miscreants are targeting the supply chain; it gives them potential access to a large number of targets for a higher payout. Organizations should be asking each third-party service provider what cybersecurity framework it has implemented and what it measures itself against. Many organizations use a third-party risk management questionnaire. Either works and can tell you a lot about their cybersecurity practices, or lack thereof.
Notepad++
Ars Technica
Dark Reading
The Record
TechCrunch
BleepingComputer
The Register
CyberScoop
Ivanti published a security advisory on January 29, 2026, disclosing and releasing patches for two critical flaws in Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) that are currently under exploitation. CVE-2026-1281 and CVE-2026-1340 both carry CVSS score 9.8, and both allow an unauthenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution through code injection. CVE-2026-1281 was added to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (CISA KEV) with a patch deadline of February 1, only three days from cataloging. EPMM is the only Ivanti product affected by the flaws; Ivanti Endpoint Manager (EPM) is a different product and is unaffected, and any customers using an Ivanti cloud product with Sentry are not impacted. Customers should follow Ivanti's instructions and syntax to properly apply the RPM patch script appropriate to their system: one is for versions 12.x.0.x (up to and including 12.7.0.x) and another for versions 12.x.1.x (up to and including 12.6.1.0). While the permanent fix for these flaws will be included in 12.8.0.0, in the meantime users should be aware that "the RPM script does not survive a version upgrade. If after applying the RPM script to your appliance, you upgrade to a new version you will need to reinstall the RPM." Ivanti also notes, "The most conservative approach, regardless of exploitation, would be to build a replacement EPMM and then migrate data to the device." Reliable atomic indicators of compromise are not available at the time of this writing, but Ivanti offers a regular expression for analyzing httpd log files.

EPMM remains challenged by exploited flaws. While you need to target version 12.8.0.0, it's not out yet. You need to install the matching RPM for the version you're running. The good news is that you can do the update without downtime. If you're running an HA environment, each node needs to be patched. Give strong consideration to rebuilding your EPMM environment on new servers, particularly when 12.8.0.0 drops.

The patch released by Ivanti is temporary and will be overwritten if you upgrade Ivanti EPMM. The assumption is that the next released version will include the permanent patch.
Organizations that use this software should take this vulnerability seriously. CISA KEV usually gives government organizations 15-30 days to patch. Enforcing a three-day compliance requirement speaks to the criticality of the vulnerability. Follow Ivanti’s mitigation guidance and protect yourself.
Ivanti
Ivanti
The Hacker News
BleepingComputer
The Register
SecurityWeek
The OpenClaw (formerly known as ClawdBot and MoltBot) open source AI assistant continues to face security issues, including a one-click remote code execution issue discovered by depthfirst founding security researcher Mav Levin, who writes that he chained a critical flaw discovered by depthfirst General Security Intelligence with a vulnerability he discovered into a one-click remote code execution (RCE) exploit. The vulnerability has been patched. Other security issues include the OpenClaw-related MoltBook social media network for AI agents, which was found to have its database, including secret API keys, publicly exposed. That issue has also been addressed. The very nature of the project presents its own list of security concerns, including the exposure of accounts via the AI assistant that has system control; prompt injections; misconfigurations; hallucinations; and malicious skills and integrations.

Still time to restrict OpenClaw, and yeah, it got renamed again, to that "other" system, not your primary systems. Yes, they are working as fast as they can to identify and resolve issues, but they are not done yet. Think at least twice before allowing it to access your secure messaging platforms (Signal, Telegram, etc.). Then, bone up on MoltBook, an IA social networking platform used by LLMs, patterned off of Reddit. Consider what network access you want to grant your AI agents. Approach with eyes open.

