DLL Hijacking Like a Boss!

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$whoami

- Proud A+ certification holder
- Aspiring CEH
  - Hope to pass on my 3rd try next week
- Took computer classes in high school
  - 20 years ago - expert in QBASIC and Windows 3.1
- 11 yrs experience as a sandwich artist
  - Gives me unique perspective on dealing with business units who want “made to order” security solutions
Agenda

• Motivations
• What are DLL Sideload ing and Hijacking
• Auditing Methods
• Hands on fun
• Practical defenses
• 100% fewer shirtless photos than John Strand’s presentation
Why bother?

• Stealthy persistence technique for malware since most antivirus sucks at detecting DLLs
  – AV looks at the application, which is most often whitelisted and signed

• Attackers can make your multi-million dollar security investment obsolete
  – DLL Hijacking technique has been around for years, but AV still sucks
  – Executable whitelisting bypass
Is anybody doing this?

• Rendition sees this technique used in most Chinese APT compromises
  – As a pentester, if you aren’t at least as good as Chinese APT then pack up and go home

• The best way to emulate a nation state threat is to find attackers who hack like a nation state
DLL Hijacking

• Import address tables don’t specify a full path
• Hijacking abuses DLL search paths
• May offer privilege escalation when combined with weak directory permissions
  – Use icacls.exe to determine if you can write to the directory of a system process (e.g. a service)
  – Important note: I can’t see “icacls” without thinking about the work “cankles”
    • Now you’ll think of it too 😊
Where’s Waldo?

• Sometimes a program may try to load a DLL that doesn’t even exist on the system
  – Legacy code, checking for an available plugin, who knows why
• When the DLL fails to load, the code takes another path
  – Rob Lee calls this “Ghost DLL Injection”
• If you supply your own DLL, the app blindly loads it for you
Rules of Fight Club

• Safe DLL Search mode (on by default) moves the current directory to the end of the search order
  – Loading DLLs from working directory is dangerous
• Any DLL explicitly in the KnownDLLs registry key is not searched for since it is “known” to be located in the system directory
Registry Keys

- **KnownDLLs** - HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\KnownDLLs

- **Safe DLL Search** - HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\SafeDllSearchMode

- **CWDIllegalInDllSearch** - HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\CWDIllegalInDllSearch
2. The directory from which the application loaded.
3. System directory (C:\Windows\System32).
4. The 16-bit system directory (C:\Windows\System).
5. The Windows directory (C:\Windows).
6. Directories that are listed in the PATH variables.
Default DLL Search Path (SafeSearch)

1. The directory from which the application loaded.
2. System directory (C:\Windows\System32).
3. The 16-bit system directory (C:\Windows\System).
5. The Current Directory.
6. Directories that are listed in the PATH variables.
What’s the common threat(t|d)?

• Either way, %PATH% is checked for the DLL if not found in another directory
• That’s why we care significantly about DLL not found error messages seen in tool output
• Indicates that the application tried to load a DLL but it wasn’t found
• Add a DLL and injection frequently follows
WinObj Shows KnownDLLs
Always know your KnownDLLs

- KnownDLLs don’t use the typical search path
- They are always found in the system directory
- In some version of Windows, KnownDLLs are pre-loaded at system start
- KnownDLLs are not static across all versions of Windows
- The same application not vulnerable on XP may be vulnerable on Windows 8
KnownDLLs Strangeness

• Windows allows users to exclude some DLLs from KnownDLLs processing
  – Allows overrides of default behavior

• Don’t rely on defaults in customer environments
  – Many poorly coded applications remove (or add) values to KnownDLLs
  – Tend to be custom apps for a customer environment
Testing for “Ghost DLL” injection

• Ghost DLL injection is hard to audit for completely since sometimes the DLL load request is conditional

• Audit methods
  – Run strings looking for DLLs not in IAT
  – Run code with a debugger attached and set a breakpoint on LoadLibrary
  – Use gflags with loader hints
  – Reverse engineer with IDA Pro
Tools for Auditing DLL Injection

- HDMoore’s DLL Hijack Audit Kit
- Dependency Walker
- SecurityXPloded DLL Hijack Auditor
- Procmon **This is what you want**
- Sxstrace.exe
- Gflags + Windbg
HDMoore DIY for file extensions

• HDMoore wrote an auditing kit for DLL hijacking that generates test cases and uses procmon to find exploitable test cases
• Runs two batch scripts, one to generate cases and another to examine procmon output
• Note that this does not find all exploitable conditions, only those for default file extension handlers
HDMoore DIY for file extensions (2)

- Used this to successfully find some vulnerable programs in a Windows 8.1 instance I use all the time

- Pros:
  - Very easy to use

- Cons:
  - Only tests default handlers and even then may be impacted by DLL loading delays
  - Does not test plugin dependencies
HDMoore DIY for file extensions (3)

• Ouch…
DLL Referenced != Always Loaded

• Wordpad.exe looks really bad, looking for mapi32.dll in the local directory
  – But it never loads the DLL from there
• Requires more investigation with a debugger to see in which circumstances it is exploitable
  – Beyond the scope of this presentation
Dependency Walker

• Dependency Walker (depends.exe) recursively walks the DLLs used by an application
• This will show you the location from which DLLs are loaded into an application
• Perhaps the most interesting are those which are not found
Dependency Walker (2)

• Privilege Escalation
  – Admin tools usually run with elevated permissions
  – Check service autoruns for other auto-elevation possibilities

• Pros
  – Easily finds missing DLLs (and those not in %PATH%)

• Cons
  – Does not address all runtime DLL loading scenarios
Dependency Walker vs. Argon.exe

Warning: At least one delay-load dependency module was not found.
Warning: At least one module has an unresolved import due to a missing export function in a delay-load dependent module.
The DLL Hijack Auditor from SecurityXploded offers another way to search for vulnerable programs.

