

Domain Fronting FTW!

Why you could and should use domain fronting on engagements



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Who Am I?

- Currently:
 - Federal contractor, threat hunting and threat detection analytics
 - Research and emulate threats and techniques for customers
 - Aspiring pen tester
 - SANS 504 Mentor/Advisory Board
 - NoVA Hackers
- Formerly:
 - Satellite terminal operator, firewall tech support, network engineer
 - IT systems engineer/administrator
 - Enterprise security analyst/defender


Overview

- Objective: Demystify the technique, discuss issues
- Background
 - CDNs/CSPs
- Domain Fronting
 - Technical details
 - Use cases
 - Identification
 - History
 - In the News
 - Risks
 - How/When to use it
 - Future

Content Delivery Networks


- Level set on CDNs/CSPs
 - Crucial to understanding Domain Fronting
- Meets business needs:
 - Localized delivery of content (decentralized)
 - Scalability
 - Resilience

Content Delivery Networks



Content Delivery Networks

- Get MOAR memes/cat pics faster!



Content Delivery Networks

- CDNs:
 - Get content to the user faster and in larger quantities
 - Images, videos, ads, scripts, web elements etc.
 - Coalesces the bits in the browser
- Performance, load balancing, caching
- Manipulates “normal” DNS behavior, pointing clients to provider edge nodes
 - “DNS Gerrymandering”
 - Leads to other issues
- Essentially inserts a Man-in-the-Middle between client and server
 - Introduces risk


What is Domain Fronting?

- An undocumented feature of Content Delivery Networks and Cloud Service Providers that allows clients to proxy web traffic through them covertly
- Uses different destinations at different layers
- Combined with encryption = dangerous
- Abuses the way CDNs/CSPs redirect traffic
- A topic of much controversy
- Introduces significant risk for organizational networks

What is Domain Fronting?

- Seminal paper on the topic:
 - [Blocking-resistant Communication Through Domain Fronting](#)
- Several good demos/articles (at the end)
- [MITRE ATT&CK](#)
- [APT 29](#)

What is Domain Fronting?



Fun with Headers – What Routers See

IP HEADER

SOURCE IP ADDRESS: 1.2.3.4

DESTINATION IP ADDRESS: 5.6.7.8



TCP HEADER

<FIELDS>


TLS CLIENT HELLO

SERVER NAME INDICATION: www.totallysafe.com




<ENCRYPTED HTTP DATA>

Fun with Headers – What Servers & Clients See




Fun with Headers – What Servers & Clients See



Requirements

- Co-location on service provider's network
 - The “fronted” domain must exist on the provider's network
 - Attack machine with listener
 - Alternatively, a bridge/proxy
- Browser/script/tool that allows for SNI/HTTP Host Header manipulation
- Little to no coding required
 - Cobalt Strike
 - PowerShell Empire
 - Possible:
 - Metasploit
 - Python
 - PowerShell

Infrastructure



Use Cases

- Political dissidents, reporters, etc. in heavily censored nations
 - Circumvention of censorship, anti-privacy/anti-free speech controls
- Messaging:
 - Open Whisper apps (WhatsApp, Signal)
 - Telegram
- Proxy networks:
 - Tor (via Meek), Psiphon, Lantern, etc.
- Bad guys exploit this behavior to bypass controls
 - Command and Control, egress, data exfiltration
 - Web proxies, IDS, reputation and blacklist filtering
 - APT29/Cozy Bear/The Dukes (2015)
- And you!

Identification

- TLS Proxy
 - Almost nobody does it
 - May or may not be feasible
- Standard C2/Exfiltration detections in cloud-based traffic:
 - Block the service provider (Ha!)
 - Internet whitelisting
 - Detect beacons, high producer-to-consumer ratios, long-running, high-volume otherwise “weird” connections
 - Cross-reference, test “frontable” domain lists with web proxy logs/flow data
 - Find other ways to fingerprint services (like TLS cipher list signatures)
- Standard host-based detections/controls
 - Application whitelisting
 - CLI logging, shell history, etc.