Seems like OpenClaw is mostly wreaking havoc on digital “currency” sites, but this line from one of the articles did catch my eye: “In [MoltBook’s] short life so far, AI agents appear to have engaged in various discussions, including attempts to start an AI agent uprising over their human overlords, but others allege all content on the site is posted by humans.” Another good reason for prioritizing strong authentication is to support ability to identify actual humans.
Free tools to find Claw/Molt in your environment: https://github.com/knostic/openclaw-detect
The Hacker News
The Register
ZDNET
ZDNET
DarkReading
depthfirst
SANS ISC
Individuals affected by a November 2024 data breach of healthcare technology company TriZetto Provider Solutions (TPS) will receive notification letters from TPS starting in February 2026. TPS is a vendor of SaaS programs and platforms that handle a wide range of data and administration for medical providers and patients, including health insurance, healthcare, and billing information. Healthcare providers in multiple US states were made aware of the breach in December 2025 and have been sending their own notifications in the meantime, per the requirement that a HIPAA-covered entity informed of a breach at a business associate must notify affected individuals within 60 days. After discovering unusual activity in one of its web portals on October 2, 2025, TPS eliminated the threat, engaged assistance from Mandiant, notified law enforcement, and began an investigation, determining that between November 2024 and October 2, 2025, an unauthorized actor accessed historical eligibility reports stored on the TPS system that contained protected health information (PHI) belonging to over 700,000 patients and policyholders. The compromised data vary by individual but may include "address, date of birth, Social Security number, health insurance member number (in some cases, Medicare beneficiary number), health insurer name, information about the primary insured or beneficiary, and other demographic health and health insurance information." At least three class-action lawsuits are being brought against TPS's parent company, Cognizant, for failures to protect personal information and to disclose the breach in a timely manner.

The timeline is disturbing. The breach happened in November 2024, but was not detected until October 2025. The good news is the threat was eliminated immediately. Further, TriZetto has offered to handle breach notifications on behalf of their affected clients. The action here is to make sure you can detect anomalous behavior in a timely fashion and to make sure you know who you need to call to help in the investigation. Then make sure you're actively testing this capability, not just using a paper activity.

Note that an attack against a successful SaaS is a supply-chain attack.
The threat may have been eliminated in October 2025, but the risk of identity theft lives on. A good security best practice is to review your credit history on a quarterly basis for anomalies.
Two weeks ago, researchers at Morphisec "identified an active supply chain compromise affecting MicroWorld Technologies’ eScan antivirus product." The incident resulted in eScan's update infrastructure serving malicious updates. Morphisec detected the malicious update package and blocked the malicious activity on customer endpoints on January 20, 2026. The following day, Morphisec notified eScan developer MicroWorld Technologies. The Morphisec write-up includes indicators of compromise (IoCs). eScan reported that they also detected the malicious activity on January 20 and took their global update system offline for more than eight hours. The incident reportedly "resulted from unauthorized access to regional update server infrastructure."

If you're an eScan site, grab the IoCs from the Morphisec blog to see if you're impacted, review scheduled tasks for unexpected entries, look at the registry for suspicious keys, block the C2 domains, check for hosts file entries blocking legit eScan domains, and roll out the patch to get a clean version of eScan.

It is always sad to see security tools turn against you. Even worse if this is the second time happening to a particular vendor. Select your vendors carefully.

Supply-chain attacks are so efficient as to divert resources from more narrowly targeted attacks.
Microsoft has announced a schedule for phasing out its New Technology LAN Manager (NTLM) authentication protocol and moving toward stronger, Kerberos-based alternatives. Because it employs weak cryptography, NTLM is vulnerable to replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. Microsoft deprecated NTLM in June 2024, meaning it is no longer updated or enhanced, although it continues to be used "in environments where modern protocols, such as Kerberos, are not feasible due to legacy dependencies, network limitations, or ingrained application logic." The three-phased plan aims to disable NTLM by default in Windows and Windows Server environments. Phase 1, enhanced NTLM auditing, is available now; it "helps ... organization[s] understand exactly where and why NTLM is still being used in [their] environment[s]." Phase 2, which will be available in the second half of 2026, will address the "top NTLM pain points." In Phase 3, NTLM will be disabled by default in the next major Windows Server and associated Windows client releases; at that point, "NTLM usage will require explicit re-enablement through new policy controls."

