

Official communication
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What is the Stuxnet and what can it do?

# Stuxnet is a high sophisticated malware that targets very specific configurations

Affected system types

Stuxnet could infect systems with

- Windows operation systems (Windows XP and higher)
- SIMATIC automation software WinCC SCADA or PCS 7 and S7-plc
- → No damage to production or failed processes known so far
- → Up-to-date virus scanner reliably detect and eliminate the malware
- → Malware has been removed in all infected systems known to Siemens

Highly sophisticated

The highly sophisticated malware Stuxnet was probably developed by a "team of experts", because of the required knowhow about IT, industrial controllers, engineering skills and details about a specific project configuration

Specific plant configuration

Stuxnet requires a very specific environment (certain plc blocks):


- Under certain conditions, it might influence the processing of operations
- But: The behaviour has not yet been verified in test environments or real plants

Malware outside communication

Potentially transfers data into and out of the system – but this has not yet been proven, especially as the target servers are down and not reachable



How will it affect a plant or system?





Why is Siemens target of this malware?

# Malware targets specific plant configuration

Infected PC: Ten thousands

Infected systems with SIMATIC automation software known to Siemens: only 15


Number of damaged plants known to Siemens: 0!

- Ten thousands of PC are infected, but
- Only a very small percentage is part of an automation environment
  - → that explains the low number of known infected automation environments
- Malware is obviously targetting a specific process or project and not a particular brand or process technology
- All known infected systems
  - ✓ have been cleaned
  - malware was not activated
- Future infections unlikely because malware pattern is being detected by up-to-date virus scanners.



How are my SIMATIC S7 controllers affected?

# Malware tries to download trojan plc code blocks



#### **Details**

- Malware carries own block (DB 890, FC 1865, FC 1874) and checks whether they are available in the target plc. If they already available, the malware does nothing
- If the blocks are not available, the malware downloads this blocks to the plc and links them into the program sequence
- If you identify those blocks in your plc but did not have them before in your project, Siemens urgently recommends restoring the plant control system to its original state.



What has Siemens done to reduce the risk to plants?

# Many joint activities and results since first appearance of malware

but the white paper security concept is already available since years!

2010 2008 July August September October 7nd September Begin of october 15th july 2nd August <u>April 2008 →</u> White Paper Security Concept Established expert Microsoft patch 15 infected systems Information to the 5 of them in germany closed operating system regions (slide set, letter team security breach to avoid template) Test environment further infiltrations → Isolation of malware 17th September 19th july Communicated: Malware 4th August First communication to might affect only specific internals and customers Update of description configurations (Siemens Advisory of how to identify and Targeted plc blocks: Site) remove the malware DB890, FC1865,1874 22nd july Description + Tool 18th August 30nd September Detect + Remove Security Update (Tool) 12.000 downloads of malware w/o influence to security tool plant operation Infected: 4 / Damaged: 0 Infected: 12 / Damaged: 0 Infected: 15 / Damaged: 0 Infected: 15 / Damaged: 0 Security concept, Customer Support

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What has Siemens done against Stuxnet

# Siemens is dealing very seriously with this issue

#### Internal

- Since years Siemens runs a **security**lab as part of system test
- Established technical team of experts
  - Isolation of malware
  - Forcing activation of malware
- ✓ Joint activities with **Siemens CERT**
- Informed regional and head quarters sales force via webinars, newsletter, mails, phone,
- Close Attention of Top Management


Has also the customer done all he can?

#### **External**

- Siemens Advisory Site
- Security White Paper for PCS 7 and WinCC available since years
- ✓ Used connections to **Microsoft** to get a "out-of-band patch"
- Joint activities with **Anti-Virus-Tool**suppliers: Symantec, TrendMicro, McAfee
- ✓ Pro-Active communication from the very beginning related to malware
- Interview with magazines
- ✓Informed all known infected projects pro-actively about updates



Will this happen again in the future?





# Thank you for your attention!

# Siemens AG

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