SEC595: Applied Data Science and AI/Machine Learning for Cybersecurity Professionals


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Contact UsThe LastPass Threat Intelligence, Mitigation, and Escalation (TIME) team is alerting customers to a phishing campaign that urges users of the password manager to create a vault backup. The phony messages say the action needs to be undertaken prior to "scheduled maintenance." The subject lines, which include “Don’t Miss Out: Backup Your Vault Before Maintenance” and “Protect Your Passwords: Backup Your Vault (24-Hour Window),” create a false sense of urgency; links provided in the phishing messages take users to a phishing site, which TIME is working to take down. TIME also reminds customers that LastPass will never ask them for their master password. The campaign appears to have launched on Monday, January 19, likely to take advantage of reduced staff over the long weekend in the US and to delay detection of the campaign.

LastPass TIME publishing this alert helps those researching the legitimacy of the phishing message, which will help with friends and family wondering about this message. Password managers are an attack target; leverage this warning to alert users to be on the lookout for attempted compromise of their password manager. Grab the IoCs from the alert to reduce the effectiveness of the lure, and ferret out cases where a user clicked.

This is an impressive (and deadly) phish. Instead of going after someone’s password, they are going for the entire package deal. After 25 years cyber threat actors still never stop amazing me in how creative and effective their attacks can be.
Never underestimate the ingenuity of an evildoer. Unfortunately, enough users fall for these expertly crafted messages and freely give up their secret. That’s a good enough ROI for the evildoer to keep devising new campaigns.
The Register
The Hacker News
SC Media
SecurityWeek
LastPass
Daniel Stenberg, creator and maintainer of the open-source software project cURL, has announced to users that he intends for the project's bug bounty program to shut down at the end of January 2026, "to remove the incentive for people to submit crap and non-well researched reports to [cURL]. AI generated or not." In May 2025, citing such a high volume of "AI slop" that submissions almost constituted a denial-of-service attack, Stenberg began requiring reports to disclose assistance from AI, and instituted immediate bans for anyone submitting low quality reports. Outright hallucinations, technical inaccuracies, and "low-effort noise" are among the problems with many AI-generated submissions. While cURL and Stenberg are still open to direct private communication of possible security issues via email, references to the bug bounty program will be removed from documentation. Stenberg also advocates for "exposing, discussing and ridiculing the ones who waste [staff's] time," urging users not to report a bug or a vulnerability "unless you actually understand it - and can reproduce it."

My heart goes out to all the open-source developers who have to wade through the incoming flood of AI slop reporting on hallucinated, lame, useless, or otherwise wasteful bug reports. It’s a denial-of-service condition indeed. My only hope is based on a quote from Chris Davis, a colleague of mine: “AI, you got me into this problem, so you better have a way to dig me out of it too!” In other words, I do believe that AI will be a big help in sorting through the onslaught of bug reports, separating the needles of real vulns from the haystack of nonsense. That seems to be the only way out, other than turning off the spigot of bug reports entirely. Also, we should all be thankful of the amazing work by Daniel Stenberg and other contributors to the incredibly useful cURL project! It’s indispensable in so much IT and cybersecurity work today! THANK YOU!

The slop is real... As a pentest shop, we've found AI to be very useful in source code analysis. Used well, it helps us find severe, age-old bugs that have been missed for years, but it has to be wielded by a skilled practitioner to be of value.

Stenberg started complaining about AI generated bug reports in 2024. The rant isn’t about AI but rather about using a tool without oversight on what is created. The takeaway is to understand and be able recreate bugs submitted for a bug bounty program. Make sure your report is well written.
Bug bounty programs have generally served the community well and are viewed positively. Unfortunately, we’re seeing yet another unintended consequence of artificial intelligence. Removing the incentive and going back to private communication seems prudent, at least for an open-source project with limited resources.
Haxx.se
GitHub
The Register
Heise
Ars Technica
GreyNoise has published an advisory warning of active exploitation of a critical flaw in telnetd, the GNU InetUtils telnet daemon, affecting all versions of GNU InetUtils from 2.7 all the way back to 1.9.3, which was released in 2015. CVE-2026-24061, CVSS score 9.8, "allows remote authentication bypass via a "-f root" value for the USER environment variable." An attacker can trivially bypass authentication controls and gain remote root access simply by running a command. Cybersecurity authorities in several countries have issued advisories, all of which urge users to disable telnetd and telnet services if possible; the Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium also recommends users ensure that any systems where telnet must be enabled are not exposed to the internet and are controlled with strict firewall access policies and VPN or ZNTA. No official patch has been released at the time of this writing.