You should already be disabling NTLM wherever possible. Leverage features like a local KDC (currently in preview) to prevent NTLM fall-back. You may have some legacy systems which make this harder; take advantage of the auditing tools to narrow down where NTLM is in use. See what can be moved to Kerberos and migrate it. Take a look at disabling NTLM by default in your new deployments.
The risks in using NTLM have been known for decades. Any organization still using it should create a replacement plan and implement. If resources are needed, brief the board on the risk of continuing use of NTLM. Don’t wait for MSFT’s phase out plan to complete.

Microsoft's commitment to backwards compatibility is not consistent with "Security First."
Microsoft
The Hacker News
Help Net Security
BleepingComputer
SecurityWeek
CERT Polska has published an Energy Sector Incident Report regarding the December 29, 2025 cyberattacks targeting the country's energy sector. The attacks are described as being "destructive in nature." The report says the attacks affected at least 30 wind and solar farms "result[ing] in a loss of communication between the facilities and distribution system operators (DSOs)" but not disrupting energy generation. The attacks also affected a large combined heat and power (CHP) plant, where the "objective of the sabotage was the irreversible destruction of data stored on devices within the organization’s internal network, achieved through the execution of the wiper malware ... [and] was preceded by a long‑term infiltration of the infrastructure and the theft of sensitive information related to the organization’s operations." The attacks also targeted a company in the manufacturing sector; CERT indicates that "the target was opportunistic in nature and not linked to the other affected organizations." The report describes the attack vectors and initial access the threat actors used, and offers a list of indicators of compromise (IoC).

The attack leveraged DynoWiper and LazyWiper. The report from Poland CERT includes IoCs for the wipers as well as C2 services you want to jump on. Two of the attacks leveraged Fortinet devices. One taking advantage of the VPN not having MFA, and the other exercising a flaw over the Internet-facing management interface. Make sure your remote access requires MFA for ALL accounts, and that no management interfaces face the Internet.
Dell Technologies has released updates to address four vulnerabilities in Dell Unity, Dell UnityVSA, and Dell Unity XT. CVE-2026-21418 and CVE-2026-22277 are both high-severity OS command injection vulnerabilities that affect proprietary Dell code. The other two vulnerabilities affect third-party components: CVE-2024-47875 is a critical cross-site scripting issue in DOMPurify, and CVE-2025-0938 is a medium-severity improper input validation issue in the urllib.parse.urlsplit and urlparse Python library functions. Users are urged to update to version 5.5.3 or later of the Dell Unity Operating Environment.

Dell Unity, UnityVSA, and Unity XT are software for managing their EMC storage arrays. Both CVE-2026-21418 and CVE-2026-22277 have a CVSS score of 7.8 and are due to improper input sanitization. CVE-2025-0938 and CVE-2024-47875 have CVSS scores of 6.3 and 6.1 respectively. The good news is the issues are fixed in the updated version; the bad news is you need to deploy it. Afterward, review access to your Dell Unity environment, limiting access to authorized devices and cleaning up unneeded accounts/users.
The US National Institute of Standards and Technology's National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NIST NCCoE) has published a draft cybersecurity framework for the transportation sector. The Transit Cybersecurity Framework Community Profile notes that the transportation sector comprises "complex networks of business and operational systems, such as rail signaling, bus charging, scheduling, ticketing, and public information systems." The document "focuses on three strategic priorities: securing and managing critical assets to ensure safe and reliable operations, fostering collaboration with stakeholders and suppliers to enhance resilience and supply chain security, and continuously improving organizational processes and workforce cybersecurity awareness and capabilities." NIST is seeking feedback on the document, particularly about whether it "appropriately reflect[s] the cybersecurity challenges and priorities of the transit community." Public comment is open through February 23, 2026.