Was found to not be as reliable as Dependency Walker or HDMoore Audit kit

But it’s easier to use
Now click on 'Report' button to get the Audit Report for App - Wordpad.exe

Vuln Test is Finished. No Vulnerable Dlls found for App - Wordpad.exe
Going Native with Procmon

• Muralidharan Vadivel (opensecurityresearch.com) has a great article on auditing for “ghost dlls” using ProcMon

• Search for operation CreateFile and result of “Name not found”

• The LoadImage operation is also useful to filter for detecting missing DLLs
Fun With Procmon

• Let’s do a quick demo here

• Fun application called NetBalancer
  – Network throttling at the granularity of individual applications

• Extra cool because it’s not just an application, it runs a service
Setting Up Procmon

The image shows a filter configuration in Process Monitor. The filter is set to display entries where the Result is unknown, with the following conditions:

- **Process Name**: SeriousBit.NetBalancer.Service.exe - Include
- **Operation**: CreateFile - Include
- **Result**: SUCCESS - Include
- **Path**: ends with .dll - Include
- **Process Name**: Procmon.exe - Exclude
- **Process Name**: Procxps.exe - Exclude
- **Process Name**: Autoruns.exe - Exclude
Oh yeah!

• Pick your poison
• This digitally signed application will load any of these DLLs for us
What’s the big deal?

• Malware can persist now by loading a malicious DLL in the legitimate service.
• This totally screws with forensics and IR professionals who like to look for service anomalies.
Gflags for the win!

• Gflags is a tool included with the Windows Debugging Tools
• Gflags is great for finding memory errors but is also great for finding DLL issues
• The sls flag (show loader snaps) shows loader data, including dll’s loaded, which directory they are loaded from, SxS redirection, and functions imported
Finding craziness with gflags

- Run glags.exe –i tested.exe +sls
- Load the app in windbg
- Save the data to a text file
- To find attempts to load DLLs, search the output for FindOrMapDependency
Debug Output

• Look for
  – LdrpFindOrMapDependency
  – LdrpFindOrMapDll
  – LdrpFindKnownDll

```
0f6c:0e84 @ 03538062 - LdrpFindOrMapDependency - ENTER: DLL name: msvcr1.dll.
0f6c:0e84 @ 03538062 - LdrpFindOrMapDll - ENTER: DLL name: msvcr1.dll
0f6c:0e84 @ 03538062 - LdrpFindKnownDll - ENTER: DLL name: msvcr1.dll
0f6c:0e84 @ 03538062 - LdrpFindKnownDll - RETURN: Status: 0x00000000
0f6c:0e84 @ 03538062 - LdrpMapViewOfSection - ENTER: DLL name: C:\Windows\system32\msvcr1.dll
ModLoad: 764c0000 76583000  C:\Windows\system32\msvcr1.dll
```
Sxstrace.exe

• If you don’t want all the detailed information from a debugger and gflags but still want data from SxS loads, sxstrace (builtin) can help

• Tracks specific information about the versions of DLLs loaded from the WinSxS directory
  – And other locations where it may attempt to load a DLL from
Sxstrace in Action

C:\jake>sxstrace trace -logfile:tracefile.etl
Tracing started. Trace will be saved to file tracefile.etl.
Press Enter to stop tracing...

C:\jake>sxstrace parse -logfile:tracefile.etl -outfile:tracefile.txt
Parsing log file tracefile.etl...
Parsing finished! Output saved to file tracefile.txt.

INFO: Begin assembly probing.
  INFO: Did not find the assembly in WinSxS.
  INFO: Attempt to probe manifest at C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_32\Microsoft.Windows.Common-Controls\6
  INFO: Attempt to probe manifest at C:\Program Files\windows nt\Accessories\en-US\Microsoft.Windows
  INFO: Attempt to probe manifest at C:\Program Files\windows nt\Accessories\en-US\Microsoft.Windows
  INFO: Attempt to probe manifest at C:\Program Files\windows nt\Accessories\en-US\Microsoft.Windows
  INFO: Attempt to probe manifest at C:\Program Files\windows nt\Accessories\en-US\Microsoft.Windows
  INFO: Did not find manifest for culture en-US.
Practical Defenses

• Audit the software you install on your machines
  – Especially the stuff that your in-house “developers” create
• Don’t rely on only automated tools, they don’t catch everything
• Hire a pentester who knows more than nmap and nessus (I think that’s everyone in this room)
  – And scope the test with enough time to uncover the same bugs determined attackers will find
Practical Defenses (2)

• Always check permissions on all directories in the system %PATH% variable
  – World write permissions are bad here for other obvious reasons too

• .Net developers: be specific in your manifests

• Windows developers: call LoadLibrary with explicit path, don’t rely on the system
  – Or call SetDllDirectory/AddDllDirectory
Questions?

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