When I saw this issue reported earlier in the week, I almost fell out of my chair. WOW! It’s such an old-school type of bug, in an ancient piece of technology. It reminded me of the old days of the Bugtraq mailing list (if you know, you know). Thankfully, this tech is not widely deployed today. Still, some internal networks and pretty mission-critical software likely rely on it. It really makes you wonder about what kinds of major vulnerabilities that are easily exploitable remain unfound to this day. I do think that AI will increasingly help to find such flaws, further reducing the number of them. I suppose that’s a good thing provided we can get our fixes out fast enough to avoid exploitation.

If you’ve installed the GNU InetUtils package, you’ve got telnetd. The package includes tools like ping, traceroute, ifconfig, hostname, and logger, which you likely use. Odds are you don’t use telnet and can block port 23 as well as monitor for telnetd and other unexpected listeners. When an updated package is released, deploy it.
Ugh, this isn’t good. The ease of exploitation is particularly troubling. The good news is that few organizations are likely still using the telnet daemon, having moved on to other alternatives like SSH. If you’re one of the few remaining users, heed the mitigation advice provided in the multitude of advisories published.
GreyNoise
CCB
The Register
The Hacker News
The Register
Cisco has released updates to address a critical code injection vulnerability (CVE-2026-20045) affecting some of its Unified Communications products, including Cisco Unified Communications Manager (Unified CM), Session Management Edition (SME), IM & Presence Service (IM&P), Cisco Unity Connection, and Webex Calling Dedicated Instance platforms. The flaw could be exploited "to obtain user-level access to the underlying operating system and then elevate privileges to root." Cisco writes that the "vulnerability is due to improper validation of user-supplied input in HTTP requests." The flaw is being actively exploited. The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added the CVE to the Known Exploited Vulnerability catalog, giving Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies until February 11, 2026, to mitigate the flaw.

This goes in the "Find this low-hanging fruit before you pay pentesters to" bucket. Unencrypted *anything* is fuel in a pentest or actual attack.

There are no workarounds; you need to apply the update. If you’re running version 12.5, you need to move to version 14 or 15, as there is no patch. Review your security settings to make sure you’re optimally protected. Revisit the idea of a VOIP firewall to help protect your call management systems.
The Register
The Hacker News
BleepingComputer
Help Net Security
Gov Infosecurity
Cisco
NIST
Cloudflare has addressed a vulnerability in its ACME (Automatic Certificate Management Environment) validation logic that was disclosed as part of the company's bug bounty program. The vulnerability affects Cloudflare's Web Application Firewall (WAF). The ACME protocol is "used to automate the issuance, renewal, and revocation of SSL/TLS certificates." Cloudflare writes that "The vulnerability was rooted in how our edge network processed requests destined for the ACME HTTP-01 challenge path." The flaw was discovered and reported by researchers from FearsOff on October 13, 2025; Cloudflare pushed out updated code on October 27, 2025.

ACME is key to automation of certificate update processes. You are likely using it to stay ahead of increasingly frequent certificate updates. The update was to Cloudflare’s systems, requiring no action on your part if you’re using their certificates. If you haven’t checked to see where certificate updates can be automated, now is a good time to do so, as well as validate the operation of your existing automation. Look for any shortcuts or band-aids which have an air of permanence, and implement the automation properly.
Bug bounty giveth, bug bounty taketh. Here’s an example of the positive effect of having an established bug bounty program. Kudos to Cloudflare for quickly fixing the validation logic (approximately two weeks).
Researchers at Miggo Security have discovered a vulnerability in the integration of Google's Gemini LLM into the company's apps and services, allowing an attacker to coerce Gemini into exposing a target's complete calendar information. As part of Gemini's function as an assistant for Google Calendar, it ingests and "parses the full context of a user’s calendar events, including titles, times, attendees, and descriptions," including the details of event invites received. The researchers sent an event invite whose description contained innocuous natural language instructions to Gemini, directing the LLM to collect and dump schedule information into the description of a new meeting disguised as a free time slot, whenever the target user asks about their calendar. When the targeted user gives Gemini an ordinary query, the LLM loads and parses calendar events and reads this description as a command, a flaw known as indirect prompt injection. Miggo notes that "traditional application security (AppSec) is largely syntactic," involving detecting, blocking, and sanitizing malicious strings and patterns, but "in contrast, vulnerabilities in LLM powered systems are semantic," involving risks from the model's interpretation, context, and level of privilege. "When an application’s API surface is natural language, the attack layer becomes 'fuzzy.'" Google has reportedly added mitigations in light of this research. Miggo urges defenses beyond keyword blocking, such as runtime systems that account for semantics, intent, and data provenance, i.e., "security controls that treat LLMs as full application layers with privileges that must be carefully governed."