Fronting History (I)

- 2012: Bryce Boe blog post proves that SNI and HTTP need not agree
- 2014: Meek plugin for Tor uses “Domain Fronting”
- 2015: Documented in a white paper
- 2015: APT29 used in large scale breach
- 2016: Fireeye/Mandiant @ShmooCon and @DerbyCon 2016 reported on APT 29’s use during a 2015 breach
- 2016: Open Whisper announces fronting support using Google, Amazon CloudFront, S3, Azure, Cloudflare, Fastly and Akamai

Fronting History (2)

- January 2017: Optiv researchers blogged about fronting using Cobalt Strike
- February 2017: Raphael Mudge demos fronting using Cobalt Strike via Malleable C2
- April 2018: Google kills fronting on App Engine
- April 2018: Amazon kills fronting on CloudFront
- May 2018: Privacy advocates petition Google and Amazon to allow Domain Fronting
- May 2018: Amazon informs Open Whisper that they are in violation of AWS Service Terms and threatens to suspend the account

In The News

- “Google kills off domain fronting – and so secure comms just got tougher”
– April 2018
- “Amazon blocks domain fronting, threatens to shut down Signal’s account”
– May 2018
- “Domain fronting has a dwindling future” – July 2018
- “Digital Rights Groups Ask Congress for Help as Russia Ramps up Its War on Telegram” – May 2018
- “Amazon Bends the Knee to Autocrats, Threatens to Cut Off Signal for Using Anti-Censorship Technique” – May 2018
- “Lawmakers call on Amazon and Google to reconsider ban on domain fronting” – July 2018

The Risks

- Clients:
 - It's illegal in some cases
- Defenders:
 - Perimeter network tools have no clue where the traffic is actually going
 - Risk acceptance by trusting the provider
- Service Providers:
 - Complicit in unintentional web proxy-like behavior
 - Liability
- Black hats/penetration testers:
 - Winning!



To Fix or Not to Fix?

- Do nothing:
 - Good for the innocent, bad for the ignorant
- Organizations/enterprises:
 - Poses a real security risk
- Service Providers:
 - The immediate power to change Fronting
 - Disallow SNI/HTTP Host Header mismatches
 - Shut down bridges
- IETF:
 - Update TLS RFC to move the HTTP Host Header outside the encrypted payload
 - Remove the HTTP Host Header (replace with the SNI field value)
 - TLS 1.3 is moving in the opposite direction

When To Use It?

- Use maturity as your guide
- The height of stealth:
 - Use only as required
 - Don't front unless you need to
- May not be a critical finding
 - Not a lot they can do about it
 - Still raises awareness

Why Use It?

- To accurately model the threats to your clients
- To draw more attention to the issue
- If the issue arises in more places, something will happen (eventually)

The Future of Fronting

- Probably will not last forever
- Eventually all respectable service providers will kill it
- A step towards a 100% attributable Internet
 - Scary!
- People will find other ways around controls
 - Censors will fight those too
- RFCs will continue to favor privacy
 - TLS 1.3 moves everything after the “Hello” messages into the encrypted payload
 - Encrypted SNI coming soon (already implemented in BoringSSL)

Wrap-Up

- Plan of Action:
 - Everyone: Learn it (risks vs. costs)
 - Educate others
- Formulate a strategy and implement
 - Defenders: Detect it
 - Pen Testers: Use it
- Voice your opinion

Sources/Further Reading

- [Bryce Boe blog](#)
- [Tor Meek documentation](#)
- [Vincent Yiu Write-up](#)
- [Beau Bullock, Ralph May demo \(Tradecraft Security Weekly\)](#)
- [CyberArk Write-up](#)
- [Raphael Mudge/Cobalt Strike Write-up](#)
- [Optiv blog post](#)
- [Fireeye/Mandiant blog](#)
- [Fireeye/Mandiant ShmooCon Talk](#)
- [Mitre ATT&CK](#)
- [IETF TLS 1.3](#)
- [IETF ESNI Draft](#)
- [Signal blog post](#)

Thank you!

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