

Critical Citrix Vulnerability

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The best. Made better.

The Vulnerability

- Directory traversal (at least part of it)
- No authentication required
- Can lead to code execution on Citrix Application Delivery Controller / Citrix Gateway
- Easy to exploit (but no public exploit out yet)



Who/What is Affected?

- Citrix ADC / Gateway 13.0
- Citrix ADC / NetScaler Gateway 12.1 / 12.0 / 11.1
- Citrix Netscaler ADC / NetScaler Gateway 10.5



Citrix Suggested Fix

- No actual "patch" released yet
- Instead, Citrix published a workaround
- Workaround blocks access to URLs that contain "/vpns/" or "/../"
- The directory traversal part ('/../') only matters if the user (attacker) is connected to the VPN.



Citrix Added Policy

add responder action respondwith403 respondwith "\"HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden\r\n\r\n\""

add responder policy ctx267027
 "HTTP.REQ.URL.DECODE_USING_TEXT_MODE.CONTAINS
 (\"/vpns/\") && (!CLIENT.SSLVPN.IS_SSLVPN ||
HTTP.REQ.URL.DECODE_USING_TEXT_MODE.CONTAINS
 (\"/../\"))" respondwith403 bind responder
global ctx267027 1 END -type REQ_OVERRIDE



Possible False Positives

- Application sitting behind a Citrix gateway uses '/vpns/' as part of a URL
- Admin UI links to '/vpns/script/vista/*.exe' for plugins. This will be blocked
- This looks like a simple (too simple?) blacklist.
- Policy may apply to the admin interface as well




How Do Attackers Find Vuln. Systems?

- Shodan/Google/Others... may list some of them
- Certificate Transparency logs
 - Experiment:
 - Configured web server with hostname 'vpn.*' or 'remote.*'
 - Access within minutes after certificate was issued
- Attacker may just scan for files commonly found on server
- Citrix Gateway sets several specific cookies



Certificate Transparency



Directory Traversal Vulnerability

- GET /download.php?file=../../etc/passwd
- Classic input validation flaw
- Impact may be limited if permissions are limited
- Typically associated with information leakage
- But once exploited, can often be leveraged to bypass authentication (reading files with credentials)
- Or can be used to find other vulnerabilities (reading source code)



Fortigate SSLVPN CVE-2018-13379

snprintf(s, <u>0x40</u>, "/migadmin/lang/<u>%s</u>.json",<u>lang</u>)

https://example.com/remote/fgt_lang?lang= /../../.././///////dev/cmdb/sslvpn_websession



What Did We Find?

- Trivial to upload files to the system without authentication (but filename is somewhat restricted)
- Several directories / files that are writeable by web server and exposed to unauthenticated users
- Missing input validation, and at least in one case, input validation was commented out (debug code left in the release?)



Possible Exploitation (1)



http://example.com/vpns/...
param1=../../var/www/file.php
param2=<?php exec("rm -rf /")</pre>

http://example.com/file.php





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




http://example.com/file.php



Possible Exploitation (1)





Tactical Mitigations

- Apply the Citrix mitigations
- Consider additional monitoring
 - HTTP requests with /vpns/ and/or /../
 - Citrix ADC, Gateway abnormal traffic towards internal network
 - Do not assume that login will be triggered (it's not required to exploit)
- Layered defense apply the same blocking and monitoring logic on other inline traffic gateways
- Citrix ADC / Gateway network access review wide open to internal network?
- Watch for the release of the patch and apply quickly



Thank You!

Questions?

http://isc.sans.edu/slack

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