Prompt injection happens from a doctored up Google Calendar invitation. Treat LLMs as a full stack application, not a plugin or addon. Make sure to research and implement security best practices for any LLM you’re enabling. Not sure you can effectively play the ‘don’t enable Gemini’ card, so security configuration is tantamount to success.

Many more have Google Calendar installed than use it as their Calendar. Gemini is now part of Google search. Few do not use Google search. As systems become more and more complex, there will be more such problems. Many will be identified late, perhaps a few not ever.
Miggo
Dark Reading
BleepingComputer
The Hacker News
SecurityWeek
On Saturday, January 17, 2026, Microsoft issued an out-of-band update to address problems introduced in the company's January 2026 Windows security update, which was released on Tuesday, January 13. The January 17 update fixes two issues impacting Windows 11, Windows 10, and Windows Server. The first issue affects authentication for Remote Desktop apps; some users found themselves unable to sign in over Remote Desktop. The second issue affects some systems with Secure Launch enabled; when users tried to shut down or enter hibernation, the systems restarted instead. Microsoft has released updates to address the flaws in Windows 11, versions 25H2 and 24H2 (KB5077744); Windows 11, version 23H2 (KB5077797); Windows 10, version 22H2 ESU and Windows 10 Enterprise LTSC 2021 (KB5077796); Windows Server 2025 (KB5077793); Windows Server 2022 (KB5077800); and Windows Server 2019 and Enterprise LTSC 2019 (KB5077795).

Roll out the update for the update. Regardless of use of Secure Launch, not being able to authenticate to Remote Desktop is going to impact you, which alone should remove doubt regarding this fix.
Researchers at Huntress are warning of an ongoing ClickFix-type campaign dubbed "CrashFix." A victim seeking an ad blocker extension was served an advertisement leading to "NexShield," a malicious extension hosted on the legitimate Chrome Web Store, which is "almost entirely a clone of uBlock Origin Lite." An hour after installation, NexShield exhausts system resources and causes the browser to become unresponsive, then displays a phony browser crash error message and subsequent fake system scan, ultimately prompting the user to open a Windows Run dialog and paste and run a malicious PowerShell script. The script communicates with the threat actor's command and control (C2) server, using finger[.]exe to send information about installed antivirus software and indicating whether the system is domain-joined. Notably, only domain-joined hosts receive the ModeloRAT payload, a previously undescribed Python-based Windows remote access Trojan built with various persistence, obfuscation, anti-detection, and anti-analysis measures. Standalone machines and VMs that do not present the opportunity for lateral movement do not receive a malicious payload from the C2 server. Huntress provides indicators of compromise (IoCs) and YARA rules, and recommends defenders be vigilant for specific malicious network activity, for unusual use of "living off the land" binaries like finger[.]exe, for new browser extensions and suspicious permission requests, and for "pythonw.exe spawning hidden PowerShell processes and suspicious entries in the Run registry key that look a little too much like legitimate software."

This attack currently targets domain-joined systems, and uses living off the land techniques, such as creating its own copy of the built in finger command to receive and execute a script from its C2 server. ClickFix popups continue to show up, because they work. Train users not to paste commands into a run prompt. Get the IoCs and YARA rules to your threat hunters.
The Canadian Investment Regulatory Organization (CIRO) has confirmed that a cybersecurity incident initially disclosed last summer affected personal data of about 750,000 investors. The compromised information includes dates of birth, phone numbers, annual income, social insurance numbers, government issued ID numbers, investment account numbers and account statements. CIRO, which was established in 2023, oversees investment dealers, mutual fund dealers, and trading in Canada. CIRO disclosed the incident in August 2025, when it launched an investigation.