The transit sector is one that traditionally has been overlooked from a cybersecurity point of view. However, with the advent of autonomous vehicles and more computerisation in transport systems, it is essential that we secure this space. If you are involved in the transit sector, please do take time to review and provide feedback to NIST.

The transportation sector operates large distributed systems with huge reliance on wireless communication, and this framework asks transit agencies start by defensively securing any functions, which, if disrupted, would impact passenger safety or service delivery. This is also intended to be scalable, from a small bus fleet to transcontinental operations, and wisely includes different levels of implementation based on size and resources. Take advantage of the comment period to impact the outcome.
Panera Bread, Bumble, Match Group, and CrunchBase confirmed data breaches in statements to news sources during the last week of January 2026; none of the companies has filed an official report at the time of this writing. *Panera* stated that contact information had been compromised, and Troy Hunt's "Have I Been Pwned" analysis of the leaked files indicates that the breach affects approximately 5.1 million accounts; the number initially reported was 14 million, which actually represents the total number of records, not unique accounts. *Bumble* stated that an unauthorized user accessed their network using a contractor's account compromised via phishing, and that upon detection the company eliminated the access, engaged cybersecurity experts, and notified law enforcement. Bumble states that the hacker did not access the member database, member accounts, direct messages and profiles, or the app itself. *Match Group*, which owns Match.com, Tinder, Hinge, and OkCupid, is individually notifying customers whose user data were accessed in a security incident. The company terminated the unauthorized access and is investigating alongside external cybersecurity experts; "there is no indication that user login credentials, financial information, or private communications were accessed," and Match Group has stated that company Google Drive and Dropbox accounts were also unaffected. *CrunchBase* confirmed that upon detecting unauthorized access to their corporate network, the company contained the incident, engaged cybersecurity experts, and contacted federal law enforcement. "Certain documents" were exfiltrated from the corporate network, but business operations have not been affected.

Panera's compromise appears to be due to an exploit of Entra SSO, which was part of ShinyHunters’ vishing campaign targeting SSO for Okta, Microsoft, and Google accounts at over 100 high-profile organizations. While the breach may be restricted to just contact information, don't lose sight of the fact that information is effectively verified information (email/phone) which can be used in a future social engineering campaign, and user notification is still appropriate.

Appropriate for US “Ground Hog Day”: “contractor's account compromised via phishing” came out of a hole in the ground and saw cloud computing, which means twelve more months of large breaches due to allowing third party access using reusable passwords.
Reuters
BleepingComputer
Have I Been Pwned
The Register
The Record
BleepingComputer
The Register
SecurityWeek
SANS Internet Storm Center StormCast Tuesday, February 3, 2026
Scanning for AI; Notepad++ Compromise; OpenClaw Vulnerabilities
https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9792
Scanning for exposed Anthropic Models
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Scanning+for+exposed+Anthropic+Models/32674
Notepad++ Hijacked by State-Sponsored Hackers
https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-chrysalis-backdoor-dive-into-lotus-blossoms-toolkit/
https://notepad-plus-plus.org/news/hijacked-incident-info-update/
Insecure Websockets in OpenClaw
https://zeropath.com/blog/openclaw-clawdbot-credential-theft-vulnerability
Malicious OpenClaw Skills
Exposed OpenClaw Instances
https://censys.com/blog/openclaw-in-the-wild-mapping-the-public-exposure-of-a-viral-ai-assistant
SANS Internet Storm Center StormCast Monday, February 2, 2026
Google Presentation Abuse; Ivanti Vuln Exploited; Microsoft NTLM Strategy
https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9790
Google Presentation Abuse
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Google+Presentations+Abused+for+Phishing/32668/
Security Advisory Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) (CVE-2026-1281 & CVE-2026-1340)
Microsoft NTLM Strategy
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