## CIRT-Level Response to Advanced Persistent Threat





Richard Bejtlich


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
#### Introduction


- Bejtlich ("bate-lik") biography
  - General Electric, (07-present)
  - TaoSecurity (05-07)
  - ManTech (04-05)
  - Foundstone (02-04)
  - Ball Aerospace (01-02)
  - Captain at US Air Force CERT (98-01)
  - Lt at Air Intelligence Agency (97-98)



- Tao of Network Security Monitoring: Beyond Intrusion
   Detection (solo, Addison-Wesley, Jul 04)
- Extrusion Detection: Security Monitoring for Internal Intrusions (solo, Addison-Wesley, Nov 05)
- Real Digital Forensics (co-author, Addison-Wesley, Sep 05)
- Contributed to <u>Incident Response</u>, <u>2nd Ed</u> and <u>Hacking</u> <u>Exposed</u>, <u>4th Ed</u>
- TaoSecurity Blog (http://taosecurity.blogspot.com)









## Assumptions

- You are an APT victim.
- You care.
- You have hope.

Remember Red, hope is a good thing, maybe the best of things, and no good thing ever dies...

I hope I can make it across the border. I hope to see my friend and shake his hand. I hope the Pacific is as blue as it has been in my dreams.

I hope.

- Andy, The Shawshank Redemption







### **Critical Themes**

- Prevention eventually fails.
- Persistent threats never give up.
- Winning does not mean preventing compromise. Rather:
  - Increase \$/MB



Predict next move



Track adversary change



Intrusion suppression





## Favorite Kris Harms APT Quotes (FIRST 2010)

- "Compliance is the floor upon which you're going to fall when you get hacked."
- "Today a B [grade] is not good enough."
- "Do not get in a battle over knowledge of Windows with an intruder. You will lose."
- "Lesley Stahl, I pwn your wireless."



http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=3538299n



### First Hour after D-Zero

- Document everything.
- Change communication patterns.
- Activate your IR plan.

D-Zero + 1 hour



## First Day after D-Zero

- Switch to alternative computing platforms.
- Implement trustworthy communication.
- Inventory security data.

D-Zero + 1 day



#### First Week after D-Zero

- Decide to enlist external help.
- Deliver initial briefing to decision makers.
- Analyze available security evidence.
- Begin deploying additional instrumentation.

D-Zero + 1 week



### First Month after D-Zero

- Determine incident scope.
- Evaluate effectiveness of security instrumentation.
- Plan remediation.

D-Zero + 1 month



#### First Year after D-Zero

- Evaluate IR capability effectiveness
- Institutionalize counter-APT ops.
- Develop and embed counter-APT improvements.
- Collaborate with peers.
- Expand security instrumentation.
- Hire help.

D-Zero + 1 year

### Second Year after D-Zero


- Create Red-Blue Team.
- Develop security intelligence capability.
- Contribute to industry counter-APT work.
- Continue hiring help.

D-Zero + 2 years

## Containment vs Honeynet?

- Reasons to not immediately contain/disconnect victims when you are new to counter-APT ops:
  - Scope of incident likely unknown.
  - Disconnecting victims removes intelligence source.
  - Adversary will notice and change tools, tactics, and procedures.
- When to start disconnecting? When you meet your win criteria.

## Suggested CIRT Structure





## Hiring Priorities

- <u>Incident Handlers</u> subject matter experts who will establish early credibility and competency
- <u>Event Analysts</u> 24x7 coverage to support more routine work
- <u>Incident Analysts</u> assume the natural balance between IH and EA work
- <u>Support team</u> transfer design, build, and run activities from the IRC to Support
- Threat cell profile adversaries and professionalize reporting
- <u>Blue team</u> provide collaborative assessment assistance
- <u>Technical Assistance Group</u> internal security consulting
- <u>Incident Coordinator</u> quality control for IRC operations
- Red team adversary replication and simulation

## Peer incident detection and response teams

Company	Team Name	Employees	Team FTE	Contractors	FTE per EC	FTE + Contractor per EC	CIRT FTE per 10,000 employees
General Electric	GE-CIRT	296,000	12	3	.000041	.000051	0.41
Aerospace 1 <sup>1</sup>	IRT	XXX,000	11	0	.000073	.000073	0.73
Aerospace 2 <sup>1</sup>	NOSC / SecEng	XX,000	13	0	.000289	.000289	2.89
DIB 1 <sup>1</sup>	Sec Ops	XXX,000	11	1	.000088	.000096	0.88
DIB 2 <sup>1</sup>	CSIRT	XX,000	5	2	.000076	.000106	0.76
DIB 3 <sup>1</sup>	DIB3-CIRT	XXX,000	50	0	.000345	.000345	3.44
DIB 4 <sup>1</sup>	DIB4CERT	XX,000	42	2	.000575	.000603	5.75
Aerospace 3 <sup>1</sup>	IRT	X,000	2	0	.000500	.000500	5
Silicon Valley 1 <sup>3</sup>	CIRT	XX,000	24	0	.000366	.000366	3.66
Software Company 1 <sup>3</sup>	IRT	XX,000	41	0	.000442	.000442	4.42
Software Company 2 <sup>2</sup>	Sec Ops Center	X,000	15	0	.001875	.001875	18.75
Utility Company 1 <sup>2</sup>	Sec Ops Center	XX,000	16	0	.000800	.008000	8

5 IR per 10,000 employees •Average FTE per EC (AFPE): .000456

•Average FTE + Contractor per EC (AFCPE): .000462

•Implied GE-CIRT FTE for GE based on AFPE: 134 FTEs

•Implied GE-CIRT FTE for GE based on AFCPE: 136 FTEs +

Contractors


Sources

•2009 DSIE survey 1

•2008 EIMP project <sup>2</sup>

•2009 EIMP project <sup>3</sup>

# Incident Cycle



Note: GE-CIRT Components

### Questions?

### KNOW YOUR NETWORK BEFORE AN INTRUDER DOES

```
40.652146 10.145.15.100 -> 216.68.1.200 DNS Standard query A z3n.phatcamp.org 40.690278 10.142.1.89 -> 216.68.1.100 DNS Standard query A z3n.phatcamp.org 40.690291 10.142.1.89 -> 216.68.1.100 DNS Standard query A z3n.phatcamp.org 41.386313 10.145.15.98 -> 87.118.100.239 DNS Standard query A z3n.phatcamp.org 43.386117 10.145.15.100 -> 87.118.100.239 DNS Standard query A z3n.phatcamp.org 43.386248 10.145.15.100 -> 87.118.100.239 DNS Standard query A z3n.phatcamp.org 44.568156 10.142.1.97 -> 10.145.15.100 DNS Standard query A z3n.phatcamp.org 46.258206 10.142.1.89 -> 87.118.100.239 DNS Standard query A z3n.phatcamp.org 46.258210 10.142.1.89 -> 87.118.100.239 DNS Standard query A z3n.phatcamp.org 46.258292 10.142.1.89 -> 87.118.100.239 DNS Standard query A z3n.phatcamp.org 46.258306 10.142.1.89 -> 87.118.100.239 DNS Standard query A z3n.phatcamp.org 48.062938 10.142.1.89 -> 87.118.100.239 DNS Standard query A z3n.phatcamp.org 48.062938 10.142.1.97 -> 10.142.1.89 DNS Standard query A z3n.phatcamp.org
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