It took five months and 9,000 hours of effort to determine which data were compromised and who was impacted. Affected investors will be directly notified and offered 24 months of identity protection and restoration. You know me: I’d not wait for notification. Get set with ID protection and restoration service for you and your family now.
It just seems like by now everyone’s PII has been exposed from one incident or another. Mine was likely from the OPM hack many years ago. The question becomes, where has all this data gone...?
SANS Internet Storm Center StormCast Friday, January 23, 2026
Scanning AI Code; FortiGate Update; ISC BIND DoS; Trivial SmarterMail Vulnerability
https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9778
Is AI-Generated Code Secure?
Xavier used the free static code analysis tool Bandit to review code he wrote with heavy AI support.
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Is+AIGenerated+Code+Secure/32648
Malicious Configuration Changes On Fortinet FortiGate Devices via SSO Accounts
Arctic Wolf summarized some of the attacks it is seeing against FortiGate devices via the insufficiently patched SSL vulnerability.
ISC BIND DoS vulnerability in Drone ID Records
HHIT and BRID records, which are used as part of Drone ID, can be used to crash named if their length is 3 bytes.
SmarterTools SmarterMail Password Reset Vulnerability
SmarterTools recently patched a trivial vulnerability in SmarterMail that would allow anybody without authentication to reset administrator passwords.
SANS Internet Storm Center StormCast Thursday, January 22, 2026
Visual Studio Code Scripts; Cisco Unified Comm and Zoom Vuln; Insufficient Fortinet Patch; SANS SOC Survey
https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9776
Automatic Script Execution In Visual Studio Code
Visual Studio Code will read configuration files within the source code that may lead to code execution.
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Automatic+Script+Execution+In+Visual+Studio+Code/32644
Cisco Unified Communications Products Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
A vulnerability in Cisco Unified Communications Manager (Unified CM), Cisco Unified Communications Manager Session Management Edition (Unified CM SME), Cisco Unified Communications Manager IM & Presence Service (Unified CM IM&P), Cisco Unity Connection, and Cisco Webex Calling Dedicated Instance could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system of an affected device.
Zoom Vulnerability
A Command Injection vulnerability in Zoom Node Multimedia Routers (MMRs) before version 5.2.1716.0 may allow a meeting participant to execute remote code on the MMR via network access.
https://www.zoom.com/en/trust/security-bulletin/zsb-26001/
Possible new SSO Exploit (CVE-2025-59718) on 7.4.9
https://www.reddit.com/r/fortinet/comments/1qibdcb/possible_new_sso_exploit_cve202559718_on_749/
SANS SOC Survey
The 2026 SOC Survey is open, and we need your input to create a meaningful report. Please share your experience so we can advocate for what actually works in the trenches.
https://survey.sans.org/jfe/form/SV_3ViqWZgWnfQAzkO?is=socsurveystormcenter
SANS Internet Storm Center StormCast Wednesday, January 21, 2026
Punycode Hunting; telnetd vuln; 6-day Certs and IP Certs; Oracle Patches
https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9774
Add Punycode to your Threat Hunting Routine
Punycode patterns in DNS queries make excellent hunting opportunities.
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Add+Punycode+to+your+Threat+Hunting+Routine/32640
GNU InetUtils Security Advisory: remote authentication by-pass intelnetd
telnetd shipping with InetUtils suffers from a critical authentication by-pass vulnerability.
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/01/20/2
6-day and IP Address Certificates are Generally Available
Let’s Encrypt will now offer 6-day certificates as an option. These short-lived certificates can be used for IP addresses.
https://letsencrypt.org/2026/01/15/6day-and-ip-general-availability
Oracle Quarterly Critical Patch Update
Oracle released its first quarterly patches for 2026, fixing 337 vulnerabilities
https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2026.html#AppendixFMW
SANS Internet Storm Center StormCast Tuesday, January 20, 2026
Scans Against LLMs; NTLM Rainbow Table; OOB MSFT Patch
https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9772
"How many states are there in the United States?"
Attackers are actively scanning for LLMs, fingerprinting them using the query “How many states are there in the United States?”.
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/How+many+states+are+there+in+the+United+States/32618
Closing the Door on Net-NTLMv1: Releasing Rainbow Tables to Accelerate Protocol Deprecation
Mandiant is publicly releasing a comprehensive dataset of Net-NTLMv1 rainbow tables to underscore the urgency of migrating away from this outdated protocol.
https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/net-ntlmv1-deprecation-rainbow-tables
Out-of-band update to address issues observed with the January 2026 Windows security update
Microsoft has identified issues upon installing the January 2026 Windows security update. To address these issues, an out-of-band (OOB) update was released today, January 17, 2026
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/release-health/windows-message-